State v. Rudy B.

• Decision Date: 19 October 2010
• Docket Number: No. 31,909.,31,909.
• Citation: 243 P.3d 726,149 N.M. 22,2010 -NMSC- 045
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. RUDY B., Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

243 P.3d 726

149 N.M. 22

2010 -NMSC- 045

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner,

v.RUDY B., Defendant-Respondent.

No. 31,909.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Oct. 19, 2010.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, M. Victoria Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.

Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender, J.K. Theodosia Johnson, Assistant Appellant Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent.

Marsha L. Levick, Katherine E. Burdick, Philadelphia, PA, for Amici Curiae, Juvenile Law Center, Children's Law Center of Massachusetts, Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana, National Juvenile Defender Center, New Mexico Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, Southern Juvenile Defender Center, and Professor Barbara Fedders.

OPINION

BOSSON, Justice.

{1} New Mexico law requires a trial judge to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a juvenile, adjudicated as a youthful offender for having committed certain serious criminal offenses, is "amenable" to treatment or rehabilitation in juvenile facilities or should be sentenced to prison as an adult. See NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-20 (1993) (amended 2009). Our courts have labored for years debating whether the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial requires the amenability determination to be made by the jury or by the trial judge as the statute provides. See State v. Gonzales, 2001-NMCA-025, 130 N.M. 341, 24 P.3d 776, overruled by State v. Rudy B., 2009-NMCA-104, ¶ 53, 147 N.M. 45, 216 P.3d 810.

{2} On the basis of U.S. Supreme Court precedent recently issued in Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 129 S.Ct. 711, 172 L.Ed.2d 517 (2009), we now conclude that the Sixth Amendment does not require a jury determination, and thus, we uphold from constitutional challenge New Mexico's statutory preference for judge-made amenability decisions. In so doing, we reverse the recent contrary opinion of our Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

{3} The Court of Appeals succinctly described the events resulting in the prosecution of Rudy B. ("Child") in this case. "Child was involved in a gang fight in a parking lot. Under the impression that one of the other gang members had a gun, Child pulled out his own weapon and began shooting. He hit three people, one of whom was rendered a quadriplegic." Rudy B., 2009-NMCA-104, ¶ 2, 147 N.M. 45, 216 P.3d 810.

{4} The State then filed a petition in children's court against Child, seventeen years old at the time, alleging various youthful offender offenses and potentially subjecting him to an adult sentence. Soon thereafter, the State filed notice of its intent to seek adult sanctions and obtained a grand jury indictment, charging Child with three counts of shooting from a motor vehicle (great bodily harm), three counts of aggravated battery (deadly weapon), and one count of unlawful possession of a handgun by a minor, and one count of tampering with evidence. Prior to trial, Child pleaded guilty to two counts of shooting from a motor vehicle (great bodily harm) and to two counts of aggravated battery (deadly weapon) (firearm enhancement). In return, the State agreed to drop the remaining charges.

{5} The plea agreement specified that Child was to be sentenced after an amenability hearing that would be held "pursuant to [Section] 32A-2-20." Section 32A-2-20 requires a trial judge to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a juvenile adjudicated as a youthful offender should be sentenced as a juvenile or as an adult. To sentence a youthful offender as an adult, the trial judge must make two findings (collectively "the amenability determination"): "(1) the child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a child in available facilities; and (2) the child is not eligible for commitment to an institution for children with developmental disabilities or mental disorders." Section 32A-2-20(B). The statute provides a list of factors for the trial judge to consider in light of the evidence presented at the amenability proceeding. Section 32A-2-20(C).¹

{6} Child's agreement further explained that, depending on the outcome of the amenability proceeding, he faced either a juvenile disposition until the age of twenty-one with the Children, Youth & Families Department, or an adult sentence of up to twenty-six years with the Department of Corrections. The agreement also contained a provision in which Child waived "all motions, defenses, objections, or requests" regarding the judgment against him, and "specifically waive[d] his right to appeal as long as the Court's sentence [was] imposed according to the terms of [the] agreement."

{7} At the amenability hearing, the trial judge heard conflicting evidence regarding Child's amenability to treatment or rehabilitation as a juvenile in available facilities. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge explained that her decision as to Child's amenability would turn primarily on "the prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the child by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently available," given that Child was eighteen at the time of the hearing. Section 32A-2-20(C)(7). She further explained that the parties had not done an adequate job of educating her regarding the programs and facilities available to treat or rehabilitate Child by the time he reached twenty-one. Because the trial judge felt incapable of rendering an informed decision, she deferred her ruling on Child's amenability until the parties could present additional evidence regarding the available treatment or rehabilitation options.

{8} Based on the evidence presented at a subsequent hearing, the trial judge concluded that no suitable facilities or services were available to treat or rehabilitate Child to a level that would adequately protect the public by the time he turned twenty-one. Consequently, the judge found that Child was not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a child in available facilities, and that he was not eligible for commitment to an institution for children with developmental disabilities or mental disorders. The judge imposed an adult sentence of twenty-five years imprisonment with the Department of Corrections.

{9} On appeal, our Court of Appeals reversed, holding Section 32A-2-20(B) and (C) facially unconstitutional because its amenability determination was made by a judge and not the jury. Rudy B., 2009-NMCA-104, ¶ 53, 147 N.M. 45, 216 P.3d 810. In so doing, the Court relied on a string of Sixth Amendment decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court reaching back to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Rudy B., 2009-NMCA-104, ¶¶ 15-19, 147 N.M. 45, 216 P.3d 810. The Court overruled its prior opinion in Gonzales, 2001-NMCA-025, 130 N.M. 341, 24 P.3d 776, which had arrived at the opposite conclusion with regard to these same amenability determinations. See Rudy B., 2009-NMCA-104, ¶¶ 34-35, 53, 147 N.M. 45, 216 P.3d 810. We granted certiorari to address important and timely constitutional issues under the Sixth Amendment as they affect our statutory process for adjudicating juveniles charged with serious criminal offenses. See State v. Rudy B., 2009-NMCERT-009, 147 N.M. 423, 224 P.3d 650.

DISCUSSION

{10} The State raises two issues on appeal. First, the State contends that the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to consider Child's constitutional challenge toSection 32A-2-20 because Child waived his right to appeal in the plea agreement. Second, the State argues that the Court of Appeals erred when it declared Section 32A-2-20 unconstitutional, largely because it improperly applied the U.S. Supreme Court's recent opinion in Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 129 S.Ct. 711, 172 L.Ed.2d 517. We address each argument in turn.

The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over this case.

{11} The State maintains that Child's explicit waiver of his right to appeal divested the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction to consider his constitutional challenge to Section 32A-2-20. The State's argument is essentially that appellate jurisdiction rests on the status of an appellant as an "aggrieved party," and that Child "agreed not to be aggrieved" when he waived his right to appeal. See N.M. Const. art. VI, § 2 ("[A]n aggrieved party shall have an absolute right to one appeal."). We find the jurisdictional argument unpersuasive.

{12} The State does not cite, and we cannot find, any authority to support the proposition that a waiver in a plea agreement of the right to appeal divests the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction to hear an appeal in a criminal proceeding. The two cases on which the State relies merely illustrate the well-established principle that a voluntary plea of guilty or nolo contendere " 'ordinarily constitutes a waiver of the defendant's right to appeal his conviction on other than jurisdictional grounds.' " State v. Chavarria, 2009-NMSC-020, ¶ 9, 146 N.M. 251, 208 P.3d 896 (quoting State v. Hodge, 118 N.M. 410, 414, 882 P.2d 1, 5 (1994)); see also id. (limiting review to the question of whether the trial court had jurisdiction to sentence the defendant to life in prison, rather than reaching the merits of the defendant's Eighth Amendment challenge to his life sentence); State v. Michael S., 1998-NMCA-041, ¶ 11, 124 N.M. 732, 955 P.2d 201 (declining to address the child's substantive appellate arguments because they were not based on jurisdictional grounds). These cases do not hold, however, that such a waiver in a plea agreement divests an appellate court of jurisdiction to entertain that appeal.

{13} At bottom, a plea agreement is simply a contract between the State and an accused that affects the rights of the parties but not the court's jurisdiction, which is a creature of statute and the state constitution. See State v. Simmons, 2006-NMSC-044, ¶ 12, 140 N.M. 311, 142 P.3d 899 ("We address the plea agreement as a unique form of contract, binding upon both parties, relying on the rules of contract...