State v. Rose

• Decision Date: 10 July 2012
• Docket Number: No. 18323.,18323.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Irvin D. ROSE.

305 Conn. 594

46 A.3d 146

STATE of Connecticut

v.Irvin D. ROSE.

No. 18323.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 30, 2011.

Decided July 10, 2012.

Timothy F. Costello, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was John C. Smriga, state's attorney, and Nicholas J. Bove, Jr., senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).

Deborah G. Stevenson, special public defender, for the appellee (defendant).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, HARPER and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.

PALMER, J.

The state appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the conviction of the defendant, Irvin D. Rose, for assault of public safety personnel in violation of General Statutes (Sup.2006) § 53a–167c (a)(5).¹ The Appellate Court reversed the defendant's conviction on the ground that the trial court had compelled him to wear identifiable prison clothing at his jury trial in contravention of his constitutional right to a fair trial. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court on the alternative ground that reversing the defendant's conviction is warranted in the exercise of this court's inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following facts that the jury reasonably could have found. “On January 15, 2006, the defendant was incarcerated [as a pretrial detainee] at the Bridgeport correctional center (center). While housed in the center's hospital unit in an isolation cell, the defendant removed his hospital gown and pushed it, along with his blanket, under his cell door. Thereafter, he tore the seam of his mattress, created a large hole and removed the mattress' stuffing. He then crawled into the mattress and wrapped it around his body, covering himself entirely.

“Correction Lieutenant Timothy Cox was alerted by a department [of correction] employee that the defendant had crawled into his mattress. Cox instructed uniformed [C]orrection Officers Brian Guerrera and Scott Whiteley to remove the damaged mattress from the defendant's cell. Whiteley was instructed to remove the remains of the mattress while Guerrera served as a ‘cover down’ officer. Guerrera was assigned to position himself between Whiteley and the defendant, continuously to monitor the defendant and to protect Whiteley as he removed the mattress. While still outside the cell, Cox instructed the defendant to remove himself from the mattress and sit on the bunk frame. The defendant complied with the instruction, and Guerrera and Whiteley entered the cell. Whiteley picked up the damaged mattress and backed out of the cell. Guerrera maintained his position between Whiteley and the defendant and, still facing the defendant, started to exit the cell. The defendant, without leaving his position ... on the bunk, spat at Guerrera before he exited the cell. Saliva struck Guerrera's face and chest.

“Following department [of correction] protocol for such an incident, Guerrera reported to a department [of correction] nurse at the center. The nurse instructed Guerrera to wipe his face with alcohol pads and [to] complete medical and incident reports. The defendant subsequently was charged with assault of public safety personnel. The defendant represented himself at trial. After a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to a term of ten years incarceration, execution suspended after six years, and five years probation.” State v. Rose, 112 Conn.App. 324, 326–27, 963 A.2d 68 (2009).

The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of conviction, claiming, inter alia,² that the trial court had improperly compelled him to wear prison clothing during trial in violation of his federal constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial ³ and Practice Book § 44–7.⁴Id., at 326, 331, 963 A.2d 68. With one judge concurring in part and dissenting in part; see id., at 342, 963 A.2d 68 ( Foti, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); the Appellate Court agreed with the defendant's constitutional claim and reversed his conviction, concluding that “it is evident that the defendant did not receive a fair trial.” ⁵Id., at 342, 963 A.2d 68.

In resolving the defendant's constitutional claim, the Appellate Court set forth the following additional facts and procedural history that were relevant to its inquiry. “The defendant was arrested on January 15, 2006, for assault of public safety personnel. At that time, he was a pretrial detainee in the center because he was unable to post a $1000 bond for an October 24, 2005 arrest for larceny in the sixth degree.... On January 17, 2006, the defendant was arraigned on the charge of assault of public safety personnel in violation of [General Statutes (Sup.2006) ] § 53a–167c and bond was set at $100,000. He remained incarcerated as a pretrial detainee through trial in July, 2006.

“On the morning of July 21, 2006, prior to jury selection, the court stated to the defendant that ‘I don't know anything about you ... besides that information which you have, but based on the charges that I see, I'm concerned and inclined probably to keep the shackles on....’ The defendant responded that he was not an escape risk and objected to being tried in shackles. The defendant added that ‘[a]lso, my attire, Your Honor, this Bozo the Clown suit is not sufficient.’ The court replied that ‘based on the nature of the charges, the jury is going to know that you are incarcerated anyway.... I do feel that the ankle shackles are required, and the attire, sir, based on the nature of the charges, they are going to know you are incarcerated anyway.... [T]hat's how that stands.’ After the court denied the defendant's request to be tried in civilian clothing, and before the first venire panel was brought in, the defendant again raised concerns that the prospective jurors would not understand that he was a pretrial detainee, rather than an incarcerated convict. The court directed the defendant to confer with his standby counsel about his ‘procedural kind of question.’ The record discloses that the court made no further inquiry concerning this issue during trial.

“During jury selection, the court instructed the members of each venire panel not to consider the defendant's attire in assessing the evidence or in the determination of the outcome of the case. The court's entire instruction to the first venire panel was: ‘The defendant's attire is not to be considered in assessing the evidence or in a determination of the case.’ The court instructed the second panel: ‘I would also note that the defendant's attire is not to be considered by you in assessing the evidence or in determining the outcome of the case.’ The jury was selected from those two venires. The instructions given by the court prior to the jury's deliberationwere completely [de]void of any curative measure concerning the defendant's attire.

“During voir dire, the defendant attempted to determine the [jurors'] assumptions based on his attire. The court repeatedly prevented the defendant from asking jurors about their assumptions about incarcerated persons.

“[During the afternoon session] on July 21, 2006, the defendant brought to the court's attention that he had been seen by one of the potential jurors outside of the courtroom in full restraints. The court responded that ‘[f]or heaven's sake, sir, you are clearly in restraints. Everyone knows you are in restraints. You are in a prison outfit. This is not a secret. You are walking around with the shackles on approaching the jurors, so, please.’ The court began to call in the next prospective juror but stopped and noted on the record that during voir dire, each juror could see the defendant's ankle shackles when he walked to the lectern and that he was sitting in court in a jumpsuit. The court also noted that it had instructed the jurors not to consider his attire.

“The first witness, Guerrera ... testified in uniform. Guerrera stated that he was in his uniform at the time of the alleged assault. The [state] asked him to identify the defendant, and Guerrera stated that the defendant was wearing ‘[a] yellow jumper.’ ” State v. Rose, supra, 112 Conn.App. at 332–34, 963 A.2d 68.

Reversing the defendant's conviction, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court had impermissibly compelled the defendant to stand trial in identifiable prison clothing in contravention of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Id., at 338, 342, 963 A.2d 68. Relying in part on Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976), the Appellate Court reasoned that “it is inappropriate to apply harmless error analysis in cases such as this [one, in which] the defendant clearly [had] objected at trial and the [trial] court [made] no findings with respect to an essential state policy” militating in favor of compelling the defendant to stand trial in prison clothing.⁶State v. Rose, supra, 112 Conn.App. at 340, 963 A.2d 68. The Appellate Court also concluded that, “[e]ven if [it] assume[d] that harmless error analysis were appropriate, the state [had] not proven harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.... [T]he defendant was compelled to wear prison garb during jury selection and the entire three days of evidence, and the court instructed the jurors only once, prior to their individual voir dire and selection, that they should not consider the defendant's attire. There was no further instruction at the end of evidence and before deliberation, nor was there any instruction that would discourage the jurors from assuming that the defendant had been convicted of some prior crime. Furthermore, [the trial court gave] no curative instruction ... after a potential juror saw the defendant in the hallway in prison garb, belly chains and ankle shackles; this further indicates the court's failure to consider the prejudice to the defendant should he be tried in his ‘Bozo the Clown suit....’ Finally, the potential prejudice to...