State v. Saenz
Decision Date | 06 April 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 2 CA-CR 99-0177-PR.,2 CA-CR 99-0177-PR. |
Citation | 197 Ariz. 487,4 P.3d 1030 |
Parties | The STATE of Arizona, Petitioner, v. Oscar Alberto SAENZ, Respondent. |
Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney By Karl Fazio, Tucson, for Petitioner.
¶ 1 In this petition for review of the trial court's order granting post-conviction relief, Rule 32.9(c), Ariz. R.Crim. P., 17 A.R.S., the State of Arizona challenges the court's order granting respondent Oscar Saenz a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence after a jury had found him guilty of first-degree murder. Saenz has not filed a response to the petition. Because it is clear from the record that Saenz was aware of the evidence before trial but chose not to reveal it, we agree with the state that the trial court erred in granting him a new trial.
¶ 2 In December 1998, a jury found Saenz guilty of first-degree murder. The victim, M.G., was shot in February 1998 outside a Tucson bar as she and a friend were trying to get into her car. Two days before the sentencing set for January 22, 1999, however, a Nogales police detective contacted one of the Tucson police detectives who had investigated the murder and reported that a Mexican national, Jesus Lugo-Dominguez, had approached immigration authorities and confessed to the murder. The trial court vacated the sentencing hearing to permit the state to investigate the matter further. On January 25, Saenz filed a "Petition to Vacate Judgment Pursuant to Rule 24.2(a)(2) & for Post Conviction Relief Pursuant to Rule 32.1(e)." Thereafter, however, Saenz filed a "Petition to Proceed Under Rule 32.1," in which he conceded that his request for a new trial pursuant to Rule 24.1(b), Ariz. R.Crim. P., 17 A.R.S., was untimely. The state joined in that motion, and the trial court proceeded under Rule 32, with Saenz claiming that the confession was newly discovered evidence and that he was entitled to a new trial. After an evidentiary hearing on March 26, the trial court found that there was "sufficient credible newly-discovered evidence" and that, if the evidence had been introduced at trial, "the jury could have found otherwise than the verdict they rendered." This petition for review followed. We conclude that the trial court erred in granting relief for several reasons.
¶ 4 As our supreme court noted in State v. Green, 174 Ariz. 586, 587, 852 P.2d 401, 402 (1993), the criminal rules of this state do not define the term "conviction"; "[t]he word is susceptible of more than one meaning, and its meaning varies with the context in which it is used." The meaning of the word "depends upon the construction of the particular law or statute under consideration." State v. Superior Court, 138 Ariz. 4, 6, 672 P.2d 956, 958 (1983). See, e.g., State v. Williams, 131 Ariz. 211, 639 P.2d 1036 (1982) ( ); State v. Heartfield, 316 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 22, 196 Ariz. 407, 998 P.2d 1080 (Ariz.App.2000) ( ).
¶ 5 Rule 32 contemplates that all claims related both to the finding of guilt and the sentence(s) imposed, other than claims that may be raised on appeal, are to be raised in one petition as part of one post-conviction proceeding. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.1 cmt.; see also Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.2 ( ). And, perhaps more significantly, the rule expressly provides that post-conviction proceedings may be commenced by filing a notice in a non-capital case "within ninety days of the entry of judgment and sentence." Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.4(a); accord A.R.S. § 13-4033(A)(1) ( ); Ariz. R.Crim. P. 26.1 and 26.2 ( ); State v. Perez, 172 Ariz. 290, 836 P.2d 1000 (1992) ( ). Thus, for purposes of determining when a petition for post-conviction relief may be filed, a guilty verdict is not a conviction.
¶ 6 The petition for post-conviction relief was premature. Further, although Rule 24.1 permits a defendant who has been found guilty to seek a new trial based on the verdict, as Saenz conceded below, such a motion must be filed no later than ten days after the verdict is rendered. Ariz. R.Crim. P. 24.1(b). Saenz filed his petition seeking a new trial on January 25, 1999, thirty-eight days after the verdict was rendered on December 17, 1998. Nor could he have proceeded under Rule 24.2 because a judgment of conviction and sentence had not yet been entered. Like the petition for post-conviction relief, a motion to vacate the judgment would also have been premature.
¶ 7 Even assuming, however, that the trial court could have addressed the issues in a post-conviction proceeding under Rule 32,1 the court abused its discretion in granting relief. See State v. Serna, 167 Ariz. 373, 807 P.2d 1109 (1991) ( ); State v. Watton, 164 Ariz. 323, 793 P.2d 80 (1990) ( ). In order to be entitled to post-conviction relief on the ground of newly discovered evidence under Rule 32.1(e), a defendant must establish that the evidence was discovered after trial although it existed before trial; that it could not have been discovered and produced at trial through reasonable diligence; that it is neither cumulative nor impeaching; that it is material; and that it probably would have changed the verdict. State v. Mauro, 159 Ariz. 186, 766 P.2d 59 (1988); see also State v. Apelt, 176 Ariz. 349, 861 P.2d 634 (1993). As with all grounds for post-conviction relief, the defendant has the burden of proving the allegations in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence. Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.8(c); State v. Verdugo, 183 Ariz. 135, 901 P.2d 1165 (1995).
¶ 8 The state contends that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Saenz a new trial because (1) Saenz did not present any evidence that he had discovered Lugo-Dominguez's alleged confession after trial; (2) Saenz did not act with due diligence in bringing the confession to his attorney's attention before trial; (3) Saenz did not sustain his burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession probably would have changed the verdict; and (4) the trial court applied a lower burden for this part of the test for newly discovered evidence. Because we agree with the state's first two arguments, we necessarily conclude that the confession was not newly discovered evidence as contemplated by Rule 32.
¶ 9 Maria Lugo-Dominguez testified at the evidentiary hearing that her brother, Jesus Lugo-Dominguez, had told her in March 1998 that he had committed a murder in Tucson, giving her details as to how and where he had killed the victim. She claimed she had learned from reading the newspaper that another man had been charged with the murder and was in jail. She testified that she did not know the man, whom she identified as Saenz, and explained that she had learned his name from the newspaper articles. She stated she had traveled to Tucson and gone to the jail to see Saenz in April, June, and July 1998 and had told him her brother had confessed to her. She added that Saenz had asked her to persuade her brother to turn himself in to authorities. She testified that, by the time of her second visit, her brother had disappeared and she did not know where he was, all of which she claimed to have told Saenz.
¶ 10 Tucson Police Detective Olivas testified that, in January 1999, he had been contacted by Detective Weatherbie from Nogales, Arizona, who had told him that someone in Nogales had confessed to a Tucson murder.2 Olivas went to Nogales and spoke to Lugo-Dominguez who stated he had committed the February 1998 murder, although there were inconsistencies between the account he had previously given Weatherbie and what he told Olivas. Lugo-Dominguez was then being held by authorities in Nogales pending a deportation proceeding. On January 28, Olivas and the prosecutor interviewed Lugo-Dominguez in the Pima County Jail. At that time, he recanted his confession. He also said that Maria Lugo-Dominguez was married to Saenz and that Saenz was his brother-in-law. According to Olivas, when asked if he had been paid to confess falsely, Lugo-Dominguez stated that he "did it for his family" and that he would so testify before the trial court as long as Saenz was not present.
¶ 11 In addition to this evidence, the trial court had before it the deposition of Lugo-Dominguez, taken before the January 28 interview. Although we have not been provided with a transcript of that deposition, Lugo-Dominguez apparently made statements that...
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