State v. Rydzewski
| Decision Date | 21 December 1970 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Stanley RYDZEWSKI, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
Robert A. Galisson, Asst. Deputy Public Defender, for appellant (Stanley C. Van Ness, Public Defender, attorney; Edward Weisslitz, Asst. Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Joseph T. Maloney, Deputy Atty. Gen., for Department of Institutions and Agencies (George F. Kugler, Jr., Atty. Gen., attorney).
Richard A. Fiore, Asst. Prosecutor, for respondent (Robert Dilts, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney).
Before Judges GOLDMANN, LEONARD and MOUNTAIN.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GOLDMANN, P.J.A.D.
On this appeal from a denial of his petition for post-conviction relief defendant again argues, as he did in the County Court, that the denial of his applications for classification as a 'minimum security' prisoner constitutes an illegal sentence and, further, that the 3--5 and 1--2 concurrent State Prison sentences imposed for breaking and entering and for larceny were 'manifestly' excessive although concededly within statutory limits.
We find no merit whatever in the claim of excessive sentence. Indeed, at the post-conviction hearing defendant said, However, he believed the sentence burdensome in his case, and his exposition of what he means by this points in the same direction as his claim that he was entitled to minimum security status.
Defendant argues that under N.J.S.A. 30:4--92 the State Prison Classification Committee should have classified him for minimum security employment, and that the court should so classify him and thereby reduce his sentence by 73 1/2 days, constituting the work credits he would have received had he been properly classified. The county judge held that even if that argument had merit, post-conviction relief was not the proper method of testing the administrative action of the prison officials at Rahway where defendant was incarcerated: a person aggrieved by the action of a state administrative agency should seek judicial review in the Appellate Division.
The notice of appeal recites that defendant appeals not only from the County Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief but from the administrative determination of the prison authorities denying him minimum security work status. The Attorney General appears solely for the purpose of appropriate response to the latter.
Defendant's appeal from the complained-of administrative action should have been brought in this court in the first instance. R. 2:2--3(a), formerly R.R. 4:88--8(a), provides that appeals may be taken to the Appellate Division as of right to review the final action of any state administrative agency or officer, except where governed by R. 4:74--1 and 8, not here applicable. We overlook defendant's lapse since the matter is now squarely before us for decision.
N.J.S.A. 30:4--92 provides:
The inmates of all correctional and charitable, hospital, relief and training institutions within the jurisdiction of the State Board shall be employed in such productive occupations as are consistent with their health, strength and mental capacity and shall receive such compensation therefor as the State Board shall determine.
Compensation for inmates of correctional institutions may be in the form of cash or remission of time from sentence or both. Such remission from the time of sentence shall not exceed 1 day for each 5 days of productive occupation, but remission granted under this section shall in no way affect deductions for good behavior or provided by law.
In addition, all inmates classified as minimum security and who are considered sufficiently trustworthy to be employed in honor camps, farms or details, shall receive further remission of time from sentence at the rate of 3 days per month for the first year of such employment and 5 days per month for the second and each subsequent year of such employment.
It is the last paragraph that is the focus of defendant's classification argument.
The statute thus gives the State Board of Control full power and authority in the area of internal prison management to engage inmates in productive occupations consistent with their health, strength and mental capacity, and further, to provide such compensation therefor as in its best judgment it may determine. Cf. Harris v. Yeager, 291 F.Supp. 1015 (D.N.J.1968) ().
Discretion is vested in the prison officials to determine which inmates shall be classified as minimum security because 'considered sufficiently trustworthy to be...
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