State v. S.S.
| Decision Date | 21 June 2017 |
| Citation | 162 A.3d 1058,229 N.J. 360 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. S.S., Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Joseph J. Russo, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Joseph J. Russo and Jessica L. Spencer, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs).
Sara M. Quigley, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).
Rebecca J. Livengoodargued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Edward L. Barocas, Legal Director, attorney; Rebecca J. Livengood, Edward L. Barocas, Alexander Shalom, and Jeanne M. LoCicero, on the letter brief).
John J. O'Reilly argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, LLP, attorneys; John J. O'Reilly and Andrew Gimigliano, on the brief).
In this interlocutory appeal, we must determine two issues: what is the appropriate standard of appellate review of a trial court's factual findings based solely on the court's viewing of a video-recorded police interrogation, and did defendant invoke his right to remain silent during the interrogation.
Relying solely on a review of the video-recorded interrogation, the trial court found that defendant asserted his right to silence when he said, The trial court suppressed all statements made after that utterance because the investigators failed to honor defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent in violation of Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
A panel of the Appellate Division engaged in a de novo review of the video-recorded interrogation and reversed. The panel made its own factual findings based on defendant's tone of voice and the flow of the interview, concluding that defendant did not assert his right to remain silent. In applying the de novo standard of review, the panel relied on language in State v. Diaz–Bridges , 208 N.J. 544, 566, 34 A. 3d 748 (2012), which stated that when "the trial court's factual findings are based only on its viewing of a recorded interrogation that is equally available to the appellate court ... deference to the trial court's interpretation is not required."
After a careful reappraisal of Diaz–Bridges , we now hold that the non-deferential standard articulated in that case is at odds with traditional principles limiting appellate review. We have reached this conclusion for several reasons.
First, our system of justice assigns to our trial courts the primary role of factfinder. That role is especially suited to our trial judges, who have ongoing experience and expertise in making factual rulings. Trial judges routinely make factual determinations not only in assessing the credibility of witnesses but also in assessing documentary evidence, which oftentimes is susceptible to alternative inferences.
Second, the customary role of an appellate court is not to make factual findings but rather to decide whether those made by the trial court are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. That limited standard of review is consistent with the belief that appellate courts should not replicate the work of our trial courts or reverse their factfindings based on a mere difference of opinion.
Third, notions of judicial economy and finality call for a standard of review where appellate courts defer to a trial court's factual findings in the absence of clear error.
Applying these principles, we find that the trial court's factual determination, based solely on its review of the video-recorded interrogation, is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. Although the Appellate Division and trial court drew different inferences from the record, we conclude that the inferences drawn by the trial court were reasonable and that the trial court's ultimate determination was not clearly mistaken.
We therefore reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In 2011, defendant S.S. was tried before a jury and convicted of first-degree aggravated sexual assault of his six-year-old daughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:14–2(a)(1), and second-degree endangering the welfare of his child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24–4(a). The trial court sentenced defendant to a fifteen-year prison term on the sexual-assault charge, subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43–7.2, and to a concurrent five-year term on the endangering charge. The Appellate Division reversed those convictions for reasons unrelated to this appeal and ordered a new trial. This Court denied the State's petition for certification, State v. S.S. , 220 N.J. 573, 108 A .3d 633 (2015), and defendant's cross-petition, State v. S.S. , 220 N.J. 574, 108 A .3d 633 (2015).
Before the start of the second trial, defendant moved for the first time to suppress incriminating statements he made to investigators in the Hudson County Prosecutor's Office, claiming that investigators failed to honor his invocation of his right to silence in violation of Miranda .1
The Honorable Sheila A. Venable, P.J.Cr., conducted a Miranda hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104(c)2 at which the State introduced one piece of evidence—the video-recorded interrogation. Neither the State nor the defense called any witnesses. From her review of that video, Judge Venable made her ultimate findings of fact.
To give context to defendant's interrogation and the factual conclusions reached by the trial court, we begin with the events that led to the interrogation.3
In August 2009, defendant and "Jane" had been married for five years and were the parents of two daughters, "Marilyn," age six, and "Lois," age four.4 While defendant and Jane worked during the week, Lois was in daycare, and a babysitter looked after Marilyn. On August 21, 2009, Marilyn was at the babysitter's house. While the babysitter was changing her infant son's diaper, Marilyn began asking questions about the infant's penis. During the conversation, Marilyn told the babysitter that defendant put his penis in her mouth.
Later, the babysitter told Jane about her daughter's claim. In response to an anonymous call alleging that defendant had abused Marilyn, a representative of the Division of Youth and Family Services5 (DYFS) visited defendant's home and interviewed each family member. On August 25, 2009, defendant, Marilyn, the babysitter, and Jane each gave video-recorded statements to Sergeant Kenneth Kolich and Detective Polly Hans of the Hudson County Prosecutor's Special Victims Unit.
During her interview, Marilyn denied that her father abused her or put his penis in her mouth. She also denied making the comment that the babysitter attributed to her. In speaking with the investigators, the babysitter stood by her recollection of Marilyn uttering that one remark. The babysitter noted, however, that Marilyn never repeated the statement. Jane told the investigators that she did not believe that an act of abuse had occurred.
After those interviews, Sergeant Kolich and Detective Hans interrogated defendant in the Hudson County Prosecutor's Office.6 Defendant waited for several hours in a room in the Prosecutor's Office before the interrogation started at about 6:17 p.m. For approximately forty-seven minutes, Detective Hans conducted the interrogation alone. She began by reading defendant his Mirandarights, which included advising him that he had "the right to remain silent" and that anything he said would "be used against [him] in court." In response to Detective Hans's questions, defendant repeatedly denied that he had abused his daughter.
After Sergeant Kolich entered the interview room, the questioning became increasingly accusatory. Sergeant Kolich repeatedly made the misrepresentation that Marilyn told the investigators that defendant put his penis in her mouth. At various times, Sergeant Kolich made such statements as, "your daughter finally told us the truth," "[s]he was brave enough to tell us that her daddy did something to her," "she kept coming up to the truth," and "this is a big coverup between you and your wife." Sergeant Kolich, again and again, accused defendant of lying and warned that a judge was unlikely to believe his account over his daughter's.
A little more than one hour into the interrogation, the following exchange occurred:
At this point, defendant had denied the accusations more than a dozen times. The interrogation proceeded, and defendant continued to suggest that he did not want to speak:
Approximately one hour and thirteen minutes into the interrogation, a forty-nine-minute break was taken. When the investigators returned, the following colloquy occurred:
Almost immediately after this exchange, at defendant's request, Detective Hans left the room. The interrogation continued, with Sergeant Kolich urging defendant to confess. Sergeant Kolich pressed when defendant indicated that something occurred "a long time ago" when he was drunk.
Defendant then indicated that "it happened" when, after a...
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