State v. Rogerson

• Decision Date: 24 October 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–1329.,13–1329.
• Citation: 855 N.W.2d 495
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Zachariah J. ROGERSON, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

855 N.W.2d 495

STATE of Iowa, Appellee

v.Zachariah J. ROGERSON, Appellant.

No. 13–1329.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 24, 2014.

Brian D.W. Spannagel, Boffeli & Spannagel, P.C., Dubuque, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, and Ralph Potter, County Attorney, for appellee.

Opinion

MANSFIELD, Justice.

This case requires us to decide when the Sixth Amendment permits a witness to appear by live, two-way video instead of testifying in person. In a prosecution for four counts of serious injury by operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, see Iowa Code § 707.6A(4) (2013), the State moved to allow three out-of-state victims of the car accident and three state-employed lab analysts to testify via a two-way videoconferencing system. The defendant objected, contending the remote testimony would violate his Sixth Amendment right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The district court held a hearing on the motion and granted the State's request for the witnesses to testify remotely. The defendant filed an application for an interlocutory appeal, which we granted.

Applying Sixth Amendment precedent, we now hold that two-way videoconference testimony should not be substituted for in-person confrontation absent a showing of necessity to further an important public interest. Because the grounds advanced by the State do not reach that level, we hold the district court erred in allowing the videoconference testimony. Therefore, we reverse the district court's order and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

According to the minutes of testimony, early in the morning on August 13, 2012, the defendant, Zachariah Rogerson, was involved in a single-vehicle car accident on Hales Mill Road in Dubuque County. Dubuque County sheriff's deputies responding to the scene encountered four other people at the crash site, all of whom were injured. Kyle Rohman suffered a shattered elbow, fractured ribs, and a partially collapsed lung. Kelly Barrett's sternum was cracked and her back fractured. Jack Cole's injuries included fractured ribs, a cracked collarbone, and a collapsed lung. Terrie Totse was airlifted to University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics for treatment of her broken back and shoulder.

Two of the injured parties identified Rogerson as the driver of the wrecked vehicle. Sergeant Pothoff of the Dubuque County Sheriff's Office made contact with Rogerson at the scene of the accident and detected an odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breath. Rogerson was transported to Mercy Hospital Emergency Room where he was sedated and intubated. The attending physician, Dr. Gudenkauf, signed a “Dead or Unconscious” form indicating that Rogerson was physically unable to give consent to a blood alcohol content test. Deputies then obtained a blood draw showing Rogerson's blood alcohol content to be .150.

The State charged Rogerson with four counts of unintentionally causing serious injury by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle. See Iowa Code § 707.6A(4). Rogerson entered a plea of not guilty to all four counts. Before trial, the State filed a motion requesting that several of its witnesses be permitted to testify remotely via two-way videoconferencing technology rather than physically appearing in court. In its motion, the State asserted that three of the parties injured in the crash, Rohman, Barrett, and Totse, resided outside the state of Iowa and that remote video “testimony would greatly expedite and facilitate their participation in the Trial.” The motion also sought authorization for three employees of the Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) Criminalistics Laboratory to testify remotely because they worked in Ankeny, and their testimony was “not dependent upon the specific fact pattern of this case.”¹

Rogerson opposed the State's motion, arguing that permitting the witnesses to testify via videoconferencing technology would violate his Sixth Amendment right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. Rogerson explained that video testimony was not an adequate substitute for face-to-face confrontation. He urged the trial court to deny the State's motion because there were no special circumstances justifying remote testimony.

The trial court held a hearing on the motion for distance testimony. At the hearing, the State reiterated its arguments that remote videoconferencing would facilitate the testimony of its out-of-state witnesses and of the state lab technicians. The State posited two-way videoconferencing fulfilled the Sixth Amendment confrontation requirement because both the defendant and witness could simultaneously see and hear each other. The prosecution stated that its witnesses had suffered “serious injury” during the accident but did not present any evidence from doctors or the witnesses themselves that they were unable to travel at the time set for the trial. With respect to the DCI employees, the State emphasized the convenience of “them walking down the hall and testifying” via videoconference rather than “giving up a day, at least coming up from the State lab in [Ankeny]” to testify.

In opposition to the motion, Rogerson argued that the State had failed to show that it was necessary, rather than merely convenient, for its witnesses to testify remotely. Rogerson again stated his concern that permitting videoconference testimony would violate his Sixth Amendment confrontation right. He urged the court to adopt a standard requiring the State to prove the necessity of distance testimony before allowing witnesses to testify via two-way video.

The trial court granted the State's motion for distance testimony. The court explained,

The statements to be offered by the Division of Criminal Investigation through [its employees] are non-testimonial and are factual. Therefore, the use of the ICN² network for the presentation of their testimony is deemed not to violate the confrontation[ ] clause.

The primary purpose of the confrontation clause is to secure the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination. The secondary purpose of the confrontation clause is to enable the judge and the jury to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness's deportment while testifying. To allow the witnesses who are residing outside of the State of Iowa with the opportunity to appear on the ICN network provides the Defendant with an opportunity for cross-examination. The personal presence of these individuals over the network, which transmits their image simultaneously, allows the judge and the jurors the opportunity to observe the witness during testimony. Any non-verbal communication may be therefore viewed during this live testimony. It is therefore deemed that the use of the ICN network to permit the injured named victims the opportunity to remain in a place of comfort during their recuperation period to provide testimony in this trial does not violate the Defendant's rights under the confrontation clause.

(Citations omitted.)

Rogerson applied to this court for permission to bring an interlocutory appeal, again asserting that the trial court's decision to permit the State's witnesses to testify remotely violated his constitutional right to be confronted by the witnesses against him. He contended that the district court had applied the wrong standard for determining whether two-way video testimony in a criminal trial is permissible. He further urged that the State failed to meet its burden under the correct standard.

We granted Rogerson's application to proceed with an interlocutory appeal and retained the case.

II. Standard of Review.

We review constitutional claims, including those based on the Confrontation Clause, de novo. State v. Schaer, 757 N.W.2d 630, 633 (Iowa 2008).

III. Analysis.

A. Constitutionality of Two-Way Video Testimony Under the Confrontation Clause. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI.³ Courts have long construed the Confrontation Clause to “guarantee [ ] the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.” Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 2801, 101 L.Ed.2d 857, 864 (1988). In Coy, the United States Supreme Court referenced both history and precedent, emphasizing the fundamental role that face-to-face confrontation has always played in judicial proceedings:

The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of face-to-face encounter between witness and accused serves ends related both to appearances and to reality. This opinion is embellished with references to and quotations from antiquity in part to convey that there is something deep in human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation between accused and accuser as “essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution.” What was true of old is no less true in modern times.

Id. at 1017, 108 S.Ct. at 2801, 101 L.Ed.2d at 864–65 (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068, 13 L.Ed.2d 923, 926 (1965) ).

In subsequent cases, however, the Supreme Court has clarified that while the Confrontation Clause does express a strong preference for face-to-face confrontation, the latter is not an absolute constitutional requirement.See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849–50, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 3165–66, 111 L.Ed.2d 666, 680–82 (1990). This preference for face-to-face confrontation “ ‘must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.’ ” Id. at 849, 110 S.Ct. at 3165, 111 L.Ed.2d at 681 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243, 15 S.Ct. 337, 339–40, 39 L.Ed. 409, 411 (1895) ).

In Craig, the trial court permitted a child victim of sexual abuse to testify via a one-way, closed-circuit television system under which the defendant could see and hear the testimony, but the child could neither see nor hear the defendant. See id....