State v. Ronald Medina
| Decision Date | 11 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | 12–101,12–309,12–207,12–103,12–231.,Nos. 12–087,12–102,s. 12–087 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Vermont v. Ronald MEDINA. State of Vermont v. Douglas J. Hewitt, Jr. State of Vermont v. Shane T. Goodrich. State of Vermont v. Ricardo Ramos. State of Vermont v. William Abernathy. State of Vermont v. Tyler J. Hartz. State of Vermont v. Jeffrey Gerrow, et al. |
William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and Bridget C. Asay and John Treadwell, Assistant Attorneys General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, and Joshua S. O'Hara, Appellate Defender, Montpelier, for Defendants–Appellants.
Present: REIBER, C.J., DOOLEY, SKOGLUND, BURGESS and ROBINSON, JJ.
¶ 1. Defendants in these consolidated cases challenge as unconstitutional a recent amendment to Vermont's DNA-database statute that, as of July 1, 2011, mandates warrantless, suspicionless DNA collection and analysis from anyone arraigned for a felony after a determination of probable cause. 20 V.S.A. § 1933(a)(2). All five of the trial courts in these cases found that the amendment authorizes unconstitutional searches and seizures, either under the Vermont Constitution, Chapter I, Article 11, or under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, or both. We affirm, addressing only the compliance of the statute with the requirements of Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution.
¶ 2. We repeat at the outset that our holding today pertains only to the Vermont Constitution and not to the U.S. Constitution. After the trial courts in these cases issued their opinions addressing both constitutions, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that a similar Maryland statute—one that authorized warrantless, suspicionless DNA collection from persons arrested for violent crimes or burglary1 —is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Maryland v. King, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 1980, 186 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013). We delayed our ruling in these cases to consider the import of King2 and to allow additional briefing on the matter. Having done so, we recognize that there are two possible bases to differentiate this case from King: (1) the Vermont statute sufficiently differs from the Maryland statute involved in King to produce a different result under the Fourth Amendment;3 and (2)
the heightened standards and requirements of Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution compel a different result. We have examined the second basis and determined that the result is different. We have not analyzed the first possible basis in depth, although differences are noted as we encounter them. Nor does the outcome of the Fourth Amendment analysis determine compliance with the Vermont Constitution, as we have firmly established that Article 11 is more protective in this area than its federal counterpart. State v. Cunningham, 2008 VT 43, ¶ 16, 183 Vt. 401, 954 A.2d 1290 ; see generally State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233 (1985) (). We strike down the amendment to 20 V.S.A. § 1933 as unconstitutional solely under Vermont Constitution Chapter I, Article 11. Although we discuss King, it is only to determine whether we would adopt parts of its reasoning in our Article 11 analysis.
¶ 3. With that preamble, we begin with a discussion of the evolution of the statute and its DNA-collection mandate. We then turn to a summary of our own Article 11 jurisprudence as it currently exists regarding the special-needs doctrine. Next, we examine and distinguish King, as well as a handful of other Fourth Amendment decisions that we find to be helpful in determining the contours of Article 11. Finally, we apply our Article 11 special-needs doctrine to the case at hand.
¶ 4. As an initial matter, Vermont's statutory scheme creates both a DNA data bank, which contains the DNA samples, and a DNA database, which contains the DNA records (also known as “profiles”) derived from the DNA samples. 20 V.S.A. §§ 1932(10) -(11), 1938(c) -(d). In 1998, Vermont created the statewide DNA data bank and database and began populating them by collecting and analyzing DNA from those convicted of any statutorily defined
“ violent crime.” 1997, No. 160 (Adj.Sess.), § 1 (). In 2005, the Legislature expanded the statutory mandate to require a DNA sample and profile from all those convicted of any felony or attempted felony. 2005, No. 83, §§ 7, 8 ().5 WE UPHELD THIS EXPANSION AS CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER ARTICLE 11 in State v. Martin, 2008 VT 53, ¶ 35, 184 Vt. 23, 955 A.2d 1144.6 The most recent amendment, enacted in 2009, expands further those subject to DNA sampling by adding the following language: “The following persons shall submit a DNA sample: ... A person for whom the court has determined at arraignment there is probable cause that the person has committed a felony in this state on or after July 1, 2011.”7 2009, No. 1, § 24 (codified at 20 V.S.A. § 1933(a)(2) ). It is this requirement, expanding mandatory DNA sampling to those merely charged with a felony, but not yet convicted, that defendants challenge here.8 Hereinafter, we refer to felony
charges on which probable cause has been found as “qualifying charges.”
¶ 5. The current laws governing the data bank and database are codified at 20 V.S.A. §§ 1931 –1946. Other than the expansion, described above, of the classes of people subject to DNA sampling under the scheme, the law remains essentially unchanged since 1998. The policy section of the database and data bank law, § 1931, reads as follows:
It is the policy of this state to assist federal, state, and local criminal justice and law enforcement agencies in the identification, detection, or exclusion of individuals who are subjects of the investigation or prosecution of crimes. Identification, detection, and exclusion may be facilitated by the DNA analysis of biological evidence left by the perpetrator of a crime and recovered from the crime scene. The DNA analysis of biological evidence can also be used to identify missing persons.
The law allows analysis of DNA samples only “for law enforcement identification purposes,” “to assist in the identification of human remains,” and, “if personal identifying information is removed, for protocol development and administrative purposes.”9 Id. § 1937(a). It also provides that DNA records “in appropriate circumstances ... may be used to identify missing persons.” Id. § 1941(b). The statute specifically prohibits analysis “for identification of any medical or genetic disorder.” Id. § 1937(b).
¶ 6. The DNA sample is analyzed to produce a record, or profile, of identification information from the DNA loci specified for the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), the national DNA repository maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Id. § 1932(4). Both the sample and its associated record may “be provided to law enforcement agencies for lawful law enforcement purposes.” Id. § 1938(a). The tissue or fluid from which the DNA is extracted “may be provided to law enforcement agencies only for DNA sample analysis for use in any investigation and prosecution.” Id. § 1938(b). The Vermont database shares its DNA profiles with the national CODIS database. Id. §§ 1936, 1938(e), 1939(b).
¶ 7. The Legislature included several provisions to safeguard the integrity of the database and data bank and the privacy of the personal information contained therein. The statutes contain a general confidentiality requirement, id. § 1941(a), impose criminal penalties for breach of that requirement, id. § 1941(c), and allow a private right of action for equitable relief and damages, including punitive damages and reasonable attorney's fees, id. § 1941(d). Criminal and civil penalties also attach to tampering or attempted tampering with DNA samples. Id. § 1945. Additionally, for those convicted of a qualifying offense, DNA records must be expunged and samples destroyed if the qualifying offense is pardoned, or reversed and dismissed. Id. § 1940(a)(1)-(2). For those whose DNA is collected after arraignment on a qualifying charge, DNA records must be expunged and samples destroyed if the qualifying charge is dismissed or pled down to a nonqualifying charge, or if the qualifying charge is acquitted or downgraded to a nonqualifying charge at trial. Id. § 1940(a)(3)-(5). If, before the record is expunged, it yields a match with another record in the state or federal system, the record of that match is retained even though the sample itself and the original record are destroyed. Id. § 1940(d).
¶ 8. In its implementation of the database and data bank law, the State incorporates further safeguards to protect DNA privacy and minimize the intrusion on the individual. The law provides for the DNA sample to be extracted from a blood draw unless a “less intrusive means” of collection is available. Id. § 1934. The State's current practice is to collect the sample via a cheek swab. See Martin, 2008 VT 53, ¶ 22, 184 Vt. 23, 955 A.2d 1144. For purposes of this analysis we will assume, as we did in Martin, that the State uses only cheek swabs to collect DNA.10 Id. We do not analyze any other method of collection, nor have the parties asked us to do so.
¶ 9. The State maintains a separate database for convicted-offender records, arraignee records, and unknown forensic-sample records (i.e., unsolved crime samples). The DNA samples, the DNA records generated from the samples, and the identifying
information of the subject—name, date...
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