State v. Russell

• Decision Date: 30 January 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2003-353-C.A.,2003-353-C.A.
• Citation: 890 A.2d 453
• Parties: STATE v. David RUSSELL.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

890 A.2d 453

STATE v. David RUSSELL.

No. 2003-353-C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

January 30, 2006.

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Diane Daigle, Esq., for Plaintiff.

Paula Rosin, Esq., for Defendant.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

Justice GOLDBERG, for the Court.

This case came before the Supreme Court on October 24, 2005, on the state's appeal from a Superior Court judgment that dismissed a criminal complaint charging the defendant, David Russell (defendant), with disorderly conduct. The defendant did not participate in this appeal. In light of the importance of the issues raised in this case, this Court, on March 30, 2005, issued an order inviting amicus curiae briefs from the Public Defender and other interested parties. The Court gratefully acknowledges the joint brief and participation in oral argument by the Office of the Public Defender, the Criminal Defense Clinic of Roger Williams University School of Law, and the Rhode Island Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys (amici), and an amicus curiae brief submitted by the Rhode Island Affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union.

Before the Supreme Court, the state argues that the hearing justice erred by dismissing the complaint and by construing G.L.1956 § 11-45-1(a)(1) as unconstitutionally void for vagueness when applied to disorderly conduct occurring in the home. The state requests that the judgment be vacated, the complaint be reinstated, and the case be remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings. For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the judgment and remand the case to the Superior Court with directions to reinstate the complaint.

Facts and Travel

The events leading to this appeal are based on a Warwick Police Department affidavit and the hearing justice's written decision. The hearing justice did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, in disregard of our holding in State v. Fonseca, 670 A.2d 1237 (R.I.1996), in which we declared that "vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts of the case at hand[.]" Id. at 1240. (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975)). Because there is no suggestion that the First Amendment is implicated in this case, an evidentiary hearing was in order.¹ However, because the salient facts are not disputed, we shall decide this appeal based upon the limited record before us. Nevertheless, we emphasize that trial justices should not lightly undertake a constitutional analysis of penal statutes, as applied to a specific defendant, without compiling a factual record.

According to the police report and the facts relied upon by the trial justice, on September 3, 2002, Warwick police officers responded to a report of a domestic disturbance at the home defendant shared with his wife, Linda Russell (wife or Mrs. Russell). During a heated argument with his wife, in which defendant demanded that the family home be sold or he would destroy it, defendant turned over the dining room table and threw a chair through a screened porch window into the yard. The defendant's wife called the police, and defendant fled the scene. According to the responding police officers, they observed a beverage stain on the dining room wall, a ripped window screen on the porch where the chair was thrown, and other debris that defendant had tossed into the yard. A warrant was issued for defendant's arrest, and on October 23, 2002, he surrendered. This prosecution ensued.

The defendant was charged with one count of disorderly conduct in violation of § 11-45-1(a)(1)² and G.L.1956 § 12-29-2.³ In Superior Court, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint and alleged that the police lacked probable cause to charge him with disorderly conduct for behavior that occurred in his home and not in a public place. According to defendant, as applied to behavior in one's home, the statute is unconstitutionally "vague and indefinite."

The defendant also argued that subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of § 11-45-1 must be read in conjunction with each other, thereby specifying that, to fall within the provisions of § 11-45-1(a)(1), the behavior, as required in § 11-45-1(a)(2), must be committed in a public place or in a private residence that the accused has no right to occupy.

The hearing justice correctly held that § 11-45-1(a) contains seven specific, mutually exclusive incidents of behavior that are prohibited and that none is incorporated into the other. However, she agreed with defendant and found that, to the extent disorderly conduct reached behavior occurring in an individual's home, it was unconstitutionally vague in violation of both state and federal guarantees of due process. The hearing justice, citing State v. Authelet, 120 R.I. 42, 385 A.2d 642 (1978), held that a person may not be found "criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed." Id. at 45, 385 A.2d at 643 (quoting State v. Levitt, 118 R.I. 32, 36, 371 A.2d 596, 598 (1977)). In her analysis, she found that in most instances, the "fighting, threatening, violent, and tumultuous" language of the statute affords adequate warning to individuals of ordinary intelligence that their conduct was illegal; but as applied to disturbances in a private home, she found that § 11-45-1(a)(1) was unconstitutional.

As it relates to conduct occurring in the home, the hearing justice also declared that § 11-45-1(a)(1) fails to provide law enforcement officers and courts with sufficient standards to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The court reasoned that "[f]or a person to be guilty of disorderly conduct, the public or some member thereof must be disturbed." Thus, the hearing justice concluded that § 11-45-1(a)(1) applied "only to conduct which occurred outside the person's private residence which he or she has a right to occupy or which disturbs one or more persons outside the home." Because defendant's conduct occurred within his home, the court granted the motion to dismiss. The state appealed.

Standard of Review

This Court undertakes statutory interpretation de novo, State v. Martini, 860 A.2d 689, 691 (R.I.2004), and we begin with a presumption that a legislative enactment is constitutional. State ex rel. Town of Westerly v. Bradley, 877 A.2d 601, 605 (R.I.2005). The party contesting the statute's constitutionality has "the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the challenged enactment is unconstitutional." Id. This Court "will attach `every reasonable intendment in favor of * * * constitutionality' in order to preserve the statute." Id. (quoting Gem Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Rossi, 867 A.2d 796, 808 (R.I.2005)). In determining whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to an accused, this Court considers the enactment in light of the facts. State v. Berberian, 416 A.2d 127, 129 (R.I.1980). We will not indulge in hypothetical situations that would lead to absurd results. See State v. Sahady, 694 A.2d 707, 708 (R.I.1997) (When the facts show that defendant had adequate notice that his conduct was proscribed, "we see no reason to speculate whether the statute notifies a hypothetical defendant.").

I Overbreadth

In her written decision, the hearing justice found "that [§ ]11-45-1(a)(1) is capable of an overbroad interpretation and would, without limitation, be unconstitutional." To the extent this finding encompasses the overbreadth doctrine, we deem it erroneous as a matter of law. The defendant argued that the statute was "void for being vague and indefinite," but did not challenge the disorderly conduct statute on overbreadth grounds. Although we question whether this was preserved for appellate review, we shall address it briefly herein.

The overbreadth doctrine arises when a statutory enactment is so broad in its sweep that it is capable of reaching constitutionally protected conduct. Cranston Teachers Alliance Local No. 1704 AFT v. Miele, 495 A.2d 233, 235 (R.I. 1985). The overbreadth doctrine generally applies in the context of First Amendment freedoms and is intended to prevent the imposition of criminal penalties for the exercise of one's constitutional rights. DiRaimo v. City of Providence, 714 A.2d 554, 565 (R.I. 1998). The question of whether a statute is overly broad is separate and distinct from the issues raised by a vagueness challenge. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). The judicially created overbreadth doctrine "is strong medicine that should be employed sparingly and only as a last resort[.]" Cranston Teacher's Alliance, 495 A.2d at 235. When a limiting construction can be placed on a statute to save its constitutionality, an overbreadth analysis should be avoided. Id. Further, in cases that involve conduct and not speech, an enactment's overbreadth not only must be apparent, but also substantial in view of the conduct that legitimately may be restrained by the state. Id. Accordingly, an overbreadth challenge in this case is without merit.

II Vagueness

A penal statute is void for vagueness in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause if it "fail[s] to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits * * * [or] authorize[s] and even encourage[s] arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Bradley, 877 A.2d at 605 (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999)). This constitutional principle is based on our judicial system's concept of fairness. Authelet, 120 R.I. at 45, 385 A.2d at 644. "If a criminal act is set forth in a statute in uncertain terms, the innocent may be trapped by inadequate warning of what the state forbids." Id. Thus, the Legislature must draft a criminal statute "to provide...