State v. Sadler

• Decision Date: 14 October 2008
• Docket Number: No. 35021-1-II.,35021-1-II.
• Citation: 193 P.3d 1108,147 Wn. App. 97
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Stanley Scott SADLER, Appellant.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

193 P.3d 1108

147 Wn. App. 97

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Stanley Scott SADLER, Appellant.

No. 35021-1-II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

October 14, 2008.

Rita Joan Griffith, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.

Michelle Hyer, Pierce County Prosecutor, Tacoma, WA, for Respondent.

ARMSTRONG, J.

¶ 1 Stanley Scott Sadler appeals his convictions of eight counts of sexual exploitation of a minor. Through counsel, he argues that the trial court erred when it: (1) heard his Batson¹ challenge in the jury room rather than the open courtroom, thereby violating his right to an open public trial; (2) denied his CrR 3.6 motion to suppress the evidence discovered in his residence; and (3) admitted his statements to law enforcement. In a pro se statement of additional grounds for review (SAG),² Sadler also argues that the statutory defense to the sexual exploitation of a minor charges, RCW 9.68A.110(3), is unconstitutionally vague as applied.³

¶ 2 We hold that the trial court violated Sadler's constitutional right to an open public trial when it held the Batson hearing in the jury room. We further hold that (1) the trial court erred when it concluded that a second warrantless entry into Sadler's residence by law enforcement for the sole purpose of obtaining information to support a search warrant application was lawful, (2) the trial court properly admitted Sadler's statements to law enforcement, and (3) Sadler's vagueness argument is without merit. Accordingly, we reverse the convictions and remand for a hearing on the validity of the search warrant under the independent source doctrine and, if the search warrant is valid and the State chooses to retry Sadler, for a new trial.

FACTS

¶ 3 On August 29, 2004, 14-year-old K.T. ran away from her Clark County, Washington foster home and was reported missing. Following a tip from a private organization that had tracked K.T.'s recent Internet activity, officers eventually located K.T. at Sadler's residence.

¶ 4 The subsequent searches of Sadler's residence and computer equipment yielded a significant amount of evidence,⁴ including numerous images of K.T. engaging in sexually explicit activities. Based on this evidence, the State charged Sadler by second amended information with 38 felony offenses, including 8 counts of sexual exploitation of a minor.⁵

¶ 5 During jury selection, the parties conducted an extensive voir dire of the 71-member jury panel. Following voir dire, the State exercised two of its peremptory challenges to dismiss juror 2 and juror 27, the only two African-American jurors on the panel. At the close of voir dire, defense counsel raised a Batson challenge to the State's exercise of peremptory challenges against jurors 2 and 27, asserting that the State was unlawfully excluding these jurors because of their race.

¶ 6 Without discussing its reasons for doing so on the record or asking Sadler or anyone else present to comment, the trial court heard Sadler's Batson challenge in the jury room. Before moving the hearing, the trial judge stated, "We are going to step into the jury room for one matter on the record. Just don't leave the courtroom" Report of Proceedings (RP) at 855. The record does not reflect whether members of the public were present in the courtroom at the time or whether the trial court intended to allow spectators into the jury room. Sadler, defense counsel, the deputy prosecutor, corrections officers, and the court reporter were present at the hearing.

¶ 7 During the Batson hearing, the State posited several justifications for striking each of the two African-American jurors. Defense counsel argued that these reasons were pretextual, but the trial court found that the State had carried its burden of showing that the peremptory strikes were not racially motivated.

¶ 8 At trial,⁶ Sadler admitted that he met K.T. online through a bondage, discipline, and sadomasochistic (BDSM) oriented web site and, at her request, took her to his home after picking her up in Camas, Washington; that he had repeated sexual contact with K.T.; that he photographed K.T. engaging in a variety of sexually explicit conduct; and that he distributed some of these photographs to others. But he asserted that K.T consented to the activities; that K.T. had represented to him that she was 19 and he reasonably believed her; that K.T. showed him a Michigan birth certificate and a Washington identification card or driver's license via webcam, which showed she was 19; and that others appeared to believe K.T. was over 18.

¶ 9 Sadler's assertion that K.T. had shown him identification proving she was over 18 went to the statutory defense for the sexual exploitation of a minor charges, RCW 9.68A.110(3). That statute required Sadler to prove that he

made a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of the minor[⁷] by requiring production of a driver's license, marriage license, birth certificate, or other governmental or educational identification card or paper and did not rely solely on the oral allegations or apparent age of the minor.

The State attempted to show that Sadler's claim that K.T. showed him identification via webcam was not credible and that even if K.T. had shown him such identification, it was not a reasonable bona fide attempt to establish her age.

¶ 10 The jury convicted Sadler on eight counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and acquitted him of the remaining thirty counts.

ANALYSIS

I. OPEN PUBLIC TRIAL

¶ 11 Sadler first argues that the trial court denied him his constitutional right to an open public trial when it heard his Batson challenge in the jury room rather than in the open courtroom. We agree.

A. Right to Open Public Trial

¶ 12 "Article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution[⁸] and the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution[⁹] both guarantee criminal defendants the right to a public trial."¹⁰ State v. Brightman, 155 Wash.2d 506, 514, 122 P.3d 150 (2005). The right to an open public trial ensures that the defendant receives a fair trial, in part by reminding the officers of the court of the importance of their functions, encouraging witnesses to come forward, and discouraging perjury. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46-47, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984); see Brightman, 155 Wash.2d at 514, 122 P.3d 150. Although the right to a public trial can serve the public or the defendant, the public's right and the defendant's right "serve complementary and interdependent functions in assuring the fairness of our judicial system. In particular, the public trial right operates as an essential cog in the constitutional design of fair trial safeguards."¹¹ State v. Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d 254, 259, 906 P.2d 325 (1995).

¶ 13 Additionally, "it is well settled that the right to a public trial also extends to jury selection." Brightman, 155 Wash.2d at 515, 122 P.3d 150 (citing In re Pers. Restraint of Orange, 152 Wash.2d 795, 804, 100 P.3d 291 (2004) (citing Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Calif., Riverside County, 464 U.S. 501, 505, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984))). "[A] closed jury selection process harms the defendant by preventing his or her family from contributing their knowledge or insight to jury selection and by preventing the venire from seeing the interested individuals." Brightman, 155 Wash.2d at 515, 122 P.3d 150 (emphasis added) (citing Orange, 152 Wash.2d at 812, 100 P.3d 291). In addition, "[t]he guaranty of open criminal proceedings extends to `[t]he process of juror selection'" because the jury selection process "`is itself a matter of importance, not simply to the adversaries but to the criminal justice system.'" Orange, 152 Wash.2d at 804, 100 P.3d 291 (emphasis added) (quoting Press-Enter. Co., 464 U.S. at 505, 104 S.Ct. 819 (second alteration in original)).

¶ 14 Generally, to protect these important rights, before a trial court may exclude the public from the courtroom, it must conduct a five-part Bone-Club inquiry¹² and determine if the closure will unjustifiably interfere with the defendant's right to a public trial. Brightman, 155 Wash.2d at 515, 122 P.3d 150. If the proceeding is subject to the right to a public trial, a trial court's failure to conduct a Bone-Club inquiry before excluding the public "results in a violation of the defendant's public trial rights." Brightman, 155 Wash.2d at 515-16, 122 P.3d 150 (citing Orange, 152 Wash.2d at 809, 100 P.3d 291). The defendant need show no prejudice resulting from a violation of this right; prejudice is presumed. Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d at 261-62, 906 P.2d 325 (citing State v. Marsh, 126 Wash. 142, 147, 217 P. 705 (1923)); State v. Rivera, 108 Wash.App. 645, 652, 32 P.3d 292 (2001). Furthermore, a defendant's failure to "lodge a contemporaneous objection" at the time of the closure does not amount to a waiver of his right to a public trial.¹³ Brightman, 155 Wash.2d at 517, 122 P.3d 150 (citing Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d at 257, 906 P.2d 325). The remedy for a violation of article I, section 22 is remand for a new trial. Rivera, 108 Wash.App. at 652, 32 P.3d 292 (citing Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d at 261-62, 906 P.2d 325). Because the issue of whether a defendant's right to a public trial has been violated is a question of law, we review it de novo. Brightman, 155 Wash.2d at 514, 122 P.3d 150.

B. Closure Excluding the Public

¶ 15 To determine whether the trial court violated Sadler's right to a public trial, we must first decide whether the trial court's action here amounted to a closure excluding the public. We conclude that it did.

¶ 16 Without citation to authority, the State argues that the proceeding was not closed to the public because the trial court never asked anyone in the courtroom to leave the courtroom; nothing in the record shows that the trial court affirmatively excluded the public from the Batson hearing; and because counsel, the trial court, the defendant, two correctional officers, and the court...