State v. Rolli

• Decision Date: 11 May 1999
• Docket Number: (AC 17392)
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ALFONSO ROLLI

53 Conn. App. 269

729 A.2d 245

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ALFONSO ROLLI

(AC 17392)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued December 8, 1998.

Officially released May 11, 1999.

Schaller, Hennessy and Dupont, Js.

Katharine S. Goodbody, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Carolyn K. Longstreth, assistant state's attorney, with whom were Matthew Couloute, Jr., deputy assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, Robert G. Hall, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

HENNESSY, J.

The defendant, Alfonso Rolli, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of burglary in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-103 (a) and larceny in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-125 (a). The defendant claims that (1) there was insufficient evidence to prove that the value of the property taken exceeded $500 as required by § 53a-125 (a), (2) the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence and (3) the prosecutor violated the defendant's due process right to a fair trial during closing argument.¹ We affirm the judgment of conviction.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. Darrel Cheifetz stored two bicycles, one belonging to her husband and one belonging to her daughter, in the garage of the family home. On May 11, 1996, shortly before 10 a.m., Cheifetz observed the defendant in her driveway getting into a plain grey pickup truck with a black toolbox in the back and she observed that two bicycles from her garage were in the back of the pickup truck. Cheifetz ran after the pickup truck in an attempt to get the license number; the defendant, however, drove away in reverse.

Cheifetz' neighbor, Scott Silver, was driving out of his driveway at the time and observed the driver of the pickup truck. Cheifetz asked him to follow the pickup truck to get the license number. Silver followed the pickup truck and, using his car phone, reported the license plate number to the police. The police traced the license plate number to the defendant's father. The police went to the father's residence and saw a grey pickup truck with a black toolbox in the back in the driveway. The license plate on the pickup truck had the number reported by Silver. The police did not see either of the bicycles in the truck. The defendant's father indicated that his son had borrowed the pickup truck on the morning of the theft and had used it between 9:30 and 10:30 a.m.

Silver made a photographic identification and an in-court identification of the defendant. Additional facts will be discussed where relevant to the issues on appeal.

I

The defendant first claims that the evidence was insufficient to show that the value of the property taken exceeded $500 and, therefore, he could not be convicted of larceny in the fourth degree pursuant to § 53a-125 (a).² Specifically, the defendant cites the definition of the value of property as it pertains to a charge of larceny as provided in General Statutes § 53a-121³ and claims that the state failed to provide proof of the market value of the bicycles at the time of the crime or that the value was not ascertainable.

"The standard of review employed in a sufficiency of the evidence claim is well settled. [W]e apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [trier of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.... State v. James, 237 Conn. 390, 435, 678 A.2d 1338 (1996)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Crespo, 246 Conn. 665, 670, 718 A.2d 925 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1125, 119 S. Ct. 911, 142 L. Ed. 2d 909 (1999). "On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [trier of fact's] verdict of guilty." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Torres, 242 Conn. 485, 490, 698 A.2d 898 (1997).

Section 53a-125 (a) provides in relevant part: "A person is guilty of larceny in the fourth degree when he commits larceny as defined in section 53a-119 and the value of the property ... exceeds five hundred dollars." "[V]alue means the market value of the property or services at the time and place of the crime or, if such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property or services within a reasonable time after the crime...." General Statutes § 53a-121 (a) (1). The defendant argues that Cheifetz testified as to what she believed she may have paid for the bicycles but never testified as to the age or condition of the bicycles or anything else that could impact on their market value at the time of the crime. We disagree.

An owner of property is competent to testify as to its value. See State v. McCarthy, 197 Conn. 166, 172, 496 A.2d 190 (1985); Shane v. Tabor, 5 Conn. App. 363, 364, 497 A.2d 1047 (1985). Cheifetz, the owner of the bicycles, testified that the bicycle that she bought for her daughter was a regular woman's bicycle that was probably worth approximately $300 when purchased. She further testified that it was so new that on the day before the bicycles were stolen, she had purchased a service contract from the dealer. Cheifetz also testified that the bicycle that she bought for her husband was a Morin twenty-one speed bicycle that cost approximately $400.

We note that "[i]t is within the province of the jury to draw reasonable and logical inferences from the facts proven.... The jury may draw reasonable inferences based on other inferences drawn from the evidence presented.... Our review is a fact based inquiry limited to determining whether the inferences drawn by the jury are so unreasonable as to be unjustifiable.... We note that the probative force of the evidence is not diminished because it consists, in whole or in part, of circumstantial evidence rather than direct evidence.... It has been repeatedly stated that there is no legal distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence so far as probative force is concerned.... It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence.... [T]he inquiry into whether the record evidence would support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence... established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.... Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.... In doing so, we keep in mind that [w]e have not had the jury's opportunity to observe the conduct, demeanor, and attitude of the witnesses and to gauge their credibility." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sanchez, 50 Conn. App. 145, 149-50, 718 A.2d 52, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 922, 722 A.2d 811 (1998).

In this case, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the bicycle that Cheifetz bought for her daughter was new and worth $300. In addition, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the bicycle that she bought for her husband was not new and, therefore, not worth $400; however, the jury could have reasonably inferred that the bicycle was worth more than $200.

We conclude, under the facts in this case, that it was not unreasonable for the jury to conclude that the market value of the stolen property exceeded $500. The evidence, therefore, was sufficient to sustain the verdict on the larceny charge.

II

The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence the officer's identification of the person to whom the license plate was registered. Specifically, the defendant argues that the statement, made by Detective John Calca of the Westport police department while testifying, that the license plate number was registered to the defendant's father was made to establish the truth of the facts contained in the statement and was based on a statement made by someone else in the police department and, thus, was inadmissible hearsay.

The state responds that the contents of a public record are admissible provided that the record is a public one made by an official who is legally required to keep such record in the course of his or her official duties and that the maker of the record had personal knowledge of the facts stated.⁴ We agree with the defendant.

The following facts are necessary to the resolution of this issue. Calca testified that, on checking on the license plate number reported to him by Silver, the license number came back indicating that the vehicle was registered to the defendant's father, Angelo Rolli, of West Haven. The defendant objected to the introduction of that testimony on the ground that it was impermissible hearsay. The trial court overruled the objection.

"Our standard of review regarding challenges to a trial court's evidentiary rulings is that these rulings will be overturned on appeal only where there was an abuse of discretion and a showing by the defendant of substantial prejudice or injustice.... In reviewing claims that the trial court abused its discretion, great weight is given to the trial court's decision and every reasonable presumption is given in favor of its correctness.... We will reverse the trial court's ruling only if it could not reasonably conclude as it did." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cole, 50 Conn. App. 312, 330-31, 718 A.2d 457, cert. granted on other grounds, 247 Conn. 937, 722 A.2d 1217 (1998).

"An out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted is...