State v. Saint

Decision Date24 April 2014
Docket NumberNo. M2013-01511-CCA-R3-CD,M2013-01511-CCA-R3-CD
PartiesSTATE OF TENNESSEE v. JAMES H. SAINT, JR.
CourtTennessee Court of Criminal Appeals

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2005-C-2234

Cheryl A. Blackburn, Judge

The petitioner, James H. Saint, Jr., was convicted of six counts of aggravated sexual battery and was ordered to serve a sixty-six-year sentence. The petitioner brings this post-conviction action where he alleges that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in that: (1) trial counsel failed to sufficiently inform the petitioner regarding the details of his settlement offer; (2) trial counsel failed to adequately prepare both himself and the petitioner for trial; and (3) trial counsel failed to adequately cross-examine the petitioner's wife at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the petitioner has not established that counsel performed deficiently or that any deficiency prejudiced the petitioner. We accordingly affirm the denial of his petition.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JERRY L. SMITH and NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JJ., joined.

Jason Mitchell Chaffin, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, James H. Saint, Jr.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Ahmed A. Safeeullah, Assistant Attorney General; Victor S. Johnson, III, District Attorney General; and Brian Holmgren, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION
Facts and Procedural History

On October 26, 2006, a jury found the petitioner guilty of six counts of aggravatedsexual battery, Class B felonies. The trial judge sentenced the petitioner to serve eleven years for each count, with the sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of sixty-six years. The facts of that case are set forth in this court's opinion in State v. Saint, 284 S.W. 3d 340, 348 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). On direct appeal, this court affirmed the convictions but remanded the case for resentencing in accordance with the Sentencing Act as it existed at the time of the offenses. Saint, 284 S.W. 3d at 340. On remand, the trial court again sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of sixty-six years, and this court affirmed the sentence. State v. James H. Saint, Jr., No. M2009-01287-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2106224 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 26, 2010).

On April 16, 2012, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. On May 17, 2012, the trial court appointed counsel to the petitioner and on July 24, 2012, conducted a hearing to determine whether the petition was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court determined that although the petition was filed untimely, "[d]ue process necessitate[d] Petitioner be afforded a full and fair evidentiary hearing." The petitioner then filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief, and the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing.

At the post-conviction hearing, the trial court heard testimony from both the petitioner and his trial counsel. The petitioner testified that he did not have very strong reading comprehension skills and that his memory was poor. He felt that he suffered from memory problems, as he often had to write things down to remember them. He stated that he never received a copy of the discovery in his case before he went to trial, and that while he did meet with trial counsel prior to the trial, he did not recall reviewing or discussing the evidence against him. He further testified that he was unaware of the true nature of the allegations against him and that he only became aware of these allegations when his trial commenced and he heard the testimony of his wife and the victim. The petitioner claimed that he did not understand that he was being charged with six counts of aggravated sexual battery but rather thought that the indictment contained only one count. The petitioner further stated that he was not made aware of the potential sentence that he faced.

Prior to trial, the petitioner rejected a plea offer from the State that would have required him to serve a twelve-year sentence. He did recall discussing the State's offer with trial counsel but testified that trial counsel told him only that "if you don't take it, you'll be sorry." The petitioner testified that, during trial, it was his understanding that he would only receive a twelve-year sentence if he were convicted.

The petitioner stated that the defense's theory of the case was that the petitioner was innocent, and the petitioner proclaimed his innocence at trial. The petitioner did not recall discussing preparation for his defense with trial counsel but remembered only that whendiscussing his potential testimony, trial counsel told the petitioner "just to tell the truth."

The petitioner stated that he provided trial counsel with the names of witnesses who could establish that the victim was dishonest and had problems with thievery. He testified that trial counsel may have followed up with some of the witnesses, but "not probably all of them."

On cross-examination, the petitioner reiterated that his memory was poor, and he conceded that it was possible that he did not remember meeting extensively with trial counsel and discussing trial strategy. He also conceded that it was possible that trial counsel did discuss the penalties he was facing and that he simply did not remember these discussions. He testified that the only thing he remembered about his potential sentence was when it was addressed at the conclusion of the trial. The petitioner stated that he did not know whether trial counsel discussed with him the bill of particulars that had been filed. He testified that he thought he remembered trial counsel showing him a video recording of his confession to police and that he did remember discussing with trial counsel that the trial strategy would be to suggest that the victim was lying about the accusations against the petitioner. He further stated that he remembered witnesses testifying in court but could not recall if they testified about the victim's history of dishonesty and theft.

Trial counsel testified that he assumed representation of the petitioner after the attorney initially assigned to the case resigned from the public defender's office. He stated that as part of his representation he would have discussed the petitioner's interviews with police and played the tapes of the interviews for the petitioner. He testified that he would have had the opportunity to go over discovery materials with the petitioner that had been provided in the formal discovery response and that initial trial counsel was also involved in the discussion of the discovery materials.

Referencing a letter between the petitioner and his first attorney, trial counsel determined that the petitioner received the discovery in his case on November 14, 2005, and that he returned the discovery to the public defender's office on December 15, 2005. Trial counsel testified that the petitioner had physical control of the discovery materials for a period of one month and that he later had discussions as to the various aspects of the discovery materials with the petitioner.

Trial counsel acknowledged that the petitioner had expressed difficulty in reading and understanding the discovery materials. Trial counsel made observations in his notes reflecting "a little bit of exasperation where I say, explained yet again this thing or that again regarding the proof in the case and a couple of times when [the petitioner] called and said he just didn't understand something and wanted it repeated. And so a lot of time was spent withhim trying -- trying to do that." Trial counsel testified that the petitioner's memory struggles manifested themselves in two different ways. The first was when the petitioner would request clarification on an issue that trial counsel believed that he had made clear to the petitioner. The second was the petitioner's inability to remember whether specific events occurred, a response trial counsel noted was "unusual . . . in an allegation of this nature."

Trial counsel testified that the petitioner would have "absolutely" been made aware that he was facing six counts of aggravated sexual battery. He stated that he explained to the petitioner that if he rejected the State's plea agreement and proceeded to trial that he faced the potential for consecutive sentencing. He explained on multiple occasions that the petitioner would potentially receive far more than a twelve-year sentence if he was convicted at trial. Trial counsel referenced his case notes, which mentioned specific meetings on February 4, 2006, and February 27, 2006. During the February 4 meeting, trial counsel indicated that the petitioner could receive a sentence ranging from eight to seventy-two years if convicted, and on February 27, trial counsel drew a diagram for the petitioner in an attempt to clearly explain the concept of consecutive sentencing.

Trial counsel stated that he requested and received a bill of particulars from the State and that it was his common practice to go over the bill of particulars with his clients. He further testified that he raised the inconsistencies between the bill of particulars and the actual trial testimony in his motion to dismiss and his motion for a new trial.

Trial counsel confirmed that the petitioner gave him the names of other potential witnesses and that he contacted four of these witnesses, ultimately calling two of the witnesses to testify as to the pattern of lying and stealing that the victim exhibited. He stated that these witnesses "were both very verbal, very committed to [the petitioner] and I thought particularly strong witnesses." Trial counsel recalled that a fairly extensive amount of testimony dealt with the victim's dishonesty and theft and stated that the...

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