State v. Roedder
| Decision Date | 30 January 2019 |
| Docket Number | #28435 |
| Citation | 923 N.W.2d 537 |
| Parties | STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Richard Keith ROEDDER, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
MARTY J. JACKLEY, Attorney General, PATRICIA ARCHER, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee.
WILLIAM D. GERDES, Aberdeen, South Dakota, Attorney for defendant and appellant.
[¶1.] Richard Roedder received an enhanced forty-year prison sentence after pleading guilty to a charge of unauthorized possession of a controlled substance and admitting to five prior felony convictions listed in a part II habitual offender information. Roedder challenges his conviction, claiming his guilty plea was not supported by an adequate factual basis. He also argues the circuit court erred when it relied upon his five prior felony convictions to enhance his sentence and impose a forty-year sentence rather than the presumptive sentence Roedder sought. Roedder further claims the court’s sentence violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm Roedder’s conviction but reverse his sentence and remand for resentencing.
[¶2.] On August 24, 2017, Aberdeen police officers responded to a call from a resident who reported screaming and crying in a nearby apartment. Once there, officers found Roedder and Nashay Wurtz. Roedder was on parole for a 2011 distribution of a controlled substance conviction. Wurtz was also on parole and was taken into custody when police officers learned she had been drinking alcohol in violation of her supervision conditions.
[¶3.] Before Wurtz was transported to the Brown County Jail, a police officer accompanied her into the apartment so that she could retrieve some property. Inside the apartment, the officer noticed a hollowed-out pen tube lying on a dining room table. The officer recognized it as a device used to ingest narcotics, and an inspection of the tube revealed the presence of small white crystal flakes that field tested positive for methamphetamine.
[¶4.] Officers obtained a search warrant for the apartment and a vehicle parked nearby registered to Roedder. A search of the apartment yielded methamphetamine residue near the location of the hollowed-out pen and approximately twenty-two grams of methamphetamine in a packaged baggy inside a golden balloon. While searching Roedder’s vehicle, officers discovered a bag of golden balloons similar to the one found filled with methamphetamine in the apartment. Roedder later admitted to methamphetamine use, which was confirmed by a urinalysis test administered pursuant to the search warrant.
[¶5.] Roedder was indicted and charged in a series of superseding indictments with the following drug-related offenses: (1) possession with intent to distribute a controlled drug or substance in violation of SDCL 22-42-2 ; (2) conspiracy to distribute a controlled drug or substance in violation of SDCL 22-3-8 and 22-42-2 ; (3) unauthorized possession of a controlled substance in violation of SDCL 22-42-5 ; and (4) unauthorized ingestion of a controlled drug or substance in violation of SDCL 22-42-5.1.
[¶6.] The State also filed an amended part II information, alleging Roedder was a habitual offender and listing five prior felony convictions. Included were a 2000 Arizona conviction for conspiracy to commit armed robbery, along with four 2011 convictions for drug-related offenses in Brown County. The part II information listed the same date for all four Brown County convictions. Roedder challenged the part II information, arguing the four Brown County convictions arose out of the same transaction and therefore could only be counted as a single prior conviction for enhancement purposes. He also claimed the Arizona conspiracy conviction did not constitute a felony in South Dakota, citing differences in the two states' conspiracy statutes. The circuit court rejected Roedder’s arguments; deemed the Arizona conviction to be a crime of violence; and determined that Roedder’s enhanced maximum potential punishment, if convicted, was the equivalent of a Class C felony, or life imprisonment.1
[¶7.] On September 5, 2017, Roedder pled guilty to unauthorized possession of a controlled substance in violation of SDCL 22-42-5, without the benefit of a plea agreement. He also admitted to the allegations contained in the part II information, despite still disputing the ability of the circuit court to use the convictions to enhance his sentence.
[¶8.] During the change of plea hearing, the circuit court advised Roedder that he could receive a sentence of up to life in prison for the possession of controlled substance offense. Roedder acknowledged the risk and continued with his plan to waive his rights and plead guilty. The court elicited a factual basis statement from the prosecutor with which Roedder agreed, adding only that he possessed "a small amount of methamphetamine[,]" not the twenty-two-gram amount described by the prosecutor. Roedder did not challenge any of the circuit court’s findings regarding the sufficiency of the guilty plea and indicated he would not request a presentence investigation.
[¶9.] At Roedder’s sentencing hearing, the circuit court imposed a forty-year prison sentence. Roedder was already being supervised on parole by the Department of Corrections and argued unsuccessfully for the imposition of a presumptive fully suspended penitentiary sentence for his Class 5 felony conviction. The State did not proceed with the other charges, and this appeal followed.
[¶10.] Roedder raises several issues which we restate as follows:
[¶11.] The text of SDCL 23A-7-14 (Rule 11(f) ) requires that a defendant’s guilty plea be supported by a factual basis. We have previously suggested that our review of Rule 11(f) claims involves a de novo examination of the circuit court record. See State v. Nachtigall , 2007 S.D. 109, ¶ 5, 741 N.W.2d 216, 219 ().2
[¶12.] Roedder’s argument that his sentence was incorrectly enhanced turns on the interpretation and application of statutes which provide for the enhancement. His additional claims—that the circuit court was obligated to impose a presumptive sentence under SDCL 22-6-11 and erred by finding him ineligible—also involve questions of statutory interpretation. We review these legal issues de novo. State v. Bowers , 2018 S.D. 50, ¶ 16, 915 N.W.2d 161, 166 ; State v. Underwood , 2017 S.D. 3, ¶ 5, 890 N.W.2d 240, 241.
[¶13.] We also review de novo Roedder’s claim that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. State v. Chipps , 2016 S.D. 8, ¶ 31, 874 N.W.2d 475, 486.
[¶14.] Circuit courts may accept a guilty plea only after they are satisfied "there is a factual basis for the offense charged or to which the defendant pleads." SDCL 23A-7-14 (Rule 11(f) ). In this regard, we have held:
Before accepting a guilty plea, a court must be subjectively satisfied that a factual basis exists for the plea. The court must find a factual basis for each element of the offense. The factual basis must appear clearly on the record.
Nachtigall , 2007 S.D. 109, ¶ 5, 741 N.W.2d at 219 (quoting Schulz , 409 N.W.2d at 658 ). "[T]he factual basis may come from ‘anything that appears on the record.’ " State v. Pentecost , 2016 S.D. 84, ¶ 30, 887 N.W.2d 877, 885 (quoting Nachtigall , 2007 S.D. 109, ¶ 5, 741 N.W.2d at 219 ). "[R]eading the indictment to the defendant coupled with his admission of the acts described in it is a sufficient factual basis for a guilty plea, as long as the charge is uncomplicated, the indictment detailed and specific, and the admissions unequivocal."
State v. Olson , 2012 S.D. 55, ¶ 42, 816 N.W.2d 830, 841 (quoting Nachtigall , 2007 S.D. 109, ¶ 5, 741 N.W.2d at 219 ).
[¶15.] Here, the record easily supports a factual basis for Roedder’s guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance. Under SDCL 22-42-5, a person is guilty of the offense when he knowingly possesses a drug that appears on the list of controlled substances without any authority to do so. Roedder agreed with the prosecutor’s statement that he had possessed methamphetamine at an Aberdeen residence on August 24, 2016, offering only a clarifying comment regarding the amount of drugs he possessed:
[¶16.] Roedder’s argument challenging the factual basis for his guilty plea rests uneasily upon his unconnected claim that he cannot be found guilty under SDCL 22-42-5 because he ingested the methamphetamine and could only be found guilty of SDCL 22-42-5.1. This argument is unsustainable for at least two perceptible reasons.
[¶17.] First, Roedder unequivocally admitted to the circuit court that he, in fact, knowingly possessed methamphetamine. Indeed, his signed petition to...
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