State v. Sailer, 97-2008
| Citation | 587 N.W.2d 756 |
| Decision Date | 25 November 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-2008,97-2008 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. James SAILER, Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
John J. Wolfe, Clinton, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha E. Boesen, Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence H. Schultz, County Attorney, and Bruce Ingham, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by CARTER, P.J., and LAVORATO, NEUMAN, SNELL, and CADY, JJ.
Defendant James Sailer pled guilty to a charge of third-degree theft, an aggravated misdemeanor. See Iowa Code §§ 714.1, 714.2(3) (1995). He was sentenced to the maximum term of incarceration allowed, an indeterminate prison term of two years. See id. § 903.1(2). Sailer appeals claiming that the district court erred in overruling his objection to certain portions of a victim impact statement introduced at the sentencing hearing and contends that the court improperly considered unproven offenses disclosed in the victim impact statement in determining his sentence. He requests that the sentence be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. We affirm.
Defendant James Sailer was charged with one count of first-degree theft following the investigation of allegations that he had stolen thousands of dollars of money and property from his employer, Clinton Electrical and Mechanical Contractors, Inc., over a seven-month period. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Sailer pled guilty to one count of third-degree theft. Under the terms of the plea agreement, Sailer was to make restitution to the victim of his crime "in an amount to be determined by separate hearing, said amount to be without regard for the jurisdictional amount of the included offense." The court accepted the plea agreement, ordered a presentence investigation and scheduled a sentencing hearing.
The presentence investigation report disclosed that Sailer had been convicted three years earlier of a theft charge in Illinois, for which he received the equivalent of a deferred judgment. The report recommended a one-year jail sentence, with all but thirty days suspended, followed by three years of supervised probation.
Prior to the sentencing hearing, Sailer filed a motion to exclude impact statements, contending that three letters submitted by various people should not be considered because they "contain broad and sweeping accusations against the defendant [and][t]he issues addressed in the letters go far beyond the offense to which defendant is pleading guilty." The court scheduled the motion to be heard at the sentencing hearing. At the start of the sentencing hearing, the court granted Sailer's motion in part by refusing to consider letters submitted by two members of a corporate officer's family and a former employee because they were not "victims" of the crime. The court denied the motion with regard to a proposed oral victim impact statement from Carl Aldredge, the vice president of Clinton Electrical and Mechanical Contractors. Following statements from the county attorney and Sailer's counsel regarding the appropriate punishment and a statement from Sailer, the court heard Aldredge's oral victim impact statement.
Near the start of Aldredge's statement, Sailer's counsel lodged an objection after the following exchange between Aldredge and the county attorney:
....
The statement continued in a question-and-answer format, with the county attorney eliciting statements from Aldredge regarding how Sailer committed the thefts and the impact of those thefts on the company. As part of his statement, Aldredge described several incidents outlined in the minutes of testimony, as well as incidents not contained in that document. Aldredge also explained that Clinton Electrical and Mechanical Contractors, Inc. was no longer in operation, a fact which he attributed to the repercussions from Sailer's actions. Defense counsel interjected at one point during the statement, seeking assurance from the court that a standing objection existed with regard to some of the content of Aldredge's statement. In his appeal, Sailer objects specifically to statements by Aldredge regarding Sailer's alleged theft of proceeds from the sale of scrap iron and the alleged theft of $40,000 worth of tools and equipment.
Sailer alleges that Aldredge's victim impact statement was improper because some of the allegations met the level of the original charge of first-degree theft, which is theft of property in excess of $10,000 in value. See Iowa Code § 714.2(1). Sailer contends the statement should not have been admitted because the information it contained went beyond the scope of the offense to which he pled guilty, third-degree theft, and did not comply with Iowa Code section 910A.5, providing for the use of victim impact statements.
Following Aldredge's statement, the court proceeded directly to sentencing. The court discussed information contained in the presentence investigation report regarding a past criminal incident, possible mental health problems, and Sailer's family obligations. The court then sentenced Sailer to a two-year indeterminate prison sentence, the maximum allowed for third-degree theft, an aggravated misdemeanor. See id. § 903.1(2). The court also ordered Sailer to pay victim restitution in an amount to be determined at a future hearing, pursuant to the plea agreement. The court stated as follows with regard to the reasons for the sentence imposed:
The Court has considered in this sentence all of the matters contained in the pre-sentence investigation report. The Court has considered the amount of the financial loss to the victim of this offense. The Court has specifically considered that the defendant received a special conditional discharge of twelve months in 1994 on a charge of theft.
(Emphasis added.)
Sailer contends that the court's statement shows it was improperly swayed by the victim impact statement, which contained allegations of an amount of financial loss greater than the $1000 limit for third-degree theft. Thus, he maintains that in determining the sentence to be imposed, the court considered facts constituting the offense with which he was originally charged, first-degree theft, rather than the offense to which he pled guilty, third-degree theft. Therefore, Sailer argues, his sentence was based on an unproven offense, an outcome which violates the Due Process Clauses of the Federal and Iowa Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend XIV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 9.
We review the district court's sentence for the correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 4; State v. Phillips, 561 N.W.2d 355, 357 (Iowa 1997). "A sentence will not be upset on appellate review unless the defendant demonstrates an abuse of trial court discretion or a defect in the sentencing procedure, such as trial court consideration of impermissible factors." State v. Loyd, 530 N.W.2d 708, 713 (Iowa 1995) (citing State v. Wright, 340 N.W.2d 590, 592 (Iowa 1983)). With regard to the district court's discretion in this area, we stated in Loyd:
Sentencing decisions of the trial court are cloaked with a strong presumption in their favor, and an abuse of discretion will not be found unless the defendant shows that such discretion was exercised on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.
Sailer asserts that the sentence imposed by the district court should be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. First, Sailer contends the victim impact statement furnished by Aldredge did not comply with Iowa Code section 910A.5 and therefore should not have been heard in its entirety by the court. Second, Sailer argues the court improperly considered unproven offenses detailed in Aldredge's victim impact statement in determining the sentence to be imposed.
Iowa Code section 910A.5 (1997) provides in pertinent part:
1. A victim may present a victim impact statement to the court using one or more of the following methods:
....
b. A victim may orally present a victim impact statement at the sentencing hearing in the presence of the defendant.
....
2. A victim impact statement shall include the identification of the victim of the offense, and may include the following:
a. Itemization of any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the offense....
....
e. Any other information related to the impact of the offense upon the victim.
The stated purpose of chapter 910A is as follows:
It is the purpose of this Act to assure the fair and compassionate treatment of victims and witnesses of crimes and to increase the effectiveness of the criminal justice system by affording to them certain basic rights and consideration, and by...
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State v. Thacker, 14–0374.
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