State v. Underwood, #27768
Decision Date | 25 January 2017 |
Docket Number | #27768 |
Citation | 2017 S.D. 3 |
Parties | STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. ANTWAUN UNDERWOOD, Defendant and Appellant. |
Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
#27768-a-DG
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT BEADLE COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General
JOHN M. STROHMAN
Assistant Attorney General
Pierre, South Dakota
Attorneys for plaintiff
and appellee.
AARON P. PILCHER of
Bridgman & Anderson Law Firm
Miller, South Dakota
Attorneys for defendant
and appellant.
[¶1.] Antwaun Underwood pleaded guilty to possessing a controlled substance, and the circuit court sentenced him to imprisonment for four years. Underwood appeals and argues the court failed to identify aggravating factors sufficient to deviate from a presumptive sentence of probation. We affirm.
[¶2.] On January 23, 2015, Huron Police Officer Adam Doerr observed Underwood's vehicle travelling in excess of the speed limit. Officer Doerr initiated a traffic stop and approached Underwood. While speaking to Underwood, Officer Doerr noticed a green, leafy substance that he believed to be marijuana, as well as paraphernalia, on the center console of the vehicle. Officer Doerr informed Underwood that he was placing him under arrest. A subsequent search of Underwood's coat revealed a plastic baggy containing a green, leafy substance. Underwood acknowledged that the baggy belonged to him.
[¶3.] Underwood was charged by complaint with one count of ingesting a substance for the purpose of becoming intoxicated, one count of possessing two ounces or less of marijuana, and one count of possessing a controlled substance. He was also charged with driving with a suspended license. An information was later filed that charged Underwood with possessing a controlled substance. Underwood failed to appear for his preliminary hearing, but on November 1, 2015, he pleaded guilty to one count of possessing a controlled substance. The circuit court departed from a presumptive sentence of probation and sentenced Underwood to imprisonment for four years.
[¶4.] Underwood appeals, raising one issue: Whether the circumstances enumerated by the circuit court justified a departure from the presumptive sentence of probation under SDCL 22-6-11.
[¶5.] The central issue in this case is a question of statutory construction. We review such issues de novo. Good Lance v. Black Hills Dialysis, LLC, 2015 S.D. 83, ¶ 9, 871 N.W.2d 639, 643. Thus, we give no deference to the circuit court's legal conclusions. Id.
[¶6.] Underwood pleaded guilty to possessing a controlled substance, which in this case is a Class 5 felony. For an offender not already in custody of the executive branch, such an offense carries a presumptive sentence of probation. SDCL 22-6-11.1 However, "[t]he sentencing court may impose a sentence other than probation . . . if the court finds aggravating circumstances exist that pose a significant risk to the public and require a departure from presumptive probation[.]" Id. In this case, the court cited 10 circumstances that it considered to be aggravating:
Underwood argues that a circumstance is not aggravating within the meaning of SDCL 22-6-11 unless it demonstrates a risk of violence or career criminality. Therefore, Underwood concludes that the 10 circumstances relied on by the circuit court were insufficient to warrant a departure from the presumptive sentence of probation.
[¶7.] We agree with Underwood that some of the circumstances listed by the circuit court are not aggravating circumstances justifying a departure from the presumptive sentence. SDCL 22-6-11 does not specifically define the term aggravating circumstances. However, under that statute, only circumstances that "pose a significant risk to the public and require a departure from presumptive probation" can justify imposing a sentence other than probation. Id. (emphasis added). For example, Underwood's failure to pay fines, costs, restitution, or attorney fees hardly amounts to "a significant risk to the public[.]" Id. Even if such could be considered a significant risk to the public, incarcerating Underwood rather than placing him on probation does nothing to remedy his failure to pay; therefore,Underwood's failure to pay does not require a departure from the presumptive sentence of probation. Id.
Id. ¶ 22, 862 N.W.2d at 140. The defendant argued that these circumstances were not aggravating circumstances within the meaning of SDCL 22-6-11 that justified a departure from presumptive probation. Whitfield, 2015 S.D. 17, ¶ 21, 862 N.W.2d at 140. We rejected his argument and affirmed his sentence. Id. ¶¶ 23-24, 862 N.W.2d at 140.
[¶9.] The present case involves circumstances similar to those present in Whitfield. Here, the court considered Underwood's "five-page rap sheet," which includes two felony convictions. Although it is not clear from the record what underlying felony offense led to Underwood's accessory conviction, his offense ofgrand theft is not a victimless crime. Underwood violated the terms of parole for these offenses on multiple occasions. A presentence-investigation report also indicated Underwood was involved in distributing a controlled substance. At sentencing, the court commented: Additionally, Underwood has demonstrated a complete disdain for court orders and supervised release. It is clear that sentencing Underwood to additional probation likely would not deter him from continuing his course of criminal activity. Therefore, we agree with the circuit court that "circumstances exist that pose a significant risk to the public and require a departure from presumptive probation[.]" SDCL 22-6-11.
[¶10.] The term aggravating circumstances, as used in SDCL 22-6-11, does not require a showing of likely violence or career criminality. Underwood's criminal history and complete disregard for supervised release indicate the court's departure from the presumptive sentence of probation was warranted. Therefore, we affirm.
[¶11.]
[¶12.]
[¶13.] Although this Court correctly acknowledges that the narrow legal issue presented by this case—whether the word "aggravating" in SDCL 22-6-11 requires"violence or career criminality"—is a question of law reviewed de novo, I write to clarify our standard of review in SDCL 22-6-11 cases. We apply the abuse of discretion standard to review a circuit court's decision to deviate from presumptive probation under SDCL 22-6-11 rather than de novo review. An abuse of discretion "is a fundamental error of judgment, a choice outside the range of permissible choices, a decision, which, on full consideration, is arbitrary or unreasonable." Thurman v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 2013 S.D. 63, ¶ 11, 836 N.W.2d 611, 616 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
[¶14.] It is an obvious but critical point that SDCL 22-6-11 affects the sentencing power of a circuit court. The statute creates a presumptive sentence and, through the use of the word "may," gives the court the ability to deviate from the presumptive sentence. Deviation requires the court to follow specific procedures (identifying why it found the presumptive sentence inappropriate), but SDCL 22-6-11 leaves the choice in the circuit court's discretion. It is well-established that a sentence within the statutory maximum is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. McKinney, 2005 S.D. 73, ¶ 10, 699 N.W.2d 471, 476 (citing State v. Goodroad, 1997 S.D. 46, ¶ 40, 563 N.W.2d 126, 135). We accord great deference to the sentencing...
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