State v. Saffron

• Decision Date: 22 December 1927
• Docket Number: 20834.
• Citation: 146 Wash. 202,262 P. 970
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. SAFFRON.

262 P. 970

146 Wash. 202

STATE v. SAFFRON.

No. 20834.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 22, 1927

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; Webster, Judge.

Phineus Saffron was charged with the crime of assault in the first degree and was found not guilty by reason of insanity existing at time of the assault. Upon entry of the verdict defendant's motion for his discharge from custody was denied, and he appeals. Affirmed.

See also, 143 Wash. 34, 254 P. 463.

S Edelstein, of Spokane, for appellant.

Chas W. Greenough and Louis F. Bunge, both of Spokane, for the State.

HOLCOMB J.

Appellant, having been prosecuted for the crime of assault in the first degree, pleaded not guilty, and also, by counsel, filed a written plea of mental irresponsibility in accordance with section 2174, Rem. Comp. Stat. The jury found defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, or mental irresponsibility, existing at the time of the assault. By special interrogatories submitted by the court to the jury, as required by section 2175, Rem. Comp. Stat., the jury found: First, that appellant committed the offense charged; second, that they acquitted him because of his mental irresponsibility at the time of the assault; third, that the mental irresponsibility did not continue and did not exist at the time of the verdict; and, fourth, that there was likelihood of a relapse or recurence of such mental irresponsibility, and that appellant was not a safe person to be at large.

Upon the entry of the verdict, appellant moved for discharge from custody, upon the ground of having been found not guilty because of mental irresponsibility, and the jury having found that at the time of the trial he was sane and as his mental irresponsibility did not exist at the time of the trial, he was entitled to his discharge; and upon the further ground that special finding No. 4 was void and of no effect in so far as the same affected his right to immediate discharge and release, for the reason that section 4, c. 30, Laws of 1907, under which the special finding No. 4 was made, was unconstitutional and void because it deprived appellant of his liberty without due process of law.

The motion for discharge was denied by the court, to which appellant excepted.

On the same day, the court entered a judgment, in accordance with section 2176, Rem. Comp. Stat., committing appellant to the ward for criminal insane in the Washington State Penitentiary until discharged as provided by law. He was thereupon so committed.

On appeal, appellant contends that the finding of the jury under which he was committed to the insane ward of the penitentiary is void, for the following reasons:

1. Because his commitment was made without due process of law, no notice having been given to him nor hearing had nor an opportunity to defend on the question of the likelihood of a recurrence in the future of his mental irresponsibility, or that it was danagerous for him to be at large.

2. Upon the ground that the act which provides for the method by which a person so committed can obtain a hearing for his discharge from the penitentiary is unconstitutional and void because it places within the arbitrary control of officers under the control of the executive department whether or not one so situated can ever apply to a judicial tribunal for a hearing on his right to be discharged from custody.

3. Upon the further ground that appellant, having been acquitted of the crime charged and having been found sane and mentally responsible at the time of the trial, was entitled to his immediate discharge, and could not be apprehended or taken into custody and committed to a penal institution without some subsequent act on his part, or some altered condition of his mental responsibility, and the determination thereof after a charge was filed and a hearing had thereon.

Counsel for appellant ably and very confidently argues, in support of these contentions, grounding most of the argument, first, upon the premise that a person found to be sane must be presumed to continue to be sane until the contrary is established by judicial proceedings, after notice and an opportunity given to be heard.

32 C.J. 756, is quoted as follows:

'Sanity, when once shown to exist, like any other fact or status of a continuing nature, is presumed to continue.'

It is then asserted that the fact of the sanity of the appellant at the time of the trial having been established by the verdict of the jury, he was then entitled to his immediate discharge, urging as a fundamental rule of law that no person, sane and mentally competent at the time of trial, can be committed to a penal institution as a criminally insane person, as defined in the act, without any other inquisition being had in which the issue was directly raised to determine whether or not the accused has lost his sanity or is dangerous to be at large, by having committed some overt act which had forfeited his right to be at large.

Cases and texts are cited and relied upon to the effect that the right of a person acquitted of crime on the ground of insanity to be discharged from custody on his restoration to sanity is without question; that upon that fact being once established it is the duty of the court to immediately discharge him from custody.

Our statute, section 2174, supra, provides that when one desires to interpose a defense of insanity or mental irresponsibility on behalf of one charged with a crime, his counsel or some one authorized by law to appear and act for him, shall at the time of pleading to the information file a plea in writing, setting up (1) his insanity or mental irresponsibility at the time of the commission of the crime charged, (2) whether the insanity or mental irresponsibility still exist, or (3) whether the defendant has become sane or mentally responsible between the time of the commission of the crime and the time of the trial.

Section 2175, supra, provides that if the plea of insanity or mental irresponsibility be interposed, and evidence upon that issue be given, the court shall instruct the jury, when giving the charge, that in case a verdict of acquittal of the crime charged be returned, they shall also return special verdicts finding: (1) Whether the defendant committed the crime; and if so (2) whether they acquitted him because of his insanity or mental irresponsibility at the tim of its commission; (3) whether the insanity or mental...