State v. Tenold

• Decision Date: 18 December 2019
• Docket Number: #28725
• Citation: 937 N.W.2d 6
• Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Curtis Dean TENOLD, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

937 N.W.2d 6

STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Curtis Dean TENOLD, Defendant and Appellant.

#28725

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

ARGUED ON AUGUST 27, 2019

OPINION FILED December 18, 2019

ERIC T. DAVIS, NATHANIEL F. NELSON of Nelson Law, Sturgis, South Dakota, Attorney for defendant and appellant.

JASON R. RAVNSBORG, Attorney General, SARAH L. LARSON, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee.

DEVANEY, Justice

[¶1.] A Deadwood police officer initiated a traffic stop of the defendant’s vehicle because the officer observed a brake light emit a white light. A consent search of the vehicle did not produce any evidence of unlawful drugs; however, the officer later found a foil ball under the passenger seat of the officer’s vehicle where the defendant had been seated. A presumptive test of a substance in the foil ball was positive for methamphetamine, and the defendant was arrested. Thereafter, law enforcement seized evidence from the defendant’s hotel room pursuant to a search warrant, and the defendant was indicted for possession and ingestion of an unauthorized controlled substance. The defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle because it had two properly working brake lights. The circuit court denied the motion, and a jury found the defendant guilty on both counts. The defendant appeals. We reverse and remand.

Factual and Procedural Background

[¶2.] On February 2, 2017, at 2:35 a.m., Officer Braxton McKeon noticed what he believed to be Curtis Tenold’s vehicle leaving the Deadwood Mountain Grand. He decided to follow the vehicle because he had previously received information from Officer James Olson that Tenold and Lana Gravatt were suspected of dealing methamphetamine out of their hotel room at the Deadwood Mountain Grand. Officer McKeon did not immediately initiate a traffic stop because, according to Officer McKeon’s later testimony, the claim of methamphetamine dealing "had not been substantiated enough" to seek out Tenold and Gravatt on those allegations.

[¶3.] While following Tenold’s vehicle, Officer McKeon believed he had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop when he observed what he later described as "one" taillight "emitting a white light when the brakes were applied." According to Officer McKeon, the brake light in the rear back window of the vehicle emitted white light, while the two taillights on the left and right sides of the vehicle emitted red light. Officer McKeon acknowledged that a vehicle needs only two working brake lights, but he believed that Tenold was committing a traffic violation nonetheless because his third brake light emitted white light.

[¶4.] After stopping the vehicle, Officer McKeon explained to Tenold that he had a broken taillight and would receive a warning ticket for the light. Officer McKeon also asked for and obtained consent from Tenold to search the vehicle. Another officer arrived at the scene, so Officer McKeon had Tenold’s passenger, Gravatt, sit in that officer’s vehicle during the search. Tenold sat in the front passenger seat of Officer McKeon’s patrol vehicle. The search produced no evidence of illegal drug activity. Officer McKeon told Tenold and Gravatt that they were free to leave, and Tenold drove away.

[¶5.] After Officer McKeon returned to the police department, he performed a routine search of his vehicle for items that may have been left by the last occupant. The search revealed a small foil ball under the front passenger seat where Tenold had been sitting during the stop. Officer McKeon believed the ball contained a white crystalline substance. His field test of the substance produced a presumptive positive result for methamphetamine.

[¶6.] Concluding that the foil ball belonged to Tenold, Officer McKeon located Tenold at a nearby casino and placed him under arrest. He searched Tenold’s person and found a small amount of marijuana. Thereafter, Officer McKeon prepared an affidavit in support of a request for a warrant to search Tenold and Gravatt’s hotel room. In the affidavit, Officer McKeon included additional information he had obtained from Officer Olson regarding Tenold’s and Gravatt’s suspected drug activity. Officer McKeon also included information regarding his discovery of the foil ball after the stop and the marijuana found on Tenold’s person upon his arrest.

[¶7.] A judge issued the warrant, and a search of the hotel room produced marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and a small amount of methamphetamine. Tenold was indicted by a grand jury and was charged in a superseding indictment with one count of unauthorized possession of a controlled substance or drug and one count of unauthorized ingestion of a controlled substance. Tenold pled not guilty.

[¶8.] Before trial, Tenold filed a motion to suppress. He argued that Officer McKeon did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop of Tenold’s vehicle because no law requires that all brake lights emit only red light upon actuation. He further claimed it was unreasonable for Officer McKeon to believe that the emission of white light from one of Tenold’s three brake lights violated any law. Finally, according to Tenold, all evidence obtained after the stop should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree because the evidence was obtained as a result of the stop.

[¶9.] After two hearings, the circuit court denied Tenold’s motion to suppress. A jury later found Tenold guilty of unauthorized possession of a controlled substance and unauthorized ingestion of a controlled substance. Tenold appeals, asserting the circuit court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. He also asks this Court to modify existing law to prohibit pretextual stops as unconstitutional, an issue we need not address because of our disposition on the first issue.

Analysis and Decision

Legality of the Stop

[¶10.] Tenold contends the circuit court erred when it interpreted SDCL 32-17-8.1 to mean that only red light may display from all stop lamps upon actuation. The plain language of the statute, Tenold claims, does not prohibit the emission of white light from a third brake light when two brake lights meet the display and actuation requirements of SDCL 32-17-8.1. Therefore, in Tenold’s view, Officer McKeon did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. We review de novo the issue whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop given the facts and circumstances known to, or observed by, the officer at the time of the stop. State v. Lerma , 2016 S.D. 58, ¶ 6, 884 N.W.2d 749, 751.

[¶11.] When Tenold was arrested, SDCL 32-17-8.1 provided in relevant part that:

[E]very motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, and pole trailer shall be equipped with two or more stop lamps.... The stop lamp shall be mounted on the rear of the vehicle at a height of no more than seventy inches nor less than fifteen inches. The stop lamp shall display a red light visible from a distance of not less than three hundred feet to the rear in normal sunlight, except for a moped, which distance shall be not less than one hundred fifty feet. The stop lamp shall be actuated upon application of the service (foot) brake which may be incorporated with one or more rear lamps. A violation of this section is a petty offense.^{[1 ]}

Prior to Tenold’s arrest, we specifically construed the language of this statute and held "that all originally equipped brake lights need not display red light and need not be actuated by the brake pedal[.]" See Lerma , 2016 S.D. 58, ¶ 10, 884 N.W.2d at 752. In so holding, we concluded that "the most reasonable interpretation is that the Legislature intended the display and actuation requirements to apply only to the two required brake lights." Id. ¶ 7, 884 N.W.2d at 751.

[¶12.] Here, the circuit court’s decision—that " SDCL 32-17-8.1 requires that all vehicle[ ] stop lights be red in color only"—directly conflicts with our decision in Lerma and is erroneous. It is undisputed that Tenold’s vehicle had two brake lights that met the display and actuation requirements as stated in SDCL 32-17-8.1. Therefore, the circuit court erred when it concluded that "Officer McKeon had probable cause that a traffic offense had occurred when he activated his red lights and stopped the car."

[¶13.] The State nonetheless contends it was objectively reasonable for Officer McKeon to believe that a brake light displaying white light violated SDCL 32-17-8.1. The State relies in part on the fact Lerma acknowledged that the statute was confusing, and thus claims that " SDCL 32-17-8.1 is not definite and certain, but rather unclear and ‘open to differing and equally reasonable interpretations[.]’ " The State cites previous judicial interpretations of SDCL 32-17-8.1, as well as our reference to SDCL 32-21-27 in Lerma as an alternative basis for the stop.

[¶14.] "The Fourth Amendment tolerates only reasonable mistakes, and those mistakes—whether of fact or law—must be objectively reasonable." Heien v. North Carolina , 574 U.S. 54, 66, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539, 190 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2014) ; accord Lerma , 2016 S.D. 58, ¶ 11 n.2, 884 N.W.2d at 752 n.2. In examining the officer’s objective reasonableness in Heien , the Court considered that North Carolina’s appellate courts had yet to construe the confusing law at issue in that case. 574 U.S. at 68, 135 S. Ct. at 540. Similarly, in State v. Wright , we noted that "previous judicial interpretations" are a relevant factor in determining the reasonableness of an officer’s mistake of law. 2010 S.D. 91, ¶ 16, 791 N.W.2d 791, 797 (quoting United States v. Martin , 411 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2005) ).²

[¶15.] From our review of the facts here, Officer McKeon’s mistake of law was not objectively reasonable for three reasons. First, Lerma specifically construed both the display and actuation requirements in SDCL 32-17-8.1 prior to the date of the stop in question, and an...