State v. Ruiz
| Decision Date | 04 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 20090559.,20090559. |
| Citation | 707 Utah Adv. Rep. 48,2012 UT 29,282 P.3d 998 |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Petitioner, v. Wolfgango RUIZ, Defendant and Respondent. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Laura B. Dupaix, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for petitioner.
Hakeem Ishola, Aaron Tarin, Salt Lake City, for respondent.
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
INTRODUCTION
¶ 1 In 2006, Wolfgango Ruiz pled guilty to one count of attempted sexual abuse of a child, a third degree felony. Prior to his sentencing, Mr. Ruiz made a request to withdraw his plea on the ground that his original defense counsel had not informed him of the immigration consequences of a felony conviction. Initially, Judge Fuchs of the Third District Court granted Mr. Ruiz's motion. But upon a motion to reconsider submitted by the State, Judge Skanchy, who had taken over Mr. Ruiz's case, reversed the order that permitted Mr. Ruiz to withdraw his plea.
¶ 2 The court of appeals subsequently reversed Judge Skanchy's ruling and reinstated Judge Fuchs's order granting Mr. Ruiz's motion to withdraw. The court of appeals reached this decision based on Judge Skanchy's failure to state the basis for his ruling on the record and the principle previously articulated by this court that motions to withdraw guilty pleas should be liberally granted.
¶ 3 We granted certiorari to resolve two issues: (1) whether the court of appeals erred in vacating Judge Skanchy's grant of the State's motion to reconsider and (2) whether our precedent stating that presentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas should be “liberally granted” remains good law in light of recent changes to section 77–13–6 of the Utah Code (Plea Withdrawal Statute or Statute).
¶ 4 We first hold that the court of appeals erred in vacating Judge Skanchy's ruling because the basis for the ruling is apparent on the record. Second, we hold that recent amendments to the Plea Withdrawal Statute have superseded our prior case law stating that presentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas should be “liberally granted.” Based on these conclusions, we reverse the court of appeals' decision to vacate Judge Skanchy's ruling and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 5 In 2006, Mr. Ruiz was charged with sexual abuse of a child, a second degree felony. After his arrest, he retained a private attorney to represent him. In February 2006, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Ruiz pled guilty to the lesser charge of attempted sexual abuse of a child, a third degree felony. After entering his guilty plea, Mr. Ruiz fired his first attorney and retained a second attorney.
¶ 6 Shortly after retaining his second attorney, Mr. Ruiz filed a timely motion to withdraw his plea. In support of this motion, Mr. Ruiz alleged that his first attorney had “deliberately misled [him] into believing that the original second degree felony charge ... carried a minimum mandatory prison term of five years” and had affirmatively misadvised him on the immigration consequences of his plea. In an affidavit attached to his motion, Mr. Ruiz stated that, after entering his plea, he had learned from an immigration attorney that he would “definitely” be deported if he were convicted. Mr. Ruiz also stated in his affidavit that had his first attorney correctly advised him of the potential immigration consequences of his plea, he would not have pled guilty.
¶ 7 In August 2006, Judge Fuchs of the Third District Court presided over a hearing on Mr. Ruiz's motion. Although the State opposed the motion, it presented no evidence at the hearing to rebut the allegations contained in Mr. Ruiz's affidavit. After hearing argument on the motion and considering Mr. Ruiz's affidavit, Judge Fuchs concluded that Mr. Ruiz's first attorney had affirmatively misrepresented the consequences of a guilty plea on Mr. Ruiz's immigration status. Specifically, Judge Fuchs stated that “[s]ince I have nothing on the record from [the first attorney] ..., such as an affidavit as to what he represented ..., I can only take the affidavit and the allegations as [Mr. Ruiz] gives them to me, which is that [his first attorney] told him that this was a non-deportable offense.” Based on this conclusion, Judge Fuchs permitted Mr. Ruiz to withdraw his plea. After Judge Fuchs announced this decision, the State asked whether he would consider revising his ruling if the State “were to bring in” the first attorney to determine exactly what occurred during the course of his representation of Mr. Ruiz. Judge Fuchs declined this request, noting that the State had been given the opportunity to present this evidence during the hearing.
¶ 8 Nine days after Judge Fuchs entered his order permitting Mr. Ruiz to withdraw his guilty plea, the State filed a motion to reconsider. In its motion, the State informed Judge Fuchs that prosecutors had spoken to the first attorney and that he had denied misrepresenting the immigration consequences of Mr. Ruiz's plea. In support of its motion, the State attached an affidavit from the first attorney stating that he had “repeatedly” addressed the immigration consequences of Mr. Ruiz's plea with Mr. Ruiz and that he had expressly informed Mr. Ruiz “that he faced deportation as a consequence of any felony conviction.” Although Judge Fuchs had initially stated during the hearing on Mr. Ruiz's motion that he would not considerthe first attorney's testimony, he scheduled a hearing on the State's motion to reconsider. But before this hearing was held, Judge Fuchs retired.
¶ 9 In January 2007, Judge Fuchs's successor, Judge Skanchy, presided over the hearing on the State's motion to reconsider. At the beginning of the hearing, Mr. Ruiz's second attorney asked the court to prohibit the State from presenting the first attorney's testimony. But after hearing argument from the State, Judge Skanchy allowed the State to present the testimony and explained that he felt it was appropriate for the court to consider the testimony to determine whether Mr. Ruiz's motion to withdraw had been granted in error.
¶ 10 During the hearing, the first attorney testified that he and Mr. Ruiz had addressed the immigration consequences of the charges “from day one” of his representation and that he had continued to talk about those consequences with Mr. Ruiz almost every time they met. Additionally, he testified that he had specifically informed Mr. Ruiz that he would “almost certainly be deported” if he pled guilty to, or was convicted of, the charge against him.
¶ 11 After hearing this testimony, Judge Skanchy concluded that the first attorney had rebutted “the self-serving allegations set forth in [Mr. Ruiz's] affidavit.” Based on this finding, Judge Skanchy granted the State's motion to reconsider, vacated Judge Fuchs's order granting Mr. Ruiz's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and denied Mr. Ruiz's original motion to withdraw.
¶ 12 Mr. Ruiz timely appealed Judge Skanchy's ruling to the Utah Court of Appeals.1 Before the court of appeals, Mr. Ruiz argued that the law of the case doctrine prohibited Judge Skanchy from reconsidering Judge Fuchs's prior ruling that the State could not present the first attorney's testimony to rebut Mr. Ruiz's affidavit.2 In rejecting this argument, the court of appeals explained that the law of the case “doctrine does not prevent a different judge from revisiting an interim order issued in a case by a prior judge, because ... the two judges, while different persons, constitute a single judicial office for law of the case purposes.” 3
¶ 13 After concluding that Judge Skanchy had authority to revisit Judge Fuchs's ruling, the court of appeals noted that Judge Skanchy had not articulated the basis for his decision to allow the State to present the first attorney's testimony.4 Then, after referencing opinions from this court stating that presentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas should, in general, be liberally granted, the court explained that “[a]bsent ... explanation on the record, [it] ha[d] no assurance that the change was not merely a function of personal preference on Judge Skanchy's part.” 5 Based on this concern, the court of appeals vacated Judge Skanchy's ruling and reinstated Judge Fuchs's original order permitting Mr. Ruiz to withdraw his plea.6
¶ 14 After the court of appeals issued its opinion, the State filed a petition for rehearing in which it requested that the court of appeals remove the language from its opinion stating that presentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas should be “liberally granted.” 7 The court of appeals denied this motion and explained in an amended opinion that, despite recent statutory amendments, the “liberally granted” principle remained good law.8
¶ 15 After the court of appeals issued its amended opinion, the State filed a petition for certiorari, which we granted. On appeal to this court, the State contends that the court of appeals erred in two respects. First, the State argues that the court of appeals erred in reversing Judge Skanchy's ruling either because the basis for his decision is apparent on the record or because his failure to articulate the basis for his decision warranted only remand, but not reversal. Second, the State contends that statutory amendments to the Plea Withdrawal Statute have superseded the principle that presentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas should be liberally granted. Accordingly, the State argues that it was erroneous for the court of appeals to articulate this principle in its opinion.
¶ 16 In contrast, Mr. Ruiz first argues that the issues presented on certiorari have been rendered moot by the United States Supreme Court's recent opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky.9 Mr. Ruiz also argues that the court of appeals properly reversed Judge Skanchy's ruling and correctly stated that presentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas should be liberally granted. 10 W...
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