State v. Rosa
| Decision Date | 14 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | #29832 |
| Parties | STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Malia Ann ROSA, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
JOHN R. MURPHY, Rapid City, South Dakota, Attorney for defendant and appellant.
MARK VARGO, Attorney General, JOHN M. STROHMAN, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee.
[¶1.] Malia Rosa was charged for driving under the influence (DUI) and open container in a motor vehicle after her daughter, A.R., called 911 and reported that Rosa may be drinking and driving and provided Rosa's location. Relying on the tip, officers conducted a traffic stop of Rosa's van and ultimately arrested her for DUI. Rosa filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop, arguing the stop was an unreasonable search and seizure prohibited by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The circuit court denied the motion. The court found Rosa guilty of open container and DUI and imposed a suspended imposition of sentence. Rosa appeals the circuit court's denial of her motion to suppress, arguing that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop her. We affirm.
[¶2.] On August 25, 2020, at roughly 7:06 p.m., Officer Jacob Westover received a call from dispatch reporting a "possible drunk driver in the Dollar Tree parking lot" in Spearfish, South Dakota. Dispatch informed Officer Westover that the reporting party, A.R., had called from Custer, South Dakota. A.R. identified herself by name and provided dispatch with her phone number, address, and birthdate, indicating she was 14 years old at the time. After the stop, law enforcement discovered that the provided address was a juvenile facility.
[¶3.] A.R. reported that she had spoken to her mother, Malia Rosa, on the phone and that Rosa had "sounded drunk but I couldn't tell." A.R. did not report how long ago she had spoken to Rosa. A.R. stated that Rosa had left home at 5 a.m. and had a history of disappearing and drinking. A.R. explained that Rosa had been at Dollar Tree and that she was planning to leave the area soon. Rosa was reportedly driving a white van with a design on the side. Officer Westover believed A.R.’s tip was reliable, as he assumed "she has firsthand knowledge due to it being her mother."
[¶4.] At approximately 7:18 p.m., Sergeant Steven Hofmann arrived at Dollar Tree to investigate the report. Sergeant Hofmann believed A.R.’s tip was sufficient to effect a stop and decided against personally calling A.R. for more information. Additionally, he concluded that A.R.’s statement that Rosa would be leaving Dollar Tree soon indicated that they had spoken recently.
[¶5.] Once Sergeant Hofmann arrived at Dollar Tree, he observed the white van A.R. had described. He ran the plates and confirmed that the vehicle was registered to an individual from Custer County. Seeing no occupants in the van, he left the parking lot and watched the van from a distance. Roughly ten minutes later, a woman, later identified as Rosa, walked out of Dollar Tree to the van. Sergeant Hofmann recalled that nothing in the way Rosa behaved indicated that she was intoxicated and that she walked normally to the van and drove the vehicle out of the parking lot. Sergeant Hofmann communicated with Officer Westover and instructed him to stop the van.
[¶6.] Officer Westover arrived as the van was leaving the Dollar Tree parking lot, and both officers followed it to Walmart. Neither officer observed Rosa drive erratically or commit a traffic violation. After Rosa had pulled into a parking space, the officers parked their cars behind her—blocking her in, as another car was parked in front of hers. Officer Westover testified that by the time he and Sergeant Hofmann pulled in behind Rosa, they would not have allowed her to leave.
[¶7.] The officers exited their patrol vehicles and approached Rosa's van. Upon reaching Rosa, Officer Westover informed her that he had received a "complaint" and asked to see her driver's license, which he used to identify her as Malia Rosa. Officer Westover reported an "odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from inside the vehicle." He asked Rosa to exit the van. The officers had Rosa perform field sobriety tests and, based upon their observations, arrested Rosa for DUI and open container.
[¶8.] The State filed an indictment on September 30, 2020, charging Rosa with one count of DUI in violation of SDCL 32-23-1(1), and an alternative count of DUI in violation of SDCL 32-23-1(2). The State also filed a part II information, alleging that Rosa had two prior convictions for DUI. On February 9, 2021, Rosa moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop, arguing that law enforcement's stop of her vehicle violated her right against unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. At a suppression hearing, the court heard testimony from Officer Westover and Sergeant Hofmann, detailing the information they had received prior to the stop and their interactions with Rosa during the stop.
[¶9.] The court entered an order denying Rosa's motion to suppress. The court found A.R.’s tip, coupled with rational inferences and common sense, was sufficient to give the officers reasonable suspicion to stop Rosa. The court determined A.R.’s tip was reliable because of her familial relationship with Rosa and her willingness to identify herself.
[¶10.] The parties submitted stipulated facts at a bench trial on September 9, 2021. The court found Rosa guilty of DUI in violation of SDCL 32-23-1(1) and open container. The court dismissed the alternative count for DUI. Rosa admitted to the part II information. On October 12, 2021, the court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed Rosa on probation for two years with conditions that included serving five days in county jail.
[¶11.] Rosa appeals the denial of the motion to suppress, arguing that (1) she was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, (2) the officers did not have probable cause to seize her, and (3) the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to seize her.1
[¶12.] "Our standard of review for suppression motions is well established." State v. Mousseaux , 2020 S.D. 35, ¶ 10, 945 N.W.2d 548, 551. "We review the denial of a motion to suppress based on the alleged violation of a constitutionally protected right as a question of law by applying the de novo standard of review." State v. Rolfe , 2018 S.D. 86, ¶ 10, 921 N.W.2d 706, 709 (quoting State v. Bowers , 2018 S.D. 50, ¶ 9, 915 N.W.2d 161, 164 ). "[A]s a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal." State v. Wilson , 2004 S.D. 33, ¶ 8, 678 N.W.2d 176, 180 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hirning , 1999 S.D. 53, ¶ 9, 592 N.W.2d 600, 603 ).
[¶13.] State v. Kleven , 2016 S.D. 80, ¶ 7, 887 N.W.2d 740, 742 (internal citation omitted).
[¶14.] The Fourth Amendment protects a person from "unreasonable searches and seizures[.]" U.S. Const. amend. IV. "[T]he Fourth Amendment's textual reference to the issuance of ‘[w]arrants’ has been interpreted to state a general principle that police officers ‘must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure[.]’ " State v. Grassrope , 2022 S.D. 10, ¶ 8, 970 N.W.2d 558, 561 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Schumacher , 2021 S.D. 16, ¶ 20, 956 N.W.2d 427, 432 ). As such, generally, "[a] warrantless search and seizure is per se unreasonable[.]" State v. Zahn , 2012 S.D. 19, ¶ 29, 812 N.W.2d 490, 499 (citation omitted).
[¶15.] However, the warrant requirement is not absolute. Grassrope , 2022 S.D. 10, ¶ 8, 970 N.W.2d at 561. "[T]he Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative stops ... when a law enforcement officer has ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’ " State v. Stanage , 2017 S.D. 12, ¶ 7, 893 N.W.2d 522, 525 (quoting Navarette v. California , 572 U.S. 393, 396, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687, 188 L. Ed. 2d 680 (2014) ). "[A] warrant is not required to effect a temporary seizure of a vehicle by means of a traffic stop," so long as an officer has a reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. State v. Short Bull , 2019 S.D. 28, ¶ 12, 928 N.W.2d 473, 476.
[¶16.] Reasonable suspicion to effectuate a stop must be "based upon ‘specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.’ " State v. Akuba , 2004 S.D. 94, ¶ 15, 686 N.W.2d 406, 413 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Chavez , 2003 S.D. 93, ¶ 16, 668 N.W.2d 89, 95 ). Officers are permitted "to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’ " State v. Herren , 2010 S.D. 101, ¶ 7, 792 N.W.2d 551, 554 (quoting United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S. Ct. 744, 750–51, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740 (2002) ). "To determine whether there existed a particularized and objective basis for believing that criminal activity is afoot, [this Court] review[s] the totality of the circumstances at the time the stop was effectuated." State v. Tenold , 2019 S.D. 66, ¶ 19, 937 N.W.2d 6, 12.
[¶17.] We have consistently interpreted reasonable suspicion to be "a common-sense and non-technical concept dealing with the practical considerations of everyday life." Herren , 2010 S.D. 101, ¶ 8, 792 N.W.2d at 554 (quoting State v. Quartier , 2008 S.D. 62, ¶ 10, 753...
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