State v. Roland
Decision Date | 19 April 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 2789,2789 |
Citation | 90 N.M. 520,565 P.2d 1037,1977 NMCA 43 |
Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry Lee ROLAND, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
In 1973 defendant was convicted of larceny. In 1976 defendant was convicted of armed robbery committed by use of a firearm. This Court affirmed the armed robbery conviction by memorandum in State v. Roland, (Ct.App.) No. 2656, decided November 2, 1976. This appeal involves proceedings against defendant as an habitual offender. Section 40A-29-5, N.M.S.A. 1953 . Two issues have been briefed: (1) the validity of the prior larceny conviction, and (2) the propriety of enhancing defendant's sentence for armed robbery. Issues listed in the docketing statement, but not briefed, have been abandoned. State v. Vogenthaler, 89 N.M. 150, 548 P.2d 112 (Ct.App.1976).
Defendant sought dismissal of the habitual offender charge on the basis that his prior conviction for larceny was invalid as a matter of law. He claims the trial court erred in denying this motion.
Defendant pled guilty to larceny; his larceny conviction is based on that plea. He claims the plea was invalid because of the procedure followed by the trial court in accepting the guilty plea. He argues two grounds.
First, defendant claims R.Crim.P. 21(e) was violated in that the trial court failed to advise defendant that if he pled guilty "there will not be a further trial of any kind". This provision was not in effect at the time of defendant's guilty plea, having been added by an amendment effective October 1, 1974. See annotation to § 41-23-21, N.M.S.A. 1953 .
Second, the transcript of the proceedings at the time of the guilty plea shows that defendant was not advised that his guilty plea waived the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to confront one's accusers. Because of a lack of specific reference to these rights, defendant contends his guilty plea was invalid under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). We stated our understanding of Boykin in State v. Martinez, 89 N.M. 729, 557 P.2d 578 (Ct.App. 1976):
Defendant does not claim that his plea of guilty to larceny was involuntary. The transcript of the proceedings indicates that the plea was in fact voluntary. See State v. Martinez, supra.
The trial court did not err in refusing to hold the guilty plea invalid as a matter of law.
The current, and second, felony conviction is defendant's first conviction for armed robbery; it is a second degree felony. Section 40A-16-2, N.M.S.A. 1953 . Because the offense was committed by use of a firearm, his sentence was increased. Defendant does not claim that his original penitentiary sentence of not less than fifteen nor more than fifty-five years was improper. See § 40A-29-3(B), N.M.S.A. 1953 and § 40A-29-3.1(A)(1), N.M.S.A. 1953 .
Defendant complains of the enhanced sentence imposed upon him as an habitual offender. The enhanced sentence is for not less than twenty-seven and one-half years and not more than one hundred ten years in the penitentiary. Defendant contends: (1) any enhancement as an habitual offender is not authorized; and (2) if authorized, the enhancement was figured incorrectly.
Section 40A-16-2, supra, provides that second or subsequent armed robbery convictions are first degree felonies. Defendant asserts this is a specific enhancement provision for armed robbery and, because of this specific provision, the general enhancement provisions for habitual offenders are not applicable. State v. Sanchez, 87 N.M. 256, 531 P.2d 1229 (Ct.App. 1975) pointed out that a similar argument was inappropriate when the facts showed only one armed robbery conviction. Defendant asserts that State v. Sanchez, supra, should be overruled, and that his contention is controlled by State v. Lujan, 76 N.M. 111, 412 P.2d 405 (1966). We disagree.
In State v. Lujan, supra, the habitual offender statute was used to enhance a sentence for violation of the applicable narcotic drug law. Lujan held that the penalty provisions of the two laws conflicted and that the legislative intent was that narcotic violations were to be punished only under the specific narcotic drug law. With this legislative intent, the general habitual offender statute did not apply.
Lujan, supra, discusses two decisional grounds the inapplicability of a general statute which conflicts with a specific statute and legislative intent. Both concepts have been recognized in subsequent decisions. State v. Alderete, 88 N.M. 150, 538 P.2d 422 (Ct.App. 1975); State v. Lard, 86 N.M. 71, 519 P.2d 307 (Ct.App. 1974). The result in Lujan does not control this case because the issue here is the applicability of the habitual offender statute to an armed robbery conviction and not to a narcotic conviction; a different statute is involved. We agree, however, that the approach taken in Lujan is appropriate. Is there a conflict between the habitual offender statute and the armed robbery statute? What was the legislative intent?
Both the armed robbery statute and the habitual offender statute were enacted as a part of the Criminal Code. Laws 1963, ch. 303. The original enactment of § 40A-16-2, supra, contained no enhancement provisions for armed robbery. Thus, as originally enacted, the penalty for armed robbery did not conflict with the habitual offender statute.
Section 40A-16-2, supra, was amended by Laws 1973, ch. 178, § 1. This amendment provided that second or subsequent armed robberies were first degree felonies. This was an enhanced penalty because the penalty for a first degree felony is life imprisonment, § 40A-29-3(A), supra; a penalty greater than the penalty for a second degree felony.
Even with the increased penalty for second or subsequent armed robberies, there is no conflict with the habitual offender statute. Defendant's armed robbery conviction is his second felony conviction. The pertinent portion of § 40A-29-5, supra, reads:
Under the first paragraph of the above quotation, the statute applies to a current felony "not otherwise punishable by death or life imprisonment". Second or subsequent armed robberies are punishable by life imprisonment. Section 40A-29-5, supra, does...
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