State v. Rossignol
| Decision Date | 09 April 1985 |
| Citation | 490 A.2d 673 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Armand ROSSIGNOL. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Janet T. Mills, District Attorney, Mark A. Beede (orally), Asst. Dist. Atty., Auburn, for the State.
Weston Baker (orally), Lewiston, for defendant.
Before McKUSICK, C.J., and NICHOLS, VIOLETTE, WATHEN, GLASSMAN and SCOLNIK, JJ.
Defendant Armand Rossignol appeals from judgments of the Superior Court (Androscoggin County), entered on the jury's verdicts finding him guilty of: one count of unlawful sexual contact 1 in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 255(1)(C) (1983) and two counts of simple assault in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 207 (1983). Defendant argues that the Superior Court made several erroneous evidentiary rulings and that the Superior Court failed to define clearly the phrase, "corroborating evidence", used in the jury instructions. We find no error and deny the appeal.
Defendant was charged with intentionally subjecting the prosecutrix, his niece, to sexual contact at a time when the prosecutrix was not yet fourteen and defendant was more than three years older than the prosecutrix. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 255(1)(C). Defendant also was charged with assaulting the prosecutrix by recklessly causing offensive physical contact on two separate occasions. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 207. The prosecutrix was born in June 1968. She testified that in April 1980 at her family's house, defendant rubbed her breasts and vagina. She also testified the defendant fondled her breasts on January 1, 1983 and April 30, 1983. According to the prosecutrix's testimony, defendant did not have her consent for any of the incidents and ceased his behavior only after she told him to stop.
Defendant contends that the Superior Court committed reversible error in excluding lay testimony regarding the prosecutrix's state of mind. At some point prior to the incidents, the prosecutrix apparently had received counseling for various emotional problems from the YWCA Intervention Program. Defendant proposed to examine the prosecutrix's YWCA counselor about the prosecutrix's alleged lying, attention seeking behavior, use of drugs and alcohol, suicidal tendencies, and sexual experiences with a man other than defendant. At trial, defense counsel told the court that the counselor's testimony would be used to challenge the prosecutrix's credibility. The trial justice declined to admit the offered evidence. On appeal, the defense discards the credibility justification, substituting in its place an argument that the counselor's testimony would have shown that the prosecutrix was biased against defendant.
The trial court committed no error in refusing to allow defendant to attack the prosecutrix's credibility by the proposed means. The credibility of a witness may be attacked by evidence of reputation for untruthfulness. See M.R.Evid. 608(a). As represented by defense counsel, however, the YWCA counselor's testimony would not have constituted evidence of the prosecutrix's reputation for untruthfulness. Rather, according to defense counsel, the counselor would testify as to specific instances of the prosecutrix's conduct that might reflect on her credibility. Under M.R.Evid. 608(b), extrinsic evidence of specific instances of a witness' conduct may not be used to attack the general credibility of that witness unless the conduct resulted in the conviction of a crime as provided in M.R.Evid. 609. Defendant presented no evidence that the prosecutrix has ever been convicted of any crime.
Furthermore, neither the prosecutrix's alleged attention seeking behavior nor suicidal tendencies were shown to be relevant to her character for truthfulness. In addition, defendant failed to demonstrate, as required by State v. Cedre, 314 A.2d 790, 799 (Me.1974), that the prosecutrix was under the influence of alcohol or drugs either at the time of the incident at issue, or at the time of the trial, or that the prosecutrix's ability to perceive, remember, and testify were significantly affected by drug and alcohol use. In addition, defendant's argument that M.R.Evid. 412 does not bar inquiry into all instances of a victim's past sexual behavior is unavailing in this case. Only in criminal cases in which a person is accused of rape, gross sexual misconduct, or sexual abuse of a minor, does Rule 412 expressly govern evidence of the victim's prior sexual behavior. The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 412 indicates that the language of Rule 412 was not meant to render automatically admissible evidence of prior sexual behavior in prosecutions for unlawful sexual contact. See Advisory Committee Note, Maine Reporter Vol. 449-458 at LXXI. Rather, admissibility of such evidence is determined by considerations of relevancy and impeachment. See id. (citing State v. Davis, 406 A.2d 900 (Me.1979)). The trial court did not abuse its discretionary power in the...
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State v. Oliver
...at 953. A number of other jurisdictions have extended their rape shield laws to cases involving child molestation victims. State v. Rossignol, 490 A.2d 673 (Me.1985); Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 502 A.2d 253 (Pa.Super.Ct.1985), disapproved on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Davis, 541 A.2d 315 ......
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State v. Hoffstadt, 7106
...of a victim in a case involving sexual assault or abuse is generally not admissible because it is irrelevant. See State v. Rossignol, 490 A.2d 673, 675 (Me.1985); see also M.R.Evid. 412; P. Murray, Maine Evidence § 412.1 at 4-95 (3d ed. 1992). As an exception to the general rule, the prior ......
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