State v. Rutter
| Decision Date | 24 December 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. SC 84518.,SC 84518. |
| Citation | 93 S.W.3d 714 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Charles Lee RUTTER, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
John W. Peel, Terry J. Flanagan, St. Louis, for appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Breck K. Burgess, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
Appellant, Charles Lee Rutter, appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Iron County following a jury conviction of murder in the first degree, section 565.020, and armed criminal action, section 571.015.1
After opinion by the Court of Appeals, Southern District, the case was transferred to this Court.2 Mo. Const. art. V, section 10.
The sufficiency of the evidence supporting Appellant's convictions is not in dispute. This appeal concerns seven of the trial court's rulings on: (1) admissibility of evidence seized without a warrant (testimony of two police officers as to what they observed during inspections of a closet at the crime scene); (2) unlimited expert qualification of a defense witness; (3) foundation for expert testimony from State witness' testimony as to bullet patterns; (4) foundation for expert testimony from a State witness' testimony as to the effects of a drug found in the victim's system; (5) erroneous testimony provided by a State witness as to whether Appellant was in possession of illegally obtained prescription medicine; (6) evidence of the victim's past acts of violence; and (7) submission of a voluntary manslaughter instruction to the jury.
All seven points are denied. Appellant is correct that the trial court erred in admitting evidence obtained in the officers' warrantless searches of the closet, but Appellant was not prejudiced by the error. On the other six points raised by Appellant, the trial court did not err.
The facts and reasonable inferences from such facts are considered favorably to the trial court's ruling and contrary evidence and inferences are disregarded. State v. Galazin, 58 S.W.3d 500, 507 (Mo. banc 2001).
In the morning of April 4, 1999, Appellant and Michael Hinkle were alone together in Appellant's house. Some time that morning, Appellant used a pistol to shoot Michael Hinkle in the back of the head, killing him.
Appellant did not call the police. After authorities were eventually notified several hours later, Deputy Helton of the Iron County sheriff's department was dispatched to "a shooting" at Appellant's residence. He arrived between 1:30 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. There were approximately 20 people outside the residence, many of whom had already been inside. Deputy Helton was met by ambulance personnel who informed him that the only individual inside the house was the victim, who had been fatally shot.
Without consent or a warrant, Deputy Helton entered Appellant's residence to learn if the victim was still alive and the location of the body. He found Hinkle's dead body in the bathtub. Deputy Helton saw evidence of a struggle in the living room — the television and stereo were overturned, the lights and windows were broken. There was a large damp blood stain in the living room carpet near a closet and bloody marks leading into the bathroom. Deputy Helton and the others all departed the house. He observed Appellant outside the residence and ordered him not to leave. Deputy Helton then secured the house by placing sheriffs tape around the back door. He was satisfied that the house was unoccupied and secure.
At approximately 2:00 p.m., Deputy Ivy arrived at the scene. At approximately 2:06 p.m., Deputy Young arrived. Without consent or a warrant, Deputies Helton, Ivy and Young reentered Appellant's residence and conducted a search for evidence. They photographed the entire area and took a carpet sample. They photographed and seized a pistol on a chair in the living room and a shell casing at the doorway to the living room closet. The shell casing was visible to those standing in the living room, without the aid of a flashlight. The door to the closet was open, and it was dark inside. Deputy Helton looked around inside the closet with the aid of a flashlight, but did not enter it. He did not see firearms or any other evidence in the closet. At approximately 2:30 p.m., Deputy Young inspected the closet with a flashlight, crawling into it on his hands and knees. Deputy Young believed he was searching for evidence. There was a garment hanging in the left side of the closet. Deputy Young examined the entire closet, but found no weapons or other evidence. He measured the interior of the closet at 4 feet 3 ½ inches by 3 feet 3 3/8 of an inch.
The officers all departed by 5:00 p.m. and released the home to Appellant's family, who boarded up broken windows and removed valuable property.
At 12:01 a.m. the next morning, Deputy Helton obtained a search warrant to search Appellant's residence again. He then returned to the residence and collected more evidence, including photographs, carpet and blood samples.
Appellant was charged with murder in the first degree, a violation of section 565.020, and armed criminal action, a violation of section 571.015. The State waived its right to seek the death penalty.
Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence, arguing that the warrantless searches violated Appellant's Fourth Amendment rights. The motion was overruled following a hearing.
In his opening statement, Appellant's counsel acknowledged that Appellant killed Hinkle. He told the jury that Appellant would testify that, after an argument, Hinkle launched into a violent fury in which Hinkle significantly damaged Appellant's property and physically assaulted Appellant. Then, according to Appellant, Hinkle announced that he was going to kill Appellant and started towards the closet, which Appellant alleges contained two rifles and a loaded shotgun. Appellant's counsel told the jury that Appellant would testify that he then shot Hinkle because he believed Hinkle would grab a gun from the closet to kill him. He told the jury to expect the defense to present witnesses who would testify that they observed weapons in the closet after the police released the crime scene.
In its case-in-chief, the State presented testimony of the deputies as to all evidence seized both before and after the issuance of the warrant. This included testimony from Deputies Helton and Young that they did not observe weapons in the closet and that they inspected it carefully enough to be sure. Appellant's continuing objection to the admissibility of the evidence seized without a warrant was overruled. The State presented the testimony of Dr. Russell Deidiker, a physician who conducted an autopsy of Hinkle. Over Appellant's objections, Dr. Deidiker was allowed to testify as an expert as to a bullet pattern comparison used to determine the distance from which Hinkle was shot and as to the effects of the drug Butalbital that was found in Hinkle's system at autopsy. The State also presented the testimony of Tony Cole, the Iron County coroner, that he retrieved a bottle of prescription medicine from Appellant's home bearing the name of one of Appellant's relatives. From this testimony, the State attempted to make an inference at trial that Appellant had illegally obtained the prescription medicine in his relative's name.
During an in-camera hearing, Appellant presented testimony from Steven Craigmiles, who claimed to be a victim of a past specific act of violence on the part of Hinkle. Appellant testified that because of his knowledge of this incident he had been fearful of Hinkle when he allegedly acted in self-defense. The trial court sustained the State's objection to testimony of the specific act of violence against Craigmiles, but permitted Appellant to present to the jury evidence of Hinkle's reputation for violence in the community.
In his case-in-chief, Appellant testified as indicated in his opening statement. Appellant presented two rifles and a shotgun as exhibits. Appellant presented the testimony of six witnesses who testified that they were at the crime scene after the shooting and either observed the guns in the closet or observed the guns being removed from the house. Appellant presented Dr. Terry Martinez as a witness, but the trial court sustained the State's objection to qualification of Dr. Martinez as an unlimited expert. Dr. Martinez testified as to the possible effects of Butalbital, a drug found in Hinkle's system at autopsy.
As a rebuttal witness, the State presented testimony from Hinkle's grandmother that Appellant had told her a week to ten days before the shooting that all guns except the pistol used to shoot Hinkle had been removed from Appellant's residence.
The jurors were advised by their instructions that they could find Appellant guilty of murder in the first degree or murder in the second degree. The trial court refused Appellant's request to submit a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. However, the trial court did instruct the jury on self-defense. The jury returned a verdict that Appellant did not act in self-defense, finding him guilty of first-degree murder and armed criminal action. Appellant was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment.
Appellant filed a motion for new trial. At the motion hearing, Appellant presented Cole, who testified that he had erroneously testified at trial as to the name on the seized prescription bottle, when, in fact, he had come to believe the Appellant's name was on the bottle. Appellant also repeated his Fourth Amendment arguments concerning the evidence seized without a warrant. The trial court overruled the motion for new trial.
Appellant has narrowed his original Fourth Amendment argument, conceding that much of the evidence seized without a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Rios v. State
...App. Ct. 2017); People v. Brown, No. 286716, 2009 WL 4827066, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2009); Bergerson, 671 N.W.2d at 202; Rutter, 93 S.W.3d at 725; v. Farber, 498 N.W.2d 797, 801 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993); Francis, 117 A.3d at 163; Davila, 999 A.2d at 1126; Johnson, 193 A.D.2d at 40; Dia......
-
State v. Brown
...falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions, many of which are based on the presence of exigent circumstances.” State v. Rutter, 93 S.W.3d 714, 723 (Mo. banc 2002). In this case, the State argues that the seizure of the Malibu was permissible under the “automobile exception” t......
-
State v. Carrawell
...cannot involve speculation and must focus on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment.State v. Rutter, 93 S.W.3d 714, 726 (Mo. banc 2002) (internal citations omitted). Although there was testimony that the police department here routinely conducts inventory......
-
State v. McFadden
...judge and jury of the general nature of the case, so they may appreciate the significance of the evidence as it is presented.” State v. Rutter, 93 S.W.3d 714, 727 (Mo. banc 2002) (quoting State v. Thompson, 68 S.W.3d 393, 394 (Mo. banc 2002)). An opening statement is not evidence. Id. This ......