State v. Roy
| Decision Date | 10 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | A16-2064 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, ex rel., Joshua Sather, petitioner, Appellant, v. Tom Roy, Commissioner of Corrections, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
Affirmed
Anoka County District Court
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael J. McLaughlin, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori M. Swanson, Attorney General, Lindsay K. Strauss, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and J. Smith, Judge.*
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
In this habeas appeal, appellant challenges a supervised-release condition that requires him to complete a sex-offender treatment program that mandates he take responsibility for his convicted offenses. Appellant argues that this condition: (1) is unworkable; (2) violates his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; and (3) violates substantive due process. Because appellant's release condition is workable and does not violate his constitutional rights, we affirm.
In June 2006, a jury convicted appellant Joshua Sather of first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct for sexually abusing G.T., a family relative who was nine years old at the time. The district court sentenced Sather to 12 years in prison and a mandatory five-year conditional-release term.1 On January 29, 2008, this court affirmed Sather's convictions on direct appeal. See State v. Sather, No. A06-2040, 2008 WL 224030 (Minn. App. Jan. 29, 2008), review denied (Minn. Apr. 29, 2008).
In April 2009, Sather filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the district court denied as procedurally barred. On February 2, 2010, this court affirmed. See Sather v. State, No. A09-1326, 2010 WL 346444 (Minn. App. Feb. 2, 2010), review denied .
In August 2010, Sather filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, asserting violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and claiming that he was "innocent and wrongfully imprisoned." Sather v. Dooley, Civil No. 10-3080 (JRT/JJG), 2012 WL 1005012, at *1-2 (D. Minn. Mar. 26, 2012), appeal dismissed (8th Cir. June 21, 2012). In March 2012, the district court denied Sather's habeas petition, concluding that his claims were procedurally barred because they were not fairly presented in state court. Id. at *2.
On March 19, 2014, respondent the Commissioner of Corrections released Sather from prison on intense supervision and required him to complete an approved sex-offender treatment program. Sather enrolled in an approved treatment program but asserted his innocence throughout treatment. In August 2014, Sather was terminated from the program because he refused to accept responsibility for his crimes. According to a letter from a program representative, "[t]reatment cannot treat an individual who refuses to admit to his crime or take any responsibility for his crime."
On August 21, 2014, the Department of Corrections' (DOC) Hearings and Release Unit (HRU) held a parole-revocation hearing. Sather's parole agent stated that Sather was "a high risk to reoffend" and recommended revoking Sather's supervised release because he had failed to complete treatment. Sather's attorney told the hearings officer that Sather was "willing to do whatever he needs to do to keep from going back to prison, but he won't admit to something he didn't do." A private investigator, who appeared on behalf of Sather, informed the hearings officer that G.T. had recanted his trial testimony because it was not"altogether true." But the hearings officer found this evidence "not very credible," revoked Sather's supervised release, and reincarcerated him.
During the next review hearing in March 2015, Sather's parole agent recommended extending Sather's incarceration for additional release planning because Sather had requested to attend a "deniers" program in the metropolitan area, which was outside his parole supervision area. In October 2015, Sather made a formal written request to the HRU to modify his release condition so he could attend a deniers treatment program that would not require his admission of guilt. At a hearing, Sather's parole agent stated that Sather "expressed he is not interested in release planning and has not provided release placement options." The hearings officer denied Sather's modification request, extended his incarceration, and ordered that re-release was "contingent upon an agent-approved plan."
In November 2015, Sather appealed the October 2015 decision to the HRU Executive Officer. Sather asserted that his release condition violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because compelling him to admit guilt during treatment creates a risk of perjury prosecution. The Executive Officer denied the appeal.
In August 2016, Sather filed this habeas petition, arguing that the condition of completing a sex-offender treatment program that requires him to admit guilt: (1) is unworkable; (2) violates his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and (3) violates substantive due process. After the parties completed their briefing in the district court, but before the district court filed its order, Sather filed a notarized affidavit in support of his petition, stating that "under penalty of perjury, I repeat that I am innocent of the charge of sexually abusing G.T."
The district court denied Sather's petition, concluding that his release condition was not "unworkable" because whether Sather chooses to accept responsibility for his offenses is "fully" within his control. The district court also determined that Sather's release condition does not violate his Fifth Amendment rights because he would not have a "real" risk of a perjury prosecution if he were compelled to admit guilt during treatment, nor does it violate his substantive due-process rights because it survives rational-basis review. Sather appeals.2
The Minnesota constitution guarantees the privilege of filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. The legislature has codified this privilege, extending the right to people who are "imprisoned or otherwise restrained of liberty." Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (2016). A habeas petitioner may bring "claims involving fundamental constitutional rights and significant restraints on [the petitioner's] liberty or to challenge the conditions of confinement." Guth, 716 N.W.2d at 26-27; see also State v. Schnagl, 859 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Minn. 2015) (). A habeas petitioner bears the burden of showing the illegality of his detention or restraint. Bedell v. Roy, 853 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Minn. App.2014). "The district court's findings in support of a denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus are entitled to great weight and will be upheld if reasonably supported by the evidence." Aziz v. Fabian, 791 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Minn. App. 2010). We review legal questions, including constitutional issues, de novo. State v. Schwartz, 628 N.W.2d 134, 138 (Minn. 2001).
Courts accord agencies deference, recognizing that they have expertise and "special knowledge in the field of their training, education, and experience." State ex rel. Morrow v. LaFleur, 590 N.W.2d 787, 792 (Minn. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Fabian, 735 N.W.2d 295, 300-09 (Minn. 2007). The legislature has granted the commissioner of corrections statutory authority over the supervision and discipline of offenders who are confined in Minnesota correctional facilities, including the manner of their supervised release. State ex rel. Duncan v. Roy, 887 N.W.2d 271, 276-77 (Minn. 2016); see generally Minn. Stat. § 243.05 (2016) (describing commissioner's powers); Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 3 (2016) (). The commissioner may place an offender on intense supervision and require completion of sex-offender treatment as a release condition if the commissioner determines that it is in the interests of public safety. Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 6(a), (b) (2016); Minn. R. 2940.1900; see also Roth v. Comm'r ofCorrections, 759 N.W.2d 224, 227-28 (Minn. App. 2008) ().3
When the commissioner exercises his authority, he must "fashion conditions of release that are workable and not impossible to satisfy." State ex rel. Marlowe v. Fabian, 755 N.W.2d 792, 793 (Minn. App. 2008). If a condition "becomes unworkable at the time of release due to circumstances largely outside the control of an offender, the DOC must consider a restructure or modification" of the condition.4 Id. at 796-97; see Minn. R. 2940.2700 ().
The release condition at issue here is completion of an approved sex-offender treatment program that requires the admission of guilt. Sather argues that this condition is unworkable because it is impossible to admit a crime he believes he did not commit; therefore, he contends he is unable to satisfy this release condition and he will be forced to serve his full sentence in prison. Sather argues that the DOC must restructure his condition so that he may attend a deniers treatment program, which the record reflects only exists outside his supervision area. We are not persuaded.
First, Sather has not identified any deniers treatment programs available to him, or submitted any evidence establishing that he is eligible to begin treatment at a deniers program. To...
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