State v. Rucker
| Decision Date | 04 February 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 79932,79932 |
| Citation | 613 So.2d 460 |
| Parties | 18 Fla. L. Week. S93 STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Kenneth RUCKER, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., James W. Rogers, Bureau Chief, Crim. Appeals, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sara D. Baggett and Gypsy Bailey, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, Tallahassee, for respondent.
We have for review Rucker v. State, 598 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), wherein the district court certified:
Does the holding in Eutsey v. State, 383 So.2d 219 (Fla.1980), that the State has no burden of proof as to whether the convictions necessary for habitual felony offender sentencing have been pardoned or set aside, in that they are "affirmative defenses available to [a defendant]," Eutsey at 226, relieve the trial court of its statutory obligation to make findings regarding those factors, if the defendant does not affirmatively raise, as a defense, that the qualifying convictions provided by the State have been pardoned or set aside?
Rucker, 598 So.2d at 326-27. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer in the negative and quash the decision of the district court.
Kenneth Rucker was convicted of one count each of burglary of a conveyance and criminal mischief. Pursuant to section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1989), the State sought sentencing as an habitual felony offender and introduced certified copies of Rucker's prior felony convictions, which Rucker conceded. 1 After "considering the totality of the evidence," the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Rucker qualified as a habitual felony offender. At sentencing, however, the court failed to make specific findings that the prior convictions had not been pardoned or set aside, and the district court reversed because of this.
Rucker argues that the plain language of the statute and our decision in Walker v. State, 462 So.2d 452 (Fla.1985), require the trial court to expressly find that the prior convictions have not been pardoned or set aside. He further urges that our decision in Eutsey v. State, 383 So.2d 219 (Fla.1980), did not change this requirement because the trial court in that case made the appropriate findings.
The legislature enacted the habitual offender act "to allow enhanced penalties for those defendants who meet objective guidelines indicating recidivism." Eutsey, 383 So.2d at 223. Section 775.084 sets out the definition for habitual offenders:
775.084 Habitual felony offenders and habitual violent felony offenders; extended terms; definitions; procedure; penalties.--
(1) As used in this act:
(a) "Habitual felony offender" means a defendant for whom the court may impose an extended term of imprisonment, as provided in this section, if it finds that:
1. The defendant has previously been convicted of any combination of two or more felonies in this state or other qualified offenses;
2. The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed within 5 years of the date of the conviction of the last prior felony or other qualified offense of which he was convicted, or within 5 years of the defendant's release on parole or otherwise, from a prison sentence or other commitment imposed as a result of a prior conviction for a felony or other qualified offense, whichever is later;
3. The defendant has not received a pardon for any felony or other qualified offense that is necessary for the operation of this section; and
4. A conviction of a felony or other qualified offense necessary to the operation of this section has not been set aside in any post-conviction proceeding.
....
(3) In a separate proceeding, the court shall determine if the defendant is a habitual felony offender.... The procedure shall be as follows:
....
(d) Each of the findings required as the basis for such sentence shall be found to exist by a preponderance of the evidence and shall be appealable to the extent normally applicable to similar findings.
Sec. 775.084, Fla.Stat. (1989) (emphasis added). Under the plain language of this statute, a court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has been convicted of two or more felonies within the requisite time period and that these convictions have not been pardoned or set aside.
In Eutsey v. State, 383 So.2d 219 (Fla.1980), we ruled that the burden is on the defendant to assert a pardon or set aside as an affirmative defense. Although this ruling does not relieve a court of its obligation to make the findings required by section 775.084, we conclude that where the State has introduced unrebutted evidence--such as certified copies--of the defendant's prior convictions, a court may infer that there has been no pardon or set aside. In such a case, a court's failure to make these ministerial findings is subject to harmless error analysis. 2
This ruling is not inconsistent with Walker, wherein we stated that findings under section 775.084 are a "mandatory statutory duty":
We hold that the findings required by section 775.084 are critical to the statutory scheme and enable...
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State v. Will
...no relevance where the defendant has agreed to a specific term of years as a habitual offender.4 Harper was decided before State v. Rucker, 613 So.2d 460 (Fla.1993), while Spriggs and Bell were decided after. Rucker commented that a remand for more specific findings on an undisputed point "......
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Kelley v. Rice
... ... Several hours after her petition was filed in this court—and following our order directing an immediate response from the State—Ms. Kelley was released from custody. The State now urges us to dismiss the petition as moot. Because of the serious errors apparent from the face ... ...
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Spriggs v. State
...AFFIRMED. GLICKSTEIN, C.J., and ANSTEAD, LETTS, HERSEY, DELL, GUNTHER, STONE, WARNER, POLEN and KLEIN, JJ., concur. 1 In State v. Rucker, 613 So.2d 460 (Fla.1993), the supreme court decided that the failure to make specific factual findings, that the prior felony convictions had not been pa......
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Daniels v. State, s. 91-2458
...the trial court expressly found that Daniels and Cochran each met the definition of a habitual violent felony offender. See State v. Rucker, 613 So.2d 460 (Fla.1993); Parker v. State, 546 So.2d 727 (Fla.1989). Any failure to make more specific findings was harmless where neither defendant n......