State v. Russell

Decision Date06 June 1983
Docket NumberNo. 15346-KA,15346-KA
Citation434 So.2d 460
PartiesSTATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Terrance D. RUSSELL, Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Herman A. Castete, Winnfield, for appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara B. Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baton Rouge, Charles B. Bice, Dist. Atty., Kermit M. Simmons, Asst. Dist. Atty., Winnfield, for appellee.

Before HALL, SEXTON and NORRIS, JJ.

HALL, Judge.

By grand jury indictment the defendant, Terrance D. Russell, was charged with aggravated rape (LSA-R.S. 14:42) and armed robbery (LSA-R.S. 14:64). After pleading not guilty he was tried before a jury of 12 persons. The jury found the defendant guilty of both offenses, with 10 jurors concurring in the guilty verdicts. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for the aggravated rape conviction and 20 years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for the armed robbery conviction, the sentences to run consecutively. The defendant appealed, filing 13 assignments of error. Finding all assignments of error to be without merit, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

The evidence presented by the state establishes the following facts. On March 7, 1982 at about 7:00 p.m. the victim was waiting in her Camaro automobile in front of a grocery store in Winnfield where her friend worked. The defendant, a 16-year-old black male, unexpectedly entered the victim's car on the passenger's side. He had in his hand what appeared to the victim to be a silver pistol wrapped in a white handkerchief. At gunpoint the defendant ordered the victim to drive to Natchitoches. Just north of Gum Springs, while still in Winn Parish, the defendant ordered the victim to drive down an isolated dirt road. While the defendant threatened the victim with the gun he forced her to disrobe and to have sexual intercourse with him on the back seat of the car. He also robbed her of about $140 which he took from her purse.

The defendant then ordered the victim to get into the trunk of the automobile. He first had to make room for her and took out the spare tire and other items and threw them on the ground.

The defendant then drove around for awhile. He drove to the home of Ronald Davis who got into the car and they next went to the home of Ronald Rachel. Both Davis and Rachel lived at or near Natchitoches. The defendant told them that his father had bought him the Camaro automobile. Around 9:30 p.m. all three went riding.

While stopped at a gas station the victim was able to draw the attention of Davis and Rachel. After the defendant refused to let the victim out of the trunk, Rachel persuaded the defendant to let him drive the car. He drove the car to the Natchitoches police station, arriving there about 11:30 p.m., opened the trunk, and released the victim from the trunk. The defendant fled the scene; the Natchitoches police arrested him the next day.

After a short interview, the Natchitoches police took the victim to a local hospital where she received a rape examination. Police officers gathered evidence from the scene of the crime, finding the spare tire and other items which had been taken out of the trunk. After finding what appeared to be a pistol wrapped in a handkerchief on the front seat of the car, officers determined that it was a toy cap pistol. When defendant was arrested he was taken to a Winn Parish hospital for an examination.

The defendant presented a different account of the events in his testimony. He testified that he had met the victim in mid-January when she approached him, asked for his name and address, and asked whether they could meet. He testified that they met on several occasions and they "made love" once sometime in February. He further stated that on the day in question the two had made arrangements to meet. After the victim drove to the dirt road they made love at her suggestion. The defendant testified that the reason the victim was in the trunk of the car was so that she would not be seen when he drove to see some friends in Natchitoches. The defendant also testified that she was jealous because he was seeing another girl. He ran from the police station because he was afraid of being falsely accused of a crime.

Additional facts of the case will be related as necessary to discuss the assignments of error.

Assignment of Error No. 1:

I. "The trial court erred in sustaining the objection of the State when the complaining witness, while under cross-examination, could not explain the details of the alleged rape."

During a detailed cross-examination of the victim about the exact physical positions of the victim and her assailant during the rape, the state objected when the defendant's attorney asked the victim if she were lying flat on the back seat when the rape occurred, on the grounds of the question being argumentative and repetitious. The objection was sustained. Defense counsel argues that the defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to confrontation and full and complete cross-examination of the complaining witness, citing State v. Senegal, 316 So.2d 124 (La.1975).

The right to cross-examination is a principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested, but the right is subject always to the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation. State v. Senegal, supra; Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); LSA-R.S. 15:275.

Here, the question objected to was asked after defense counsel had already thoroughly questioned the victim about the details of the rape, including the physical positions of the victim and the assailant. Numerous questions very similar to that objected to had been asked and had been answered fully on direct and cross-examination. The victim had already testified that she was lying on her back in the back seat with her head flat against the bottom part of the back seat. There was no missed opportunity on the part of the defense to thoroughly cross-examine on relevant and material issues. The question asked was substantially repetitious and appears to have been unnecessary and somewhat harassing. No substantive issues were brushed aside in this case. The defendant does not complain of any specific prejudice such as that in State v. Senegal, supra. The trial judge did not abuse his wide discretion. See State v. Kenner, 384 So.2d 413 (La.1980); State v. Murray, 375 So.2d 80 (La.1979); State v. Nero, 319 So.2d 303 (La.1975); State v. Clouatre, 262 La. 651, 264 So.2d 595 (La.1972).

This assignment of error is without merit.

Assignments of Error Nos. 2 and 3:

II. "The trial judge erred in allowing the introduction of items of clothing marked 'S-6'."

III. "The trial court erred in allowing the introduction of evidence marked 'S-2'."

Counsel for defendant complains that the court erred in allowing the introduction into evidence of certain items of the victim's clothing without a proper foundation being laid in that a complete chain of possession from the time that the items were seized until trial was not established by the state.

The proper foundation for the admission into evidence of demonstrative evidence is one of identification. Identification can either be visual as by a witness who identifies the evidence in court or by a chain of custody. State v. Demouchet, 353 So.2d 1025 (La.1977). In either case the ultimate question is whether it is more probable than not that the admitted evidence is the same evidence that was seized. State v. Roussel, 381 So.2d 796 (La.1980); State v. Godeaux, 378 So.2d 941 (La.1979). A lack of positive identification goes to the weight of the evidence and not admissibility. Ultimately, connexity and identification are factual matters for determination by the trier of fact. State v. Krolowitz, 407 So.2d 1175 (La.1981).

The clothing which the victim had on at the time she was released from the trunk of the automobile and then taken to the hospital was handed by a nurse at the hospital to detective Thompson who gave them to patrolman Guilliam in deputy Mixon's presence, and Guilliam gave them to Mixon. Other items of clothing were found in the victim's automobile and were taken into possession by deputy Mixon. The items of clothing were placed in packets and tagged.

At trial deputy Mixon visually identified the clothes which were obtained from the victim's car and detective Thompson visually identified the clothes obtained at the hospital. Also, the chain of custody of both packets of clothing appears to have been established by a preponderance of the evidence.

These assignments of error are without merit.

IV. "The trial court erred in allowing the introduction of evidence marked 'S-18' and 'S-19', being the birth certificate of Terrance D. Russell and the Winn Parish Sheriff's Department worksheet, respectively."

Counsel for defendant objected to the introduction into evidence of a certified copy of the defendant's birth certificate and a worksheet prepared by an investigator for the sheriff's office who identified the worksheet as having been prepared by him from answers given upon interrogation of the defendant. The ground for the objection was irrelevancy.

The purpose of the evidence was to establish the defendant's age. He was born December 18, 1965 and was 16 years of age at the time of the crime. The documents were relevant in this respect to establish jurisdiction in the district court rather than the juvenile court under LSA-R.S. 13:1570 A(5). Further, no specific prejudice to the defendant is shown. State v. Humphrey, 412 So.2d 507 (La.1982).

This assignment is without merit.

Assignment of Error No. 5:

V. "The trial court erred in overruling the objection to the opinion of Officer Mixon regarding the toy pistol used in the alleged crime."

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7 cases
  • State v. Burns
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana (US)
    • February 25, 1987
    ...... The right to cross-examine is a principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested; but the right is always subject to the broad discretion of the trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation. State v. Russell, 434 So.2d 460 (La.App. 2d Cir.1983), writ den. 438 So.2d 1112 (La.1983). .         In each instance complained of by the defendant the trial court afforded defense counsel the opportunity to present testimony from these witnesses within the bounds of the rules of evidence. In each ......
  • State v. Harriman
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana (US)
    • May 8, 1985
    ......Russell, 434 So.2d 460 (La.App. 2d Cir.1983) cert. denied, 438 So.2d 1112 (La.1983). It suffices if the foundation laid establishes that it is more probable than not that the object is the one connected with the case; lack of positive identification or a defect in the chain of custody goes to the weight ......
  • State v. Guillory
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana (US)
    • February 4, 1987
    ......        The right to cross-examination is a means by which the credibility of a witness is tested, but this right is subject to the broad discretion of the trial judge to prevent repetitive and harassing questioning. State v. Russell, 434 So.2d 460 (La.App. 2d Cir.1983); State v. Senegal, 316 So.2d 124 (La.1975); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). A conviction will, thus, not be reversed on the basis of a trial judge's limiting cross-examination unless the defendant shows that there was ......
  • State v. Walker
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana (US)
    • May 12, 1986
    ......        A similar issue was addressed by the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, in State v. Russell, 434 So.2d 460 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1983), writ denied, 438 So.2d 1112 (La.1983). In that case, the court said:. The right to cross-examination is a principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested, but the right is subject always to the broad ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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