State v. Rohra
| Decision Date | 21 November 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. ED105084,ED105084 |
| Parties | STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. ALOK KUMAR ROHRA, Defendant/Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis
Hon. Michael F. Stelzer1
Alok Rohra appeals the trial court's judgment and sentence on a charge of unlawful possession of a firearm. Rohra asserts that an Oklahoma deferral of judgment and sentence is not a prior "conviction" rendering gun possession unlawful under Missouri's felonious possession statute. We agree and would reverse and vacate Rohra's present conviction on that count. However, given the general interest and importance of the question as to which state's law determines the existence of a conviction, we transfer the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri pursuant to Rule 83.02.
Background
In 2013, the State of Oklahoma charged Rohra with possession and intent to distribute a controlled substance. Rohra pleaded guilty and received a deferral of judgmentunder Oklahoma law. Then in 2015, during a traffic stop in St. Louis, officers discovered Rohra in possession of marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and a firearm. The State charged Rohra with misdemeanor possession and, as relevant here, unlawful possession of a firearm. Specifically, the State charged that Rohra's gun possession was unlawful by virtue of his earlier drug offense in Oklahoma. Rohra moved to dismiss the unlawful possession charge, arguing that his deferral from Oklahoma was not a prior conviction rendering gun possession unlawful. The trial court denied Rohra's motion on the basis that, under Oklahoma law, Rohra's deferral is deemed a conviction for purposes of subsequent firearm possession. Rohra then pleaded guilty on all three counts.
Rohra appeals and asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charge of unlawful possession of a firearm because the State had no factual basis for the charge. Rohra argues that his possession of a firearm at the time of his arrest in St. Louis could not have been unlawful because he had no prior felony conviction as that term is used in Missouri. Rohra's point presents a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Smothers, 297 S.W.3d 626, 632 (Mo. App. 2009).
Preservation
As a preliminary matter, the State asserts that Rohra waived his claim by withdrawing his motion to dismiss and ultimately pleading guilty. The State originally charged Rohra with unlawful possession based on a prior Missouri misdemeanor conviction. Rohra filed a motion to dismiss that charge because the underlying prior conviction was not a felony. At a hearing on that motion October 1, 2015, the State filed an amended complaint identifying the Oklahoma deferral as the prior felony. In response, Rohra orally amended his motion to dismiss, challenging the complaint based on theOklahoma deferral. Although the record on Rohra's motions is unclear,2 the trial court ultimately considered and ruled on Rohra's amended motion in February 2016. Rohra persisted in his challenge by filing a motion to quash the indictment in June 2016, which the court heard and summarily denied that August.
We deem the matter properly before us for review on the merits. The trial court's written judgment, which begins "the court has before it Defendant's motion to dismiss," belies the State's characterization of the record. Clearly, the trial court did not view Rohra's amended challenge as withdrawn or otherwise waived. Moreover, even if Rohra hadn't raised the issue at trial, a defect in the information may be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Sparks, 916 S.W.2d 234, 237 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995), citing State v. Parkhurst, 845 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. 1992). Even when first raised on appeal, an information may be deemed insufficient if (1) it does not, by any reasonable construction, charge the offense of which the defendant was convicted and (2) the defendant demonstrates actual prejudice as a result of the insufficiency. Id. As discussed below, these conditions exist in this case.
Rohra also did not waive his claim of error by pleading guilty. It is well-settled that "a person who pleads guilty to a criminal offense has a right to challenge the sufficiency of the information or indictment by direct appeal." Dodds v. State, 60 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001).
Lastly here, the State argues that Rohra's appellate point of error is deficient in that it attacks the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss and not directly the subsequentindictment. "A brief impedes disposition on the merits when it is so deficient that it fails to give notice to this court and to the other parties as to the issues presented on appeal." Comp & Soft, Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 252 S.W.3d 189, 193-94 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008). Rohra's point does not impede disposition on the merits. Both the State and this court fully understand the substantive issue presented on appeal. Rohra frames his argument around the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss because that written order contains the trial court's legal analysis for this court to review. But Rohra's brief also cites to his subsequent motion to quash the indictment and the trial court's summary denial of that motion. Clearly Rohra's point challenges that ruling as well. As a matter of policy, this court prefers to decide cases on their merits whenever possible. Id. Rohra's point of error is adequately preserved and presented for our review on the merits.
Analysis
Missouri's felon-in-possession statute states in pertinent part:
A person commits the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm if such person knowingly has a firearm in his or her possession and such person has been convicted of a felony under the laws of this state or of a crime under the laws of any state or of the United States which, if committed within this state, would be a felony.
§571.070(1). To simplify, a person commits unlawful possession if he carries a firearm after being convicted of a crime that is a felony either in Missouri or elsewhere, if Missouri also would consider it a felony. Thus, the central dispute here is: what constitutes a conviction for purposes of felonious possession?
As general premise, we observe that a deferred sentence in Oklahoma is the same as a suspended imposition of sentence (SIS) in Missouri, the key feature being that neither results in a conviction initially. In Missouri, "a suspended imposition of sentence ... defers the sentencing as well as the entry of a conviction on defendant's record." Hoskins v. State,329 S.W.3d 695, 700 FN 3 (Mo. 2010). "An offender on a suspended imposition of sentence who successfully completes probation does not have a criminal conviction on his record. Id. "The obvious legislative purpose of the sentencing alternative of suspended imposition of sentence is to allow a defendant to avoid the stigma of a lifetime conviction and the punitive collateral consequences that follow." Yale v. City of Independence, 846 S.W.2d 193, 194 (Mo. 1993). Similarly, in Oklahoma:
The court may... without entering a judgment of guilt... defer further proceedings and place the person on probation.... Discharge and dismissal under this section shall be without court adjudication of guilt and shall not be deemed a conviction ... for purposes of disqualifications ... imposed by law upon conviction of a crime.
Okla. Stat. Ann. Title 63, § 2-410(A). Thus, as a general rule, neither a Missouri SIS nor an Oklahoma deferral results in a conviction.
However, Oklahoma has a specific statutory exception applicable to drug offenses such as those to which Rohra pleaded guilty and received deferral in 2013. It states:
Any plea of guilty ... to a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Act shall constitute a conviction of the offense for the purpose of the [Act] or any other criminal statute under which the existence of a prior conviction is relevant.
Okla. Stat. Ann. Title 63, §2-410(B). This exception applies for 10 years after a defendant's successful completion of probation. Id. Oklahoma appellate precedent further clarifies that, under this exception, an Oklahoma deferral is treated as a conviction for purposes of the defendant's subsequent conduct. In Platt v. State, 188 P. 3d 196 (Okla. Crim. App. 2008), the defendant was on probation for a drug offense when he was arrested for unlawful possession of a firearm. Platt argued that his carrying a gun wasn't unlawful because, at the time, he didn't have a prior conviction but only a deferral. The Oklahoma appellate court rejected Platt's logic and concluded that the statutory exception converted his deferralinto a conviction as applied to Platt's conduct while on probation and for 10 years thereafter.
Citing Platt, the trial court here applied the same rationale to Rohra's status: by operation of Oklahoma's statutory exception, Rohra's Oklahoma deferral was deemed a conviction, and §571.070(1) prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms. The fatal flaw in this logic is that Missouri law contains no equivalent to Oklahoma's self-executing conviction statute. Rather, in Missouri, an SIS exists precisely to avoid the punitive collateral consequences of a conviction. Yale, 846 S.W.2d at 195. An SIS is not a final judgment. Id. A final judgment of conviction occurs only upon the entry of sentence. State v. Jansen, 21 S.W.3d 86, 87 (Mo. App. S.D. 2000); Rule 29.07(c).
Nevertheless, the State insists that Rohra's deferral should be treated as a conviction for purposes of felonious possession because Oklahoma would treat it as such. But none of the State's cited precedents is authoritative here. In State v. Evans, the defendant's prior offense in Iowa resulted in a conviction and sentence, with suspended execution of sentence and probation. 410 S.W.3d 258 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013). Although Evans later received a restoration of citizenship from the Governor of Iowa, that conferral was not a pardon or expungement, so ...
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