State v. Rounds

• Decision Date: 04 May 1932
• Parties: STATE v. ROY ROUNDS
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

160 A. 249

104 Vt. 442

STATE v. ROY ROUNDS

Supreme Court of Vermont

May 4, 1932

January Term, 1932.

Criminal Law---View of Evidence on Motion To Direct or Set Aside Verdict---Discretion of Court---When Refusal of Trial Court To Set Aside Verdict Is Reviewable---Application of Rule as to Direction of Verdict to Criminal Cases---When Verdict Should Be Directed for Respondent---Homicide---Self-Defense---Amount of Force Which May Be Used in Self-Defense---Burden of Proof---Respondent's Version of Encounter---Rule as to Legal Measure of Justifiable Force Which May Be Used Applicable to Fistic Encounter---Jury Question---Presumption as to Amount of Force from Character of Injuries---Sufficiency of Evidence To Make Question of Excessive Force in Self-Defense for Jury---Involuntary Manslaughter---Necessity of Causal Connection between Acts of Respondent and Death---Insufficiency of Evidence To Establish Certain Injuries as Caused by Respondent---What Must Be Shown To Hold Respondent Responsible Where Blows Struck by Him Were Partly Justified and Partly Not Justified---Causal Connection May Not Be Supported by Mere Conjecture and Speculation---Insufficiency of Evidence To Establish Causal Connection between Death and Unlawful Acts of Respondent.

1. On respondent's motion to direct verdict and to set aside verdict, evidence must be taken in most favorable light for State, and, if there is evidence tending to support or justify verdict, weight thereof is for consideration and determination by jury.

2. Motion to set aside verdict on ground that it is contrary to evidence is addressed to sound discretion of trial court.

3. Refusal of trial court to set aside verdict as contrary to evidence cannot be disturbed except for abuse of discretion.

4. When all evidence is before court, and exception is taken on ground that verdict is wholly unsupported by evidence, matter is not for court's discretion, and action of trial court in refusing to set aside verdict is reviewable in Supreme Court.

5. Rule that, when facts are such that reasonable men can fairly draw but one conclusion, or where evidence is undisputed or of such character that court in exercise of sound judicial discretion would be compelled to set aside verdict returned in opposition to it, case should be withdrawn from jury, while inapplicable against respondent in criminal case, should have full application in his favor.

6. Where evidence is so defective that verdict of guilty based upon it cannot be sustained, verdict of not guilty should be directed.

7. When evidence only raises mere suspicion of guilt of accused, or leaves it uncertain or dependent on conjecture, it is insufficient to warrant conviction, and court should direct verdict of acquittal when requested by respondent.

8. To repel assault and battery, person assailed may beat his assailant so far as to make him desist, but may not inflict great bodily harm or take life of assailant, unless he reasonably apprehends death or great bodily harm to himself and has no other means of avoiding assault that appear to him at time to be, and are, sufficient and available.

9. Amount of force which one may justifiably use in self-defense is such as reasonably appears to him to be necessary under all circumstances in case, and, whether he is justified in particular occasion, depends upon whether jury finds that it reasonably appeared to him that it was necessary to use force that he did.

10. Where State's evidence showed that respondent was first assaulted, State has burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that acts of respondent were not in self-defense.

11. On question whether respondent acted in self-defense, State is not bound by his version of encounter, if there is evidence of facts and circumstances from which opposing inferences may fairly and reasonably be drawn.

12. Person assaulted by powerful and belligerent attacker is not bound to measure with nicety force of his blows to repel assault, and rule as to legal measure of justifiable force is equally applicable to all force, whether blows were struck by fists or regardless of means employed.

13. Character of force employed in repelling assault is circumstance for jury's consideration, but it does not control measure of force lawfully used in self-defense.

14. Numerous and serious injuries inflicted by person attacked upon person making assault, held to raise strong inference of great violence.

15. Evidence held sufficient to make question for jury whether respondent used excessive force in repelling assault.

16. Conviction of involuntary manslaughter cannot stand unless there is competent evidence tending to show that some unlawful act of respondent was cause of death.

17. Respondent is responsible for consequences, even where his acts were not immediate cause of death, if intervening cause was natural result of his wrongful acts.

18. Evidence held not to justify conclusion that respondent caused fracture of decedent's ribs, one of which punctured pleural cavity which contained streptococcic pus and caused bacteria to enter blood stream, thereby causing death.

19. Although some blow struck by respondent was contributory force in producing decedent's brain condition, where respondent was justified in using some force to repel decedent's assault, evidence held not to justify inference that decedent's unconsciousness and delirium were caused by any unlawful blow struck by respondent.

20. Where respondent's blows were partly justified and partly not justified, he cannot be held responsible for homicide unless unlawful blows contributed to death.

21. In homicide case, causal connection between death of decedent and unlawful acts of respondent cannot be supported on mere conjecture and speculation.

22. In prosecution for homicide, evidence held insufficient to establish causal connection between death of decedent and respondent's unlawful act, so as to justify conviction for involuntary manslaughter.

INDICTMENT FOR MANSLAUGHTER. Plea, not guilty. Trial by jury at a special term, November, 1931, Chittenden County Sturtevant, J., presiding. Verdict of guilty, judgment thereon, and sentence. The respondent excepted. The opinion states the case.

Judgment reversed, conviction and sentence set aside, and cause remanded.

M. G. Leary and Guy M. Page for the respondent.

On the matter of self-defense, respondent's conduct is to be judged by the situation as it then reasonably appeared to him. Russ v. Good, 90 Vt. 236; McQuiggan v. Ladd, 79 Vt. 90, 105.

The locus of the assault is to all legal effect the home of the respondent. Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 39 L.Ed. 1086; Fortune v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 669, 112 S.E. 861; State v. Bell, 38 So. Dak. 159, 166, 160 N.W. 727; Miller v. State, 139 Wis. 57, 75, 76, 119 N.W. 850; State v. Gordon, 128 S.C. 422, 425, 122 S.E. 501; State v. Laura, 93 W.Va. 250, 256, 115 S.E. 251; State v. Marlowe, 120 S.C. 205, 112 S.E. 921.

If one be assaulted in his own house or curtilage, he need not flee, but may repel force by force in defense of his person. If his assailant comes only to beat him, the owner is justified in beating the assailant so far as to make him desist, though he may not use a weapon in his defense, unless it appears necessary to protect himself from serious bodily harm or death. In the instant case the assault and the defense by respondent, were alike with fists at the very doorway of respondent's barn, and the latter was justified on his own home premises and without retreating, in beating his assailant so far as to make him desist, his rights of resistance being determined by conditions as they appeared to him. State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308, 322, 323; Weston v. State, 167 Ind. 324, 78 N.E. 1014; State v. Trust, 1 Penniwell (Del.), 319, 40 A. 766, 768.

A person assaulted may resist the assault with his fists in circumstances where he would be compelled to take other measures for his safety before resorting to weapons. Where the assault and defense are alike without weapons, the fear and threat need not be of serious injury. Weston v. State, supra; State v. Gough, 187 Iowa, 363, 368, 174 N.W. 279; Russ v. Good, 90 Vt. 236; Foss v. Smith, 76 Vt. 113.

Justifiable self-defense exists where one is attacked in the lawful pursuit of his business and without blame. In such cases he can stand his ground and need not retreat, and is justified if he is compelled to kill his adversary in defense of his life. His rights in this respect are distinguishable from self-defense when he has in some measure provoked his attack. Myers v. State, 192 Ind. 592, 137 N.E. 547; People v. Lewis, 117 Cal. 186, 48 P. 1058.

Ordinarily, one resisting an assault with his fists is not bound to measure with nicety the force of his blows, and deliberately withhold some portion of his strength against a vigorous adversary who is attacking him. State v. Patterson, supra; Brown v. U. S., 256 U.S. 335, 65 L.Ed. 961, 41 S.Ct. 501, 18 A. L. R. 1276; State v. Caldwell (Mo.), 231 S.W. 613.

In circumstances of obscure bodily disease and hidden and unusual physical processes, a jury may find a verdict only upon the testimony of witnesses expert in those matters, that is, expert medical evidence; and, when that evidence is undisputed and unimpeached, neither court nor jury may disregard it. Sheldon v. Wright, 80 Vt. 298; Ryder v. Last Block Co., 91 Vt. 158; Lawson v. Crane, 83 Vt. 115, 119; State v. Rusch, 95 W.Va. 132, 120 S.E. 304; Little v. Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 494, 276 S.W. 158; Central Vt. Ry. Co. v. Bowers Granite Co., 100 Vt. 26, 30; Ewing v. Goode, 78 F. 442; Fledge v. State, 93 Neb. 610, 142 N.W. 276; Kerwin v. Freidman, 127 Mo.App. 519, 105 S.W. 1102; Estate of Butt, 181 Wis. 141, 193 N.W. 999.

However...