State v. Rodriquez
| Decision Date | 20 December 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 13821,13821 |
| Citation | 106 Idaho 30,674 P.2d 1029 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Richard A. RODRIQUEZ, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
John C. Lynn of Lynn, Scott & Hackney, Boise, for defendant-appellant.
David H. Leroy, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.
Richard Rodriquez has appealed from his judgment of conviction for second degree murder. His appeal raises several issues: (1) Did the trial court err in denying a motion for mistrial made by Rodriquez after the court refused to strike the testimony of a witness? (2) Did the court err in admitting the testimony of a detective offered in rebuttal to show that Rodriquez was not remorseful immediately after the killing? (3) Did the court err in denying Rodriquez' motion for a judgment of acquittal? And, (4) did the court err in refusing to grant a new trial after a juror submitted an affidavit stating that other jurors had pressured her into reaching a guilty verdict? We find that no prejudicial error occurred at Rodriquez' trial and that his conviction is supported by substantial, competent evidence. We thus affirm the conviction.
On December 30, 1979, Richard Rodriquez and George Wemm spent the afternoon together drinking beer. They went from bar to bar ending up at a tavern in Meridian, Idaho, known as the Hanging Tree.
Rodriquez testified that he and Wemm were brothers-in-law and usually got along well together. That night, at the Hanging Tree, they were talking, drinking and apparently having a good time until Rodriquez noticed his wife (Wemm's sister) seated at the bar. According to Rodriquez, his wife's presence at the bar angered him. He feared that a "bull decker" (a lesbian) was trying to "pick her up." Rodriquez approached his wife and demanded that she leave, but she refused and did her best to ignore him. Trying to get her attention, Rodriquez hit her in the back and started pulling her hair. One of the bartenders intervened to protect her, but soon Rodriquez and Wemm began fighting each other.
Their brief scuffle ended when two bartenders separated them. The bartenders told both men that they had to leave, and one of them escorted Wemm out the side door. Rodriquez remained in the bar for several more minutes. During this time he took off both his shirts--a sweatshirt and a T-shirt--but he put the sweatshirt back on. As he left the bar escorted by one of the bartenders, he was carrying his T-shirt wrapped around his right hand. When Rodriquez and the bartender went out the front door, they found Wemm, who was in a dazed condition, leaning against the wall of the building. Someone yelled an obscenity and Rodriquez lunged at Wemm, making a roundhouse swing with his right arm and striking Wemm in the chest. The bartender again intervened to break up what he thought was another fist fight. He told Rodriquez to leave, ushered him off the bar's property, and returned to find that Wemm had suffered a puncture wound in the chest. A few minutes later the police arrived, and Rodriquez returned to the bar and was arrested. The police discovered an open folding knife in a field across from the bar. Wemm later died as a result of a punctured heart.
At trial several witnesses testified concerning Rodriquez' behavior in the bar. All who testified said that Rodriquez was not drunk. No witnesses actually saw Rodriquez carrying a knife prior to the stabbing. The bartender who escorted Rodriquez out of the tavern was an eyewitness to the stabbing, but he too admitted that at no time did he actually see Rodriquez with a knife. Taking the stand in his own defense, Rodriquez admitted that the weapon found by the police belonged to him and that he had stabbed Wemm. He claimed, however, that he did not open the knife until after he got outside and that Wemm, who also carried a knife, had threatened to "stick" him. The police found Wemm's knife still in its sheath on his belt.
One of the state's witnesses was Lola Layne, the proprietor of the Hanging Tree. Layne testified that she arrived at the bar at the same time as the police and saw Rodriquez wandering about. She also related a brief conversation she then had with Rodriquez:
Q. What did you say to Mr. Rodriquez and what did he say to you.
A. He said, I replied by saying,
Rodriquez' attorney later moved to strike this portion of Layne's testimony on the ground that the state had failed to disclose this statement in responding to a discovery request. Counsel also pointed out that the statement tended to characterize Rodriquez as a troublemaker. The court denied Rodriquez' motion to strike and his subsequent motion for mistrial. Rodriquez renews his contentions on appeal. He argues that the failure to disclose the statement was prejudicial because the prosecution introduced it "out of the blue" at trial. Moreover, he argues that the statement was improper character evidence and that the witness' characterization of him as a troublemaker was highly prejudicial to his defense. He thus contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a mistrial.
Prior to and at the time of trial in this case, the old "Rules of Criminal Practice and Procedure" were in effect. Rule 16(a)(1) required disclosure of certain evidence and materials by the prosecution upon motion of a defendant. The prosecution was required to disclose "any relevant, oral statement made by the defendant whether before or after arrest to a peace officer, prosecuting attorney or his agent."
In response to Rodriquez' request for disclosure of "written, recorded and oral statements made by the defendant," the prosecution replied that the only statements that had been made by the defendant were oral, "as generally testified to at the preliminary hearing." Lola Layne did not testify at the preliminary hearing. Rodriquez thus argues that the prosecution's response to his discovery request was in bad faith since it led him to believe that any statements that might be introduced against him at trial had been revealed at the preliminary hearing. He contends that he was caught off guard when the prosecution offered Layne's testimony.
The trial court ruled that the state did not violate former rule 16(a)(1) by failing to disclose Rodriquez' oral statement to Layne since Layne was not "a peace officer, prosecuting attorney or his agent." We agree with this ruling. Rodriquez' statement to Layne did not fall within the ambit of former rule 16(a)(1), and the prosecution was not required to disclose it before trial. The state was required to, and did, furnish defendant's counsel with the name of Lola Layne as a potential state's witness. But the former rule specifically did not require the state to disclose any statements made by Lola Layne to "agents of the prosecuting attorney or to any official involved in the investigatory process of the case." (Rule 16(a)(2)(ii).)
Relying on State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 584 P.2d 1231 (1978), Rodriquez also contends that the court should have excluded Layne's testimony as improper character evidence. In Wrenn the state prosecuted two defendants for armed robbery. A police officer testified that at the time of the alleged robbery, the defendants were traveling in a stolen car. The court held that this evidence of unrelated criminal activity by the defendants should not have been admitted and it reversed the convictions. The court noted that evidence of a defendant's past criminal activity is only allowed to come before the jury in certain specific circumstances.
The decision in Wrenn does not apply directly to the case before us. The questionable testimony here did not concern prior criminal activity of the defendant. It is apparent, however, that the jury could have inferred from Layne's testimony that Rodriquez was a troublemaker, a bad character. It is a general rule that evidence of a defendant's bad character offered merely to show his propensity toward criminal activity is not admissible. Most often this rule comes into play, as in Wrenn, to preclude evidence concerning prior criminal acts. It is also applicable, however, to exclude any evidence of a defendant's bad character "unless and until the accused gives evidence of his good character ...." McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 188-90 at 444-47 (2d ed. 1972).
Rule 29.1(a) of the former Rules of Criminal Practice and Procedure, which is virtually identical to present I.C.R. 29.1(a), provided in part:
At any time during trial, the court may declare a mistrial and order a new trial of the indictment, information or complaint under the following circumstances:
(a) Upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives him of a fair trial.
In State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95, 665 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Ct.App.1983) we expressed the standard for review of denial of a criminal defendant's motion for mistrial:
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the "abuse of discretion" standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated is one of reversible error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error.
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