State v. Rocha-Ramos
Decision Date | 07 July 1999 |
Citation | 985 P.2d 217,161 Or. App. 306 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Manuel ROCHA-RAMOS, Appellant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Lester E. Seto, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.
Laura S. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Before EDMONDS, Presiding Judge, and DEITS, Chief Judge,1 and ARMSTRONG, Judge.
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance, ORS 475.992(4)(b) (1995), that was entered after a stipulated facts trial. He assigns error to the trial court's denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress evidence.2 We reverse.
In its order denying defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
If there is constitutionally sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings of historical fact regarding a ruling on a motion to suppress, we are bound by them. State v. Ehly, 317 Or. 66, 75, 854 P.2d 421 (1993). If such findings "are not made on all pertinent issues and there is evidence from which such facts could be decided more than one way, we will presume that the facts were decided in a manner consistent with the court's ultimate conclusion." Id. Based on those findings, we make our own determination of law. Id.
Defendant first argues that the officers' initial entry into the apartment was unlawful because there was no consent for them to enter. In the alternative, he asserts that, even if the officers had valid consent to enter the apartment, their unlawful seizure of him by refusing to permit him to use the bathroom exceeded the scope of that consent. The state counters:
We begin by addressing the issue of whether defendant consented to the officers' entry into his apartment. The trial court found that, when the officers arrived at defendant's apartment in the course of a drug investigation, the door was open and that they asked for and were granted permission to enter. Because the trial court's finding that consent was granted is supported by evidence in the record, we are bound by it.4 State v. Larson, 141 Or.App. 186, 196, 917 P.2d 519, rev. den. 324 Or. 229, 925 P.2d 908 (1996). Based on the trial court's findings, we conclude that defendant voluntarily consented to the officers' entry into the apartment.
We now turn to the issue of the lawfulness of the officers' subsequent actions after entering the apartment. In State v. Holmes, 311 Or. 400, 406-07, 813 P.2d 28 (1991), the Supreme Court identified three types of police-citizen encounters and described the justification necessary to support each type.
Thus, the determination of whether a restraint of a person's liberty constitutes a seizure under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, depends on the facts of each case. For instance, in State v. Johnson, 105 Or.App. 587, 590-91, 805 P.2d 747 (1991), we held that, when an officer requested that the defendant step out from behind a bush and walk 15 feet toward the officer, he altered the defendant's course of travel and converted a non-coercive encounter into a stop by his show of authority.
Here, defendant argues that he was unlawfully seized when the officers first refused to allow him to use the bathroom and before the officers observed him placing a baggie in his mouth. The trial court found:
In addition, Officer Beaver testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress:
On cross-examination, Officer Beaver testified:
Based on Beaver's uncontradicted testimony,5 we conclude that defendant was stopped within the meaning of Article I, section 9. After defendant stood up and asked to use the bathroom, the officers not only asked him to sit down, but Beaver blocked his route of travel. Consequently, Beaver's show of authority interfered with defendant's freedom of movement similar to what occurred in Johns...
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State v. Hall
...occurred after the unlawful stop and its effect, if any, on defendant's decision to consent. As we indicated in State v. Rocha-Ramos, 161 Or. App. 306, 313, 985 P.2d 217 (1999), "[t]he trial court did not consider the issue of whether the officers' observations constituted an exploitation o......
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State v. Harper
...and, therefore, made no findings as to reasonableness. See, e.g., Hall, 183 Or.App. at 52, 56,50 P.3d 1258; State v. Rocha-Ramos, 161 Or.App. 306, 311-12, 985 P.2d 217 (1999). Unlike those cases, however, the record here is incomplete; part of the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, ......
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State v. Stock, D0300780M.
...are often used in such a manner. Although small plastic bags are very frequently used to carry drugs, see, e.g., State v. Rocha-Ramos, 161 Or.App. 306, 985 P.2d 217 (1999) (officer testified that drugs are often packaged in such bags); State v. Hester, 153 Or.App. 247, 956 P.2d 1052, rev. d......
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State v. McMillan
...explicit and implicit factual findings as binding as long as there is evidence in the record to support them. State v. Rocha-Ramos, 161 Or.App. 306, 309, 985 P.2d 217 (1999). On review, we determine whether the trial court applied the proper legal principles to those findings to reach a cor......