State v. Roman, 59377
| Decision Date | 16 January 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 59377,59377 |
| Citation | 240 Kan. 611,731 P.2d 1281 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Michael R. ROMAN, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
In computing the time between arraignment and trial, those delays which are caused by the application or fault of the accused are not to be counted. K.S.A. 22-3402(1) and (2). The 179-day period in which a district court kept an accused's motion to suppress evidence under advisement is not a delay caused by the application or fault of the accused and, hence, is to be counted in computing the statutory period.
Geary N. Gorup, Asst. Dist. Atty., argued the cause, and Clark V. Owens, Dist. Atty., and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., were with him on the brief, for appellant.
Michael D. Wilson, of Wilson, Warner and Skinner, Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief, for appellee.
The district court dismissed charges against defendant Michael R. Roman for the offenses of possession of cocaine after a previous conviction (K.S.A. 65-4127a) and possession of marijuana after a previous conviction (K.S.A. 65-4127b[a] on the ground defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial (K.S.A. 22-3402 had been violated. The State appeals this dismissal as a matter of right pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(1).
K.S.A. 22-3402(2) provides:
"If any person charged with a crime and held to answer on an appearance bond shall not be brought to trial within one hundred eighty (180) days after arraignment on the charge, such person shall be entitled to be discharged from further liability to be tried for the crime charged, unless the delay shall happen as a result of the application or fault of the defendant, or a continuance shall be ordered by the court under subsection (3)."
The following chart summarizes the pertinent events chronologically and focuses on the area of dispute:
NO. CHARGEABLE TO
OF --------------
DATE(S) EVENT DAYS STATE DEFENDANT DISPUTED
------------- ----------------------------- ----- ---------------- --------
1. 2/7/84 Arraignment; case set for 55 55 0 No
to jury trial calendar of 4/2/
4/2/84 84
2. 4/2/84 On day of scheduled jury 74 0 74 No
to trial, defendant waives a
6/15/84 jury. Trial continued to
6/22/84 for bench trial
Defendant's motion to
suppress evidence filed 6/
7/84 and set for hearing
6/15/84
3. 6/15/84 Motion heard by Judge 7 0 7 No
to Keith Sanborn and taken
6/22/84 under advisement until
trail date (6/22/84.)
4. 6/22/84). Judge Sanborn hears 179 ? ? 179
to further oral argument (6/22/
12/18/84 84) on motion to suppress
directs parties to file
briefs (no briefing schedule
set and trial not
rescheduled). Decision
granting suppression
motion sustained 12/18/84.
5. 12/18/84 Delay in State filing 3 3 0 No
to interlocutory appeal.
12/21/84
6. 12/21/84 Interlocutory appeal N/A N/A
to through receipt of mandate
1/30/86 which reversed district
court's sustaining of
motion to dismiss.
7. 1/30/86 Upon receipt of mandate, 43 43 0 No
to trail set for 3/14/86. Motion
3/14/86 to dismiss for violation
of statutory right of
speedy trial sustained
3/14/86.
----- ----- --------- --------
TOTALS 361 101 81 179
It is agreed 361 days of "chargeable" time elapsed between date of arraignment (February 7, 1984) and date of dismissal (March 14, 1986). This figure excluded the period of time the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction of the case during the interlocutory appeal. The 101 days chargeable to the State and 81 days chargeable to defendant are not in any serious dispute herein. The bone of contention is the 179 days Judge Keith Sanborn had the motion to suppress under advisement following the June 22, 1984, scheduled trial date. The district court (Judge Watson) held the entire 179 days was chargeable to the State, making the total time charged to the State 279 days--well...
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...of the statute" because the delay arose on the application of the defendant. 257 Kan. at 563, 894 P.2d 206. But see State v. Roman , 240 Kan. 611, 613, 731 P.2d 1281 (1987) (recognizing some reasonable delay to rule on defense motion may be charged to defendant, but not the entirety of a 17......
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...of his fault should be limited to a reasonable time measured by the particular circumstances of the case." See State v. Roman, 240 Kan. 611, 613, 731 P.2d 1281 (1987); State v. Bean, 236 Kan. 389, 393, 691 P.2d 30 (1984); State v. Sherman, 217 Kan. 326, 330, 536 P.2d 1373 (1975). The State ......
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