State v. Rodden

• Decision Date: 14 April 1987
• Docket Number: No. 67253,67253
• Citation: 728 S.W.2d 212
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. James Edward RODDEN, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 212

728 S.W.2d 212

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. James Edward RODDEN, Appellant.

No. 67253.

Supreme Court of Missouri,

En Banc.

April 14, 1987.

Rehearing Denied May 19, 1987.

Lee M. Nation, Kansas City, for appellant.

William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., John M. Morris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

ROBERTSON, Judge.

Appellant, James Edward Rodden, was convicted of the capital murder of Terry Trunnel. § 565.001, RSMo 1978. ¹ The jury recommended a sentence of death, finding that the murder was committed while appellant was engaged in the commission of another capital murder, § 565.012.2(2), ² and that the murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture or depravity of mind, § 565.012.2(7). ³ Appellant appeals his conviction and sentence, raising five points of error: (1) the evidence is not sufficient to support the verdict; (2) the death penalty in this case is barred by collateral estoppel; (3) the trial court erred in sustaining the State's challenges for cause to certain members of the venire panel; (4) the jury was "death-qualified" in violation of appellant's due process rights; and (5) the death sentence is excessive and disproportionate.

Because of the sentence imposed, this Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Mo. Const. art. V, § 3. We affirm both the judgment and the sentence.

I.

A.

The evidence against appellant is largely circumstantial. Appellant urges that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for acquittal on the ground that the evidence adduced at trial was not irreconcilable with any reasonable theory of his innocence, and therefore, that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.

On review, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, affording the State all reasonable inferences from that evidence. State v. Guinan, 665 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Mo. banc 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 873, 105 S.Ct. 227, 83 L.Ed.2d 156 (1984).

This appeal is from the second of two trials resulting from the murders of Terry Trunnel and Joseph Arnold on December 6, 1983. A jury previously convicted appellant of the capital murder of Arnold and sentenced appellant to life imprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole for fifty years. This case focuses on appellant's conviction for the capital murder of Trunnel.

Because the verdict in this case rests on circumstantial evidence, the facts and circumstances upon which the State relies must be consistent with each other and with the State's hypothesis of appellant's guilt. The evidence must be inconsistent with any reasonable theory of appellant's innocence. State v. Goddard, 649 S.W.2d 882, 884 (Mo. banc 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 997, 104 S.Ct. 495, 78 L.Ed.2d 689 (1983). The circumstances need not, however, be absolutely conclusive of guilt, nor must they demonstrate the impossibility of innocence--the mere existence of other possible hypotheses is not sufficient to remove the case from the jury. Id.

Appellant's "reasonable theory of innocence" is the same as that offered at the Arnold trial: Arnold murdered Trunnel; appellant then killed Arnold in self-defense. He asserts here, as he did on appeal from his conviction for the murder of Arnold, that because the evidence introduced against him is explained by and is not inconsistent with this "reasonable theory of innocence," the State, in effect, did no more than prove his presence at and later departure from the crime scene.

B.

In August or September, 1983, appellant took up residence with Joseph Arnold at 24 West College Circle, Marshall, Missouri. Arnold occupied the southeast bedroom; appellant used the southwest bedroom.

On Monday evening, December 5, 1983, appellant went to a local bar in Marshall. There, he met Terry Trunnel. Trunnel needed a ride home; appellant offered to take her there. En route, appellant asked Trunnel if she would like to smoke marijuana. Trunnel said yes. Appellant took Trunnel to the 24 West College Circle apartment; Arnold was already there. Appellant introduced Arnold to Trunnel.

It is at this point that appellant's recounting ⁴ of the events of that night--the basis for his theory of innocence--comes into conflict with the State's evidence. Because appellant challenges the State's refutation of his theory of innocence, we have chosen to set out appellant's story and the State's evidence in a juxtaposed manner.

At approximately 9:00 a.m., December 6, Trooper Dwight Hartung responded to a reported accident at the home of Ferrell Lewis, located in Purdin. Upon arrival, Trooper Hartung saw a blue Ford lodged under the porch roof of the Lewis house and a man lying on an ambulance stretcher just inside the front door. Hartung radioed the Ford's license plate number to patrol headquarters, and was advised that the vehicle was registered to Robert Arnold. The man on the stretcher identified himself to Officer Hartung as "James Rodden."

By his own account, appellant had left the apartment in Arnold's car, heading north toward Iowa. When he got as far as Purdin, however, he began feeling "real hot and real lightheaded," lost consciousness and drove into the front of Ferrell Lewis' house. Appellant was taken by ambulance to the Brookfield, Missouri, hospital.

After the ambulance departed, Trooper Hartung looked inside the Ford and saw a wooden-handled butcher knife, several beer cans and a bottle marked "Christian Brothers Brandy." Hartung secured the car and left for the hospital.

Appellant received medical attention at the hospital in Brookfield, Missouri. After receiving treatment, police officers took appellant to the Brookfield Police Department. There, appellant gave police permission to search the impounded Ford. Items removed from the Ford included a butcher knife, a fleece seat cover, a green bed sheet, a bottle of Christian Brothers brandy, an ice scraper, and blood scrapings from a metal tool box.

C.

Appellant, frustrated by Jones' rejection, arrived at the apartment at 1:53 a.m. He called Jones a final time, warning her that she, and he, would not live out the night.

Other than appellant, only Arnold could have killed Trunnel. Appellant's own story suggests that Trunnel disrobed prior to appellant's 1:53 a.m. arrival; the location and undamaged condition of her clothing reasonably infers that Trunnel did not disrobe under conditions of physical violence. Trunnel died between 5:00 and 5:30 a.m., at least three hours after appellant arrived.

The only believable evidence is that Trunnel was killed in Arnold's bedroom and dragged, cords dangling from her body already dead, into appellant's bedroom. Arnold's body was thrown aside to allow Trunnel to be dragged away. She died as a result of an exceedingly brutal and violent struggle--a struggle so violent that one stab fractured her upper arm bone.

It is impossible to believe that a struggle of this nature between Arnold and Trunnel could be mistaken for "making love" or escape the attention of appellant as he sat calmly in the living room "smoking half a joint."

The only believable evidence and the only reasonable inferences which can be taken from that evidence are not only inconsistent with any theory of innocence but consistent with the State's theory of guilt.

The evidence of appellant's actions after departing Arnold's apartment also reasonably tends to rebut any theory of innocence.

First, by his own admission, appellant attempted to destroy the crime scene by fire. Significantly, the evidence shows that combustible liquid was poured on Trunnel's body and ignited at several points. The jury was not required to believe appellant's explanation that he simply "wanted it to be a bad dream" and to "make it go away." State v. Holt, 592 S.W.2d 759, 774 (Mo. banc 1980).

Second, by his own account, appellant was bleeding severely after the alleged assault by Arnold, and admitted that while he saw no signs of life, he was not certain that Terry Trunnel was dead. Nevertheless, appellant did not seek medical attention for himself or Trunnel, or notify anyone of what had allegedly happened. Instead, he fled the crime scene in Arnold's car, taking with him a butcher knife which bore the blood of one, and perhaps both, of the victims. ⁵ Appellant's flight ended only when he lost consciousness and crashed into Ferrell Lewis' porch at Purdin. Appellant's flight was admissible to show a consciousness of guilt contrary to any theory of innocence. State v. Kilgore, 447 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Mo.1969); State v. Summers, 660 S.W.2d 772, 773 (Mo.App.1983); State v. Logan, 617 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Mo.App.1981).

Third, appellant told Gloria Washam and Dr. Dixon that he had injured his hand while changing a tire. This, of course, was untrue. Exculpatory statements, when proven false, evidence a consciousness of guilt and therefore bear directly on the issue of guilt or innocence. State v. Zerban, 412 S.W.2d 397, 399-400 (Mo.1967); State v. Ross, 606 S.W.2d 416, 425 (Mo.App.1980).

Facts, of course, do not speak for themselves. "They speak for or against competing theories." T. Sowell, A Conflict of Visions, 16 (1987). Based upon the facts and circumstances of this case, we find that the State's evidence and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict are consistent with each other and the State's theory of appellant's guilt. They are inconsistent with any reasonable theory of appellant's innocence. The jury properly found that appellant killed Terry Trunnel. Appellant's first point is therefore denied.

II.

Appellant was previously tried and convicted in the Circuit Court of Phelps County of the capital murder of Joseph Arnold. State v. Rodden, 713 S.W.2d 279 (Mo.App.1986). The jury in that case sentenced appellant to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for fifty years. Id. at 280. Prior to the present trial, appellant filed a motion to preclude the...