State v. Roggenbuck, 39514

Decision Date16 July 1965
Docket NumberNo. 39514,39514
Citation136 N.W.2d 857,271 Minn. 557
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Richard Lee ROGGENBUCK, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

Minn.St.1961, § 619.34 provided that every person who shall willfully 'seize, confine, or inveigle another, with intent to cause him, without authority of law, to be secretly confined * * * within the state * * * or kept or detained against his will; (or) abduct, entice, or, by force or fraud, unlawfully take or carry away another, at or from a place without the state, or procure, advise, aid, or abet such abduction * * * or keep such person, or cause him to be kept or secreted, within this state' shall be guilty of kidnapping and punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 40 years. Held, under defendant's own admissions and his plea of guilty, that he is guilty of a violation of § 619.34; also that under the facts and circumstances here, the trial court had no duty to reject defendant's guilty plea, nor to advise him in the absence of evidence of consent on the part of the person kidnapped that the consent of the latter would be a defense.

A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court subject to the usual rules governing its exercise.

In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty, this court must consider all the facts and surrounding circumstances which form the basis of the trial court's determination, including statements made by defendant at the time he entered his plea of guilty. State v. Jones, 234 Minn. 438, 48 N.W.2d 662, distinguished.

Harold Ruttenberg, St. Paul, for appellant.

Robert W. Mattson, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, George Scott, County Atty., Theodore Rix, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent.

FRANK T. GALLAGHER, C.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered pursuant to a plea of guilty of the crime of kidnapping. On July 23, 1963, defendant, age 32, was arraigned before the District Court of Hennepin County on a charge of kidnapping in violation of Minn.St.1961, § 619.34. 1 A public defender was appointed to represent him. On August 12, 1963, defendant appeared and entered a plea of guilty, after which he was examined by the court and by his court-appointed counsel.

Defendant admitted that early in the morning of July 6, 1963, while it was still dark, he approached on automobile in south Minneapolis with an intent to '(g)et the car.' It was occupied by a young man named Anderson and a girl. He asked Anderson to leave the car but his answer was 'no.' Defendant was also questioned as follows:

'(By his attorney):

'Q. Now, in regard to this charge of kidnapping, Mr. Roggenbuck, I have explained to you that this is a felony and could be punished by up to 40 years incarceration in a penal institution?

'A. Yes, sir.

'Q. I have explained to you that under the law, Mr. Roggenbuck, you have an absolute right to trial by jury; is that right?

'A. Yes.

'Q. And you would understand that in a trial by jury that you would be presumed to be innocent unless the State introduced competent evidence to prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Do you understand that?

'A. Yes, sir.

'Q. And no threats or promises have been made by myself or any other person in regard to your plea of guilty here; is that correct?

'A. Yes, sir.

'Q. And do you enter this plea of guilty to this charge of your own free will and accord?

'A. Yes.

'By the Court:

'Q. What did you threaten him with?

'A. I just told him I wasn't going to let him leave. I told him I wouldn't let him leave until it got light out and I would know where I was at.

'(By his attorney):

'Q. And you were aware of the fact you were keeping him in this automobile against his will; is that correct?

'A. Yes.

After a presentence investigation, defendant again appeared before the court with his attorney, at which time the judge questioned him with reference to two prior convictions. He admitted in the presence of the court that his attorney had explained to him that the court could impose a double penalty under the law; that he was entitled to a trial by jury as to whether he was the identical person convicted of the prior convictions; and that in a jury trial he was presumed innocent until found guilty by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. He further stated that no threats or promises had been made to him by his attorney or any other person to induce him to enter a plea of guilty to the two prior convictions and that he entered the plea of guilty to those convictions of his own free will.

Upon further questioning by the judge as to what happened in the early morning of July 6, he restated substantially the events referred to above. When asked by the court whether there was anything else he wanted to say before he was sentenced, defendant stated that he would 'like to go back over my life and my record.' The court then permitted him to review at considerable length some of his past life concerning the death of his mother when he was 4 years old, after which he lived for a time with an uncle and aunt on a farm in northern Minnesota; his father's remarriage; his experiences while living with his father and stepmother; his 'running away from home'; his appearance in juvenile court; his early school life; his being sentenced to Glen Lake; his involvement with a group out at Glen Lake; his later sentence to Red Wing; his connection with 'a series of burglaries throughout the entire State of Minnesota'; and his later marriage. His story would indicate that his life at times was a difficult one.

The court then sentenced him to the state prison at Stillwater for a maximum period of 20 years for the crime of kidnapping, taking into consideration his previous convictions for two felonies committed in Minnesota.

Defendant again appeared in court with his attorney on September 24, 1963, at which time the judge stated that defendant had advised him by letter that he wished to make a motion vacating the sentence and withdraw his plea of guilty and dismiss his attorney of record pursuant to engaging private counsel and also had requested that he be returned to court to make a motion to vacate the judgment and withdraw his guilty plea because he did not believe he was guilty as charged; that every promise made to him had been broken including the amount of his sentence and the promise that he would be given the opportunity in court to fully go into what happened on the night in question. When asked by the judge if he was making the motion with the assistance of counsel he said it was on his own. He stated that he intended to obtain his own private attorney but that he did not request him to be present to make the motion because he was unable to obtain a retainer fee for him. The court then continued the matter until October 1. On that date defendant appeared without private counsel. When defendant said that he still wanted to make the motion, the judge stated that he would regard defendant's letter as tantamount to a motion for an order vacating the judgment and for leave to withdraw his guilty plea and enter a plea of not guilty, and that defendant could state whatever he wanted to in support of his motion.

Defendant told the court that he did not feel that he was guilty of the charge of kidnapping because Anderson went with him voluntarily from the point where he got into the car until the place where he...

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9 cases
  • State v. Wolske
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • June 28, 1968
    ...his plea of guilty or nolo contendere.' (Italics supplied.)13 See, e.g., State v. Hayes, 276 Minn. 384, 150 N.W.2d 552; State v. Roggenbuck, 271 Minn. 557, 136 N.W.2d 857.14 See, footnote 10.15 A.B.A. Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Post-Conviction R......
  • State v. Minton
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • March 17, 1967
    ...p. 450.8 See appendix to this opinion. Defendant's court-appointed counsel was, of course, himself in error.9 See, State v. Roggenbuck, 271 Minn. 557, 136 N.W.2d 857; State ex rel. Crippen v. Rigg, 256 Minn. 41, 96 N.W.2d 875.10 See, State v. Jones, 267 Minn. 421, 127 N.W.2d 153.11 See, § 6......
  • State v. Ingram
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • March 18, 1966
    ...79; State ex rel. O'Neill v. Rigg, 256 Minn. 293, 98 N.W.2d 142; State v. Anderson, 270 Minn. 411, 134 N.W.2d 12; State v. Roggenbuck, 271 Minn. 557, 136 N.W.2d 857; State ex rel. Savage v. Rigg, 250 Minn. 370, 84 N.W.2d 640. Compare, State ex rel. Dehning v. Rigg, 251 Minn. 120, 86 N.W.2d ......
  • State v. Kramer, 39669
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • December 3, 1965
    ...did not err in accepting defendant's plea of guilty upon the record before us on this appeal. 1 Affirmed. 1 See, State v. Roggenbuck, Minn., 136 N.W.2d 857. ...
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