State v. Ruyle
| Decision Date | 10 November 1958 |
| Docket Number | No. 45638,No. 1,45638,1 |
| Citation | 318 S.W.2d 218 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Otis Lamar RUYLE, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Charles M. Shaw, Clayton, and Wayne C. Smith, Ju., St. Louis, for appellant.
John M. Dalton, Atty. Gen., William L. Hungate, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
By information filed in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, defendant, Otis Lamar Ruyle, and one William Cummings were jointly charged with burglary of and larceny from the offices of Baker's Union (Local No. 4), a corporation, in the City of St. Louis. The information also charged Cummings with six and defendant with four prior convictions of felonies and imprisonment and discharge from imprisonment upon lawful compliance with the sentences imposed. Upon separate trial of defendant, the jury found him guilty of burglary in the second degree and larceny and of 'a prior conviction or convictions of a felony'. His punishment was accordingly assessed at imprisonment in the State Penitentiary at 10 years for burglary and 5 years for larceny, in conformity with the provisions of Section 556.280 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. (All statutory references herein refer to said revision.) Defendant appealed.
Two grounds of error are asserted: (1) The overruling of his motion for a mistrial when a policeman, testifying in behalf of the State, stated that following arrest defendant said to him, 'I will tell you about this job but won't tell you about any others'; and (2) error in permitting the jury to find that defendant stole a safe from the premises burglarized and that its value was $380. A brief statement of the evidence adduced by the State will suffice.
The building occupied by Baker's Union is situated on the northeast corner of the intersection of Winnebago Street, an eastwest street, and Texas Avenue, a northsouth street, in the City of St. Louis. The front door opens on Winnebago and there is a door leading into the building from Texas Avenue. At the close of business on the afternoon of March 28, 1955, the building was closed and its doors were locked. A safe, in which there was in excess of $1,000, was bolted to the floor in the treasurer's office. About midnight of that day, a police officer saw a light in the office and heard 'pounding'. He with other officers entered the building, where they found the safe had been moved from the treasurer's office into the assembly room, a distance of 10 or 12 feet. It lay on its back, with the combination knocked off, and had been mauled with a sledge hammer. On the floor, by the side of the safe, the officers found a sledge hammer, two crowbars, two punches and a pair of gloves. The door on the Texas Street side of the building had been splintered and the jamb was spread. Defendant and Cummings were in the building and running toward the rear thereof. They were placed under arrest and taken to the police station. There defendant admitted that the sledge hammer and one of the crowbars were his that a Chrysler automobile parked near the building was his, that he and Cummings had ridden to the building in the Chrysler, that the 'tools' found by the safe were brought to the building in the car, and that he helped Cummings remove the safe from the treasurer's office to the assembly room. The conviction, imprisonment and discharge of defendant of the prior crimes, described in the information, were shown by duly authenticated records. Defendant admitted the former convictions, as shown in the State's evidence. He also testified that he came to the building with Cummings in defendant's automobile, but claimed that he entered it in search of a toilet. He denied that he had participated in the burglary and denied that any of the 'tools' shown him at the police station were his or that he had ever told the police officers they were his. Further details of the evidence will be stated in connection with the discussion of the contentions set forth in defendant's brief.
During the direct examination of police officer Kramer, he stated in reply to a question asked by counsel for the State that he had 'questioned' defendant after taking him to the police station. Thereupon, counsel for the State asked, 'What statement, if any, did he make at the Third District?' To which, the witness replied that defendant had stated, 'I will tell you about this job but won't tell you about any others.' No objection was then made by counsel for defendant. Counsel for the State continued to inquire as to what defendant said 'about this job, here', in answer to which questions the witness stated in detail, throughout more than a page of the transcript, the statements made by defendant as to his participation in the burglary and larceny for which he was on trial. When the witness had completed his answers to these questions, counsel for defendant came to the bench and, out of the hearing of the jury, moved for a mistrial upon the ground that the witness knew better than to make the portion of the statement, 'but won't tell you about any others'; that the statement was made for the purpose of prejudicing the jury, was highly inflammatory and that the prejudicial effect could not be removed by any instruction given the jury to disregard it; and that such an instruction would only magnify the matter in the eyes of the jury. Defendant's counsel further stated, in the court's chambers, 'I want the record to show that on at least two occasions when the witness (Kramer) was relating the contents of the statement made by Ruyle (defendant) I got up from the counsel table and started to approach the Bench there when the witness paused, and when he continued on speaking I waited until such time as the witness was through, stating as my reason therefor that I did not want...
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State v. Summers, 49237
...of property stolen in connection with a burglary is not a material factor in the case. Section 560.110 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.; State v. Ruyle, Mo., 318 S.W.2d 218, 221. The defendant also contends that the court erred in admitting into evidence a gasoline can because there was no evidence conn......
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State v. Akers
...should be declared in these circumstances and its ruling will not be held erroneous unless an abuse of discretion is shown. State v. Ruyle, Mo., 318 S.W.2d 218, 220. We are impressed by the fact that the trial court acted promptly and apparently effectively to determine if prejudice had res......
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State v. Armstrong
...the evidence was sufficient from which the jury could so find. State v. Duncan, 336 Mo. 600, 80 S.W.2d 147, 151(8-10); State v. Ruyle, Mo.Sup., 318 S.W.2d 218, 221(5). Further, the circumstances under which appellant was arrested and found to be in possession of the mentioned property were ......
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State v. Williams, 52484
...largely within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Hadley, Mo., 249 S.W.2d 857; State v. Baker, Mo., 293 S.W.2d 900; State v. Ruyle, Mo., 318 S.W.2d 218. In view of the corrective action taken by the trial court, if any such action was required, we find no abuse of Defendant's seven......