State v. Ryan

Decision Date06 April 1904
Citation34 Wash. 597,76 P. 90
PartiesSTATE v. RYAN.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Frank H. Rudkin, Judge.

Edward Ryan was convicted of obtaining money by false pretenses, and appeals. Affirmed.

Frank B. Wiestling, for appellant.

W. T. Scott, Chas. S. Gleason, and D. C. Conover for the State.

ANDERS J.

Upon the trial of an information filed by the prosecuting attorney in the superior court of King county, the appellant was convicted of the offense of obtaining money by means of false pretenses. After the return of the verdict appellant filed a motion in arrest of judgment, on the ground that the facts stated in the information did not constitute a crime or misdemeanor. This motion was denied, and exception noted, and thereafter appellant was sentenced to the State Penitentiary for a term of 2 1/2 years.

The information upon which the appellant was tried and convicted omitting the formal parts, is as follows: 'He, the said Edward Ryan, in the county of King, state of Washington, on or about the 14th day of August, 1903, unlawfully feloniously, falsely, fraudulently, and designedly, and with intent to defraud one E. J. Hickey, did obtain from said E. J. Hickey the sum of twenty ($20) dollars, the property of said E. J. Hickey, by then and there unlawfully, willfully, feloniously, fraudulently, and designedly pretending to one E. G. Hickey, the agent of said E. J. Hickey, that a certain paper, purporting to be a bank bill on the State Bank of New Brunswick, New Jersey, for the sum of twenty ($20.00) dollars, was a good and valid bank bill, and of the value of twenty ($20.00) dollars, whereas, in truth and in fact, said paper was of no value whatsoever, and was a false token, as the said Edward Ryan well knew; that by means thereof said E. G. Hickey paid to the said Edward Ryan the sum of twenty ($20.00) dollars as aforesaid.'

The statute specially applicable to this case, and under which this information was drawn, reads as follows: 'If any person, with intent to defraud another, shall designedly, by color of any false token or writing, or any false pretense, obtain from any person any money, transfer, note, bond or receipt, or thing of value, such person shall, upon conviction thereof, be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than five years nor less than one year, or imprisoned in the county jail for any length of time not exceeding one year.' Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 7165; Pierce's Code, § 1662.

The first and principal question to be determined on this appeal is whether the information above quoted states facts sufficient to constitute the offense of which appellant was convicted. Our statute provides generally that the information must contain (1) the title of the action, specifying the name of the court to which the information is presented, and the names of the parties, and (2) a statement of the acts constituting the offense, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended (Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St.§ 6840); and that the information must be direct and certain as to the party charged, the crime charged, and the particular circumstances of the crime charged, when they are necessary to constitute a complete crime (Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 6842). And it is insisted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the information in question does not meet these requirements of the Code. The particular objections made to the information are (1) that it contains no allegation of the means used by appellant in defrauding Hickey out of his money; (2) that no connection is shown in this information between the false pretenses alleged and the obtaining of the money; (3) that it does not state in what particular the token was false, and in what the invalidity consisted; (4) that it is insufficient in failing to describe fully the purported bank bill; (5) that it does not state that the pretenses alleged were relied on by Hickey; and (6) that it does not allege that Hickey parted with any money or anything else of value. While some, if not all, of these objections might be held valid, under the strict rule of the common law applicable to such cases, we do not think they are tenable when tested by our own statutes relating to the forms of pleadings in criminal actions, and to the rules by which the sufficiency of such pleadings is to be determined. It will be observed that the acts constituting the offense charged in this information are stated in the language of the statute defining the crime of obtaining money, etc., by means of false pretenses, and it is the general rule that a charge so stated is sufficient. Watts v. Territory, 1 Wash. T. 409; Schilling v. Territory, 2 Wash. T. 283, 5 P. 926; State v. Day, 4 Wash. 104, 29 P. 984; State v. Knowlton, 11 Wash. 512, 518, 39 P. 966; State v. Turner, 10 Wash. 94, 38 P. 864. This rule, however, is not applicable in all cases without exception, for, 'if the statute does not sufficiently set out the facts which constitute the offense, so that the defendant may have notice of that with which he is charged, then a more particular statement of the facts than is contained in the statute becomes necessary.' 10 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 487. The validity of the statute upon which this information is based is not challenged by appellant's counsel in this case. He does not claim that the statute does not state the facts which constitute the offense, so that the accused may know what he is required to answer. But he does insist in his argument that the information itself was so defective that it failed to apprise the appellant of the 'nature and cause of the accusation against him.' It is a well-settled rule in criminal prosecutions that the indictment or information must set forth all the facts which are necessary to constitute the crime charged, and which must be proved in order to convict the accused; and we are of the opinion that the information in question states all the facts necessary to constitute the offense, 'in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended.' It seems to us that it apprised the appellant of everything he was required to meet at the trial, and that he was not prejudiced in his defense by any of the alleged defects of the information.

In State v. Bokien, 14 Wash. 403, 44 P. 889, which was a prosecution for obtaining goods by false pretenses, under the statute here in question, it was insisted that the information was defective in that it did not aver that the alleged false pretenses were made with a view to effect the sale of the goods, and that by reason thereof the party was induced to make the sale and part with his property. But this court held, after considering some of the authorities cited by appellant in the case at bar, that,...

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18 cases
  • State v. Leach
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • November 22, 1989
    ...Wash.2d 607, 674 P.2d 145 (1983); overruled on other grounds in State v. Bergeron, 105 Wash.2d 1, 711 P.2d 1000 (1985); State v. Ryan, 34 Wash. 597, 76 P. 90 (1904). CrRLJ 2.4(b) states ... no citation and notice ... shall be deemed insufficient ... by reason of defects or imperfections whi......
  • State v. Unosawa
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • January 2, 1948
    ...be misled or how he could fail to understand the exact nature of the charge preferred against him. In State v. Bokien, supra, and State v. Ryan, supra, we concerned with the determination of whether the information stated facts sufficient to constitute the offense of which the accused had b......
  • Bates v. State
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • May 1, 1905
    ...be no doubt. “The sum of $1,500” to the ordinary intelligence means money. To nothing else is the expression applicable. State v. Ryan, 34 Wash. 597, 603, 76 Pac. 90;Comm. v. Howe, 132 Mass. 250. Indeed, if it charged the obtaining of any other property, the information would be bad for lac......
  • State v. Robison
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • October 28, 1930
    ... ... "A dollar is the ... unit of our currency. It always means money, or what is ... regarded as money." U.S. v. Van Auken, 96 U.S ... 366, 368, 24 L.Ed. 852. "Everybody in this country knows ... that the word 'dollar' means a certain amount of ... money," said Anders, J., in State v. Ryan", 34 ... Wash. 597, 604, 76 P. 90, 92. \"There is no ambiguity ... about the word 'dollars.' If any word has a settled ... meaning at law, and in the courts, it is this. It can only ... mean the legal currency of the United States.\" Halsted ... v. Meeker, 18 N. J. Eq. 136, 139 ...       \xC2" ... ...
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