State v. Rolling
| Decision Date | 15 February 1921 |
| Docket Number | 33724. |
| Citation | 181 N.W. 489,190 Iowa 1139 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. FRANK ROLLING, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Plymouth District Court.--C. C. BRADLEY, Judge.
The defendant was convicted of the crime of seduction, and appeals.
Affirmed.
J. T Keenan and Nelson Miller, for appellant.
H. M Havner, Attorney General, and F. C. Davidson, Special Counsel, for appellee.
I.
The indictment in this case was returned by the grand jury of Plymouth County on March 27, 1919, charging the defendant with having committed the crime of seduction on or about October 1, 1917. The cause was tried in September, 1919.
One of appellant's main contentions is that the State failed to establish the fact that the alleged seduction was committed within 18 months before the indictment was returned. The prosecuting witness and the defendant had lived in the same vicinity for many years, and had been acquainted since childhood. The prosecuting witness was the adopted daughter of a widower. She was about 20 years of age. Defendant is the son of a farmer, and about 18 years old.
According to prosecutrix, the parties began "keeping company" with each other in August, 1916. This continued thereafter, with frequent visits on the part of defendant, until June, 1917, when, according to the story of prosecutrix, the parties became engaged to be married. She testified that thereafter defendant frequently solicited her to yield to his desires, and that finally, in October, 1917, the claimed seduction took place.
The prosecutrix testifies that, after that time, the parties frequently indulged in sexual intercourse at different times during a period of about eight months. She became pregnant in April, 1918, and informed the defendant of her condition in May, 1918, and he ceased going with her in June, 1918. A child was born to prosecutrix on January 3, 1919.
On cross-examination, the prosecutrix explained the manner in which she fixed the date of the alleged seduction by stating that she discovered that she was pregnant on or about her menstrual period, May 5, 1918, and that she then figured back that the first act of intercourse was in October, 1917. She says it was about eight months from the time of the first act until she realized that she was pregnant.
The defendant admitted that he had indulged in repeated acts of sexual intercourse with prosecutrix. He says, however, that the first act of intercourse was in August, 1916, instead of October, 1917, as stated by prosecutrix. The parties agree as to the circumstances attending the first transaction, but differ as to the date thereof. Defendant testifies that the relationship between them continued from August, 1916, until June, 1917, when he says it was broken off and was discontinued until September of that year, and was then resumed. He says that he called on prosecutrix right along after that, and that their relations continued until June, 1918, but that he did not have sexual intercourse with prosecutrix after February, 1918.
There was a direct conflict between the testimony of the prosecutrix and that of the defendant as to whether the first act of intercourse occurred in October, 1917, or in August, 1916. If it was in August, 1916, as claimed by defendant, the prosecution therefor was barred by the statute of limitations. It was for the jury to determine which one spoke the truth in this matter.
Evidence was offered by the State to corroborate the prosecutrix as to the fact that the defendant was "keeping company" with the prosecutrix and that the parties acted toward each other as lovers in 1917 and 1918. None of the State's witnesses, however, definitely fix this relationship as early as August, 1916, the date fixed by the defendant as the time of the first act of intercourse.
The defendant's sister, testifying in his behalf, says that defendant began going with prosecutrix in 1916, but does not attempt to fix the date. But defendant's main contention in this regard is respecting the prosecutrix's testimony about a ring given her by defendant. On her first examination, she testified that she received a ring from defendant, and that she returned it to him in June, 1918. She also testified, on cross-examination, that there was no act of intercourse after the return of the ring. The defendant offered testimony to the effect that the ring was returned in 1917, instead of 1918. Thereupon, the State recalled the prosecutrix, who then testified that she was mistaken in the matter, and that the ring was, in fact, returned in 1917.
Much is made in argument of the proposition that the prosecutrix changed her testimony as to the date of the return of the ring, but did not change her former testimony as to there being no intercourse after the ring was returned. No opportunity was given the prosecutrix to explain this inconsistency in her testimony. Neither side interrogated her on this subject when she was recalled. The question of the apparent discrepancy in her testimony was essentially one for the consideration of the jury. It is conceded that she was in error about the date that the ring was returned. It is also perfectly apparent that she was in error in saying that there was no act of sexual intercourse "after the ring was returned," as both parties testify that there were repeated acts of intercourse thereafter. She said there was no act of intercourse after April, 1918, and then said that she returned the ring at that time. Both parties agree that she was correct that there was no such act after April, 1918, and both agree that the illicit relations did continue at least until February, 1918.
It would have been better if counsel for either the State or the defendant had interrogated the witness, when recalled, regarding this matter, and cleared it up. It is not altogether impossible that the failure of the State to have the witness explain this matter when recalled might have been turned by able counsel in argument, quite as much to defendant's advantage as though the witness had explained her former testimony.
We have carefully read the record regarding this testimony, and are satisfied that the whole situation was fairly before the jury, and it was for it to determine the credibility of the witness. It is not to be overlooked that the situation was a particularly trying one for a young woman of limited education and experience. The ordeal of confessing her own sin in a public place, before the curious crowd that delight to attend such trials, under a rigid cross-examination, is one that does not tend to produce clearness of thought or the most perfect accuracy of recollection. The answers of the witness in this case were mostly given in monosyllables. There is no such condition as requires us to say that the verdict is without support in the evidence at this point, or that the jury was not justified, upon the whole case, in finding the defendant guilty, by that degree of proof required to justify a conviction in a criminal case. The court covered the matter by a proper instruction. It was essentially a jury question. We do not find any error of law in respect to this matter, nor any situation respecting the evidence that would justify interference by this court.
II. It is insisted in behalf of defendant that there is no evidence that the defendant used such arts, deception, or practices of any kind as make the act seduction. Under the evidence of the State, the jury would have been warranted in finding that the prosecutrix and defendant began "keeping company" together in August, 1916, and, with the possible exception of three months, continued until after she was known to be pregnant, in 1918. She says that he came to see her about every Sunday, and sometimes twice a week. They went to shows and dances. She says he told her that he loved her; that he cared for her; that she would make a good housekeeper for him. She testifies that he asked her to marry him, and that she consented. She says that he put his arm around her and kissed her, and that they acted as lovers do, and that such conduct was frequent and usual. There is some evidence that preparations were made for the contemplated wedding. She says the defendant told her they would have been married in the winter of 1917, but were so young that they would wait a year. Defendant gave prosecutrix a ring and a toilet set. There was testimony by other witnesses tending to corroborate the prosecutrix as to these matters generally, especially regarding the frequency with which the parties were together at dances and other places. Defendant admits that he called on prosecutrix every Sunday during the time they were keeping...
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