State v. Rooney

Citation19 A.3d 92,2011 VT 14
Decision Date23 February 2011
Docket NumberNo. 08–470.,08–470.
PartiesSTATE of Vermontv.Brian ROONEY.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Vermont

19 A.3d 92
2011 VT 14

STATE of Vermont
v.
Brian ROONEY.

No. 08–470.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

Feb. 4, 2011.Motion for Revision Granted Feb. 23, 2011.


[19 A.3d 94]

Thomas Donovan, Jr., Chittenden County State's Attorney, Pamela Hall Johnson, Deputy State's Attorney, Burlington, and David Tartter, Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff–Appellee.Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, Anna Saxman, Deputy Defender General, and Jeffrey Rubin, Law Clerk (on the Brief), Montpelier, for Defendant–Appellant.Present: REIBER, C.J., DOOLEY, JOHNSON, SKOGLUND and BURGESS, JJ.BURGESS, J.

¶ 1. Defendant Brian Rooney appeals from his conviction and life sentence for aggravated murder following a jury trial. He argues that: (1) the State's failure to disclose the Vermont Forensic Laboratory's internal validation studies violated his due process rights and deprived him of a fair trial; and (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the aggravated murder charge, or, alternatively, in failing to sentence him under the first degree murder statute in violation of his equal protection rights under the United States and Vermont Constitutions. We reject these arguments and affirm both defendant's underlying conviction and his sentence.

¶ 2. On October 13, 2006, police discovered the body of Michelle Gardner–Quinn, a University of Vermont student who had been missing since the early morning hours of October 7. Gardner–Quinn's body was found in a crevasse in Huntington Gorge, and detectives determined the cause of death to be a combination of blunt force trauma to the head and neck compression. The position of Gardner–Quinn's clothes as well as subsequent medical examination and forensic testing of her body and underwear indicated a sexual assault.

¶ 3. Evidence was presented at trial as to the events leading up to Gardner–Quinn's disappearance. On the evening of October 6, Gardner–Quinn and two friends went out to dinner and to several bars in downtown Burlington. At approximately 1:30 a.m., Gardner–Quinn made plans to meet up with another friend at the Ski Rack, a store located on Main Street, and she set out alone towards that location. Gardner–Quinn was unable to connect with the friend once she reached the Ski Rack. At this point, Gardner–Quinn's cell phone battery died, and she borrowed the phone of defendant, a stranger who had apparently just left a bar in the area. Gardner–Quinn made several calls from defendant's phone, but was unable to reach the friend whom she was supposed to meet. A surveillance video from a downtown store

[19 A.3d 95]

showed defendant and Gardner–Quinn walking down the street at approximately 2:15 am. This was the last time Gardner–Quinn was seen alive. Defendant was arrested on October 23 and charged with aggravated murder under 13 V.S.A. § 2311(a)(8) for “murder [ing] another human being while perpetrating a sexual assault.”

¶ 4. Defendant was questioned multiple times about what happened to Gardner–Quinn during the early morning hours of October 7, both immediately following Gardner–Quinn's disappearance and several times subsequent to discovery of her body. Each time, he denied having any knowledge of what happened after he let her borrow his cell phone. Questioning of defendant's friends and family, however, indicated that defendant lived approximately five miles from Huntington Gorge, where Gardner–Quinn's body was discovered, and that he was familiar with the area.

¶ 5. At trial, the State presented forensic evidence linking DNA found in sperm taken from a rectal swab of Gardner–Quinn to a DNA sample obtained from defendant. Testimony was also presented from the medical examiner, indicating that Gardner–Quinn was sexually assaulted just prior to her murder. The State also relied heavily on testimony from employees of the Vermont Forensic Laboratory, detailing the processes they used to obtain a DNA sample from sperm found on Gardner–Quinn's body and to test whether that sample matched defendant's DNA profile. Marcia LaFountain, a forensic scientist at the lab who worked on Gardner–Quinn's case, testified that the result of the DNA profiling indicated that the probability of randomly selecting an unrelated individual in the general population exhibiting the combination of DNA types found from the semen in the rectal swab and the DNA sample taken from Rooney was approximately one in 240 quadrillion.

¶ 6. A substantial portion of the trial concerned whether the sample of DNA obtained from the rectal swab—which amounted to .24 nanograms of DNA—was large enough to yield an accurate profile. The State presented evidence, in the form of expert testimony from lab technicians with significant experience in both forensic analysis and quality assurance methods associated with DNA testing, indicating that the procedures followed by the lab were consistent with both national practices and with the lab's own internal procedures. Defendant challenged the lab's techniques, and presented evidence that a larger sample size of DNA provides optimal results. Defendant also showed evidence of irregularities and mistakes in the lab's handling of other pieces of evidence in both this and other cases.

¶ 7. At the conclusion of the State's case, defendant moved for acquittal, arguing that the State had not met its burden to produce evidence upon which a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he sexually assaulted and murdered Gardner–Quinn. The court denied the motion.

¶ 8. Prior to the close of evidence, defendant moved to dismiss the aggravated murder charge, 13 V.S.A. § 2311(a)(8). He argued that because the elements for this charge are identical to the elements for first degree murder under 13 V.S.A. § 2301, equal protection guarantees of the United States and Vermont Constitutions entitled him to be sentenced under the charge with the lesser penalty. Thus, defendant argued, he was entitled to sentencing under 13 V.S.A. § 2301, which carries a punishment of thirty-five years to life, 13 V.S.A. § 2303(a)(1)(A), rather than the mandatory life sentence attached to § 2311(a)(8). The trial court denied the motion in May 2008. The trial court explicitly

[19 A.3d 96]

rejected defendant's equal protection arguments, concluding instead that although “both statutes provide different penalties for identical conduct, this is exactly the situation that the [United States Supreme Court] considered when it unanimously held that overlapping criminal statutes with different penalties do not violate constitutional principles unless the prosecutor selectively bases the charging decision upon impermissible considerations.”

¶ 9. Following trial, a jury convicted defendant of aggravated murder. In July 2008, defendant moved for a new trial, arguing: (1) the trial court erred in failing to submit lesser-included offenses to the jury; and (2) the State failed to produce “critical exculpatory information” pursuant to Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b)(2). With regard to the first claim, defendant argued that the court erred in denying his request that the lesser-included offenses of second degree murder and sexual assault be included in the jury instructions. The trial court rejected this argument, concluding that “there was no evidence that Defendant murdered Michelle Gardner–Quinn apart from the evidence that he had sexually assaulted her[;] [t]herefore, no rational jury could find that Defendant committed the murder unless it also concluded that he had committed the sexual assault.”

¶ 10. On the second claim, defendant argued that because the DNA sample linking him to the sexual assault of Gardner–Quinn was the critical piece of the State's case, the State had a duty to disclose validation studies setting forth the procedure the lab is supposed to use to generate reliable DNA profiling results. Defendant claimed these validation studies, obtained after trial, showed that the State's expert provided false assertions about the lab's ability to generate reliable DNA profiles with .24 ng of DNA input. The State denied that the studies were exculpatory, but the court rejected the claim on other grounds, holding instead that under the standard articulated in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), defendant had adequate knowledge of the existence of these studies and could have requested them prior to trial.

¶ 11. Defendant raises two claims on appeal: (1) the State violated its constitutional obligations under Brady by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence in the form of validation studies that would have impeached the reliability of the State's DNA evidence; and (2) he is entitled to a new trial, or alternatively new sentencing, because his conduct is punishable under two statutes with identical elements and differing sentences, and such a statutory scheme violates equal protection guarantees under the United States and Vermont Constitutions.

I.

¶ 12. Defendant claims that he was denied a fair trial and due process of law as the result of the State's failure to disclose the Vermont Forensic Laboratory's (VFL) internal validation studies, which defendant obtained through a motion for post-trial discovery. He contends that the studies showed that the .24 ng of DNA input lab technicians were able to obtain from semen found in a rectal swab of Gardner–Quinn was well below the range that yielded accurate results in the lab's validation studies.1 He argues that

[19 A.3d 97]

the studies would have served to impeach the State's DNA evidence linking defendant to the crime and, thus, disclosure was required under Brady. See also V.R.Cr.P. 16(b)(2) (requiring prosecutor to “[d]isclose to defendant's attorney any material or information within his possession or control which tends to negate the guilt of the defendant as to the offense charged or would tend to reduce his punishment therefor”); State v. Gibbons, 146 Vt. 342, 344, 503 A.2d 540, 541 (1985) (“Impeachment...

To continue reading

Request your trial
15 cases
  • In re A.P.
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • October 9, 2020
    ...the facts supported a charge under either statute, the State had discretion to charge juvenile with the felony offense. See State v. Rooney, 2011 VT 14, ¶ 29, 189 Vt. 306, 19 A.3d 92 (holding that State had discretion to charge defendant under either of two statutes that had identical eleme......
  • In re A.P.
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • October 9, 2020
    ...the facts supported a charge under either statute, the State had discretion to charge juvenile with the felony offense. See State v. Rooney, 2011 VT 14, ¶ 29, 189 Vt. 306, 19 A.3d 92 (holding that State had discretion to charge defendant under either of two statutes that had identical eleme......
  • State v. Dow
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • August 19, 2016
    ...2013 VT 69, ¶ 22, 194 Vt. 335, 80 A.3d 52 ("On remand, the State must move to vacate one of the convictions at its election."); State v. Rooney, 2011 VT 14, ¶ 34, 189 Vt. 306, 19 A.3d 92 (recognizing that when an action violates two criminal statutes, State has discretion to prosecute under......
  • State v. Stern
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • April 6, 2018
    ...Rather, that weighing lies within the State's prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether to pursue a probation violation. See State v. Rooney, 2011 VT 14, ¶ 30, 189 Vt. 306, 19 A.3d 92 (acknowledging that "[v]irtually unlimited prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions is no stranger......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT