State v. Sahady

• Decision Date: 05 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-409-A,96-409-A
• Citation: 694 A.2d 707
• Parties: STATE v. Paul M. SAHADY. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 707

694 A.2d 707

STATE v. Paul M. SAHADY.

No. 96-409-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 5, 1997.

Aaron L. Weisman, Providence, for Plaintiff.

Timothy J. Dodd, Frank Caprio, Providence, for Defendant.

Present: WEISBERGER, C.J., and LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, and FLANDERS, JJ.

OPINION

BOURCIER, Justice.

Pursuant to a question certified here by a justice of the Superior Court pursuant to G.L.1956 § 9-24-27, this Court has been asked to determine whether G.L.1956 § 11-47-52 ¹ is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the due process clauses of the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We conclude that it is not.

The defendant, Paul M. Sahady, was arrested on October 26, 1995, and subsequently charged with carrying a firearm while intoxicated in violation of § 11-47-52. He moved to certify the aforementioned question, and pursuant to our decision in State v. Fonseca, 670 A.2d 1237 (R.I.1996), a justice of the Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing on May 6 and 16, 1996, to create a factual record to supplement the certified question. The hearing justice's findings from the record are as follows.

On October 26, 1995, at approximately 12:15 a.m. an officer of the Warwick police department received a police radio alert that a white Thunderbird had been seen driving at a high rate of speed on Airport Road in Warwick and had stopped in the parking lot of Barry's Disco, also in Warwick. That officer was dispatched to the Hoxsie area of Warwick to investigate the report.

Upon entering the parking lot of Barry's Disco, the officer observed a large white car parked nearby and two individuals standing close to it. The officer then proceeded to approach the car and saw the defendant standing beside the driver's side door and another individual standing alongside the passenger's side door. The officer then asked the defendant, standing by the driver's side door whether he had been operating the vehicle that evening, and the defendant answered that he had been the driver.

The officer then instructed the defendant to return to the interior of his vehicle and also asked to see the defendant's license and registration. The officer observed that the defendant smelled of alcohol, that his eyes were bloodshot and watery, and that his speech was slurred. The officer then ordered the defendant out of the vehicle in order to perform a pat-down search. At this point another officer arrived to assist. During the pat-down process the defendant informed the officers that he was carrying a firearm and that he had a Massachusetts license to carry a gun and that he was a prominent criminal lawyer in that state. The officers retrieved the firearm.

The defendant was then asked to perform a number of field sobriety tests including the walk-and-turn test, the finger-to-nose test, and the Romberg balancing test. The defendant failed each test. The first officer testified at the hearing below that on the basis of his experience and training, he believed the defendant to have been under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The second officer also testified that he administered a sobriety test at the scene known as the horizontal-gaze nystagmus test, which defendant also failed. Accordingly, defendant was arrested for carrying a firearm while intoxicated in violation of § 11-47-52.

The defendant contends that the phrases "when intoxicated" and "under the influence" fail to adequately warn what conduct is proscribed by the General Assembly and that the statute is therefore facially vague and vague as applied to him.

We begin our analysis by reiterating that " 'vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment Freedoms must be examined in light of the facts of the case at hand.' " Fonseca, 670 A.2d at 1240 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550, 95 S.Ct. 710, 714, 42 L.Ed.2d 706, 713 (1975)). Relying on those facts, so long as a statute is constitutionally specific in regard to a particular defendant, this Court will not consider a defendant's facial-vagueness challenge. See Village of Hoffman Estates, v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 n. 7, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191 n. 7, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 369 n. 7 (1982).

The reason for this determination is clear. Vagueness challenges under the due process clause rest principally on lack of notice. See State v. Alegria, 449 A.2d 131, 133 (R.I.1982); State v. Authelet, 120 R.I. 42, 45, 385 A.2d 642, 644 (1978). Absent some other constitutional concern, if the facts show that a defendant is given sufficient notice that his conduct is at risk we see no reason to speculate whether the statute notifies a hypothetical defendant. See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 500, 102 S.Ct. at 1191, 71 L.Ed.2d at 369. This method of generally examining vagueness challenges only as they apply to a particular defendant's factual circumstances furthers our long settled practice of construing "legislative enactment[s] of the General Assembly to be constitutional and valid * * * whenever such a construction is reasonably possible." Fonseca, 670 A.2d at 1240.

To determine whether § 11-47-52 is unconstitutionally vague as to this defendant, we have stated previously that " '[t]he standard employed * * * is whether the disputed verbiage provides adequate warning to a person of ordinary intelligence that his conduct is illegal by common understanding and practice.' " Fonseca, 670 A.2d at 1239 (quoting Authelet, 120 R.I....