State v. Sais
| Decision Date | 22 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. A-1-CA-36471,A-1-CA-36471 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER SAIS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of Appeals.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CHAVES COUNTY
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Meryl E. Francolini, Assistant Attorney General
for Appellee
Stephen E. McIlwain
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellant
{1} Defendant Christopher Sais appeals his conviction for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-3-5(C) (1969). Defendant challenges the following on appeal: (1) the admission into evidence of a printout from a Facebook page; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction; and (3) the propriety of the State's comments in closing argument. We affirm.
{2} The following facts are derived from Thomas Mein's (Victim) testimony. Victim attended a barbecue at which he had a brief, unremarkable conversation with Defendant who, Victim observed, was wearing a Dallas Cowboy's jersey. Victim had never met Defendant before this encounter. While at the barbecue, Victim observed an argument between Defendant and a mutual friend, Arthur Lacey. Later that night, Victim left the party with Lacey and Lacey's girlfriend. Lacey drove, while Lacey's girlfriend sat in the passenger seat and Victim sat in the backseat on the driver's side. Lacey pulled into a parking lot because Defendant was following them, and Lacey got out of the vehicle, followed by Victim. Victim testified that Defendant then drove into the parking lot and ran into Victim with his SUV, injuring him. Defendant next maneuvered his SUV as if he was going to run Victim over again, but Lacey helped Victim back into his vehicle before that could happen. Once inside, Victim said he saw another vehicle arrive in the parking lot and observed Defendant shooting a handgun toward Lacey's vehicle.
{3} Defendant was charged with aggravated battery with a deadly weapon (vehicle), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (firearm), and shooting at or from a motor vehicle. At trial, the State presented evidence through three witnesses—Victim and two officers. Defendant did not present any witnesses. During Victim's direct examination, the district court admitted a printout of a Facebook page purported to be that of Defendant, containing two posts alleged to be remarks about Defendant's court date and Victim. The jury convicted Defendant of aggravated battery, and the district court declared a mistrial for jury disagreement on the remaining two counts. The State subsequently dismissed these counts. Defendant appeals his conviction for aggravated battery.
{4} Before we address the merits of Defendant's argument, we pause to take note of the deficiencies in Defendant's appellate counsel's briefing. Counsel presents the vast majority of Defendant's claims of error in terse, summary fashion, failing to provide developed analysis. As has often been stated, our appellate courts have no obligation to review unclear arguments or develop arguments on behalf of a party. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 70, 309 P.3d 53; State v. Guerra, 2012-NMSC-014, ¶ 21, 278 P.3d 1031. With these deficiencies in mind, we review Defendant's claims of error as best we can.
{5} Defendant challenges the admission of a printout from a Facebook page, in which Defendant purportedly discussed his upcoming court appearance and disparaged Victim.1 Specifically, Defendant asserts that the State failed to properly authenticate or lay a sufficient foundation to attribute the contents of the Facebook printout to him.2
{6} "We review the admission of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard and will not reverse in the absence of a clear abuse." State v. Candelaria, 2019-NMCA-032, ¶ 41, 446 P.3d 1205 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Salehpoor v. N.M. Inst. of Mining & Tech., 2019-NMCA-046, ¶ 26, 447 P.3d 1169 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also State v. Aragon, 1999-NMCA-060, ¶ 10, 127 N.M. 393, 981 P.2d 1211 (). Based on the record before us and the limited argument presented by Defendant, we conclude Defendant has not met this burden.
{7} The entirety of Defendant's authentication argument is as follows: In response, the State maintains that Defendant's authentication argument is so unsupported it should not be considered. Because Defendant cites no authority to support his argument that the Facebook printout was not properly authenticated, we assume no such authority exists. In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329 ( ). Nor does Defendant otherwise develop his authentication argument for our review, and we decline to do so on his behalf. Elane Photography, LLC, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 70("requir[ing] that the parties adequately brief all appellate issues" and providing that "[t]o rule on an inadequately briefed issue, [we] would have to develop the arguments [ourselves], effectively performing the parties' work for them"); Corona v. Corona, 2014-NMCA-071, ¶ 28, 329 P.3d 701 (). We conclude, based on the foregoing, Defendant has not met his burden to establish the district court abused its discretion in admitting the Facebook printout.
{8} Nevertheless, even if we assume Defendant established the district court erred in admitting the Facebook printout, we would conclude that Defendant again has not met his burden under our harmless error standard. See State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 25, 275 P.3d 110 (). Where, as here, the error is evidentiary, rather than constitutional, we evaluate whether there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the verdict. Id. ¶ 36. "Defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that he was prejudiced by the error." State v. Astorga, 2015-NMSC-007, ¶ 43, 343 P.3d 1245.
{9} Defendant has not carried this initial burden of establishing prejudice. Defendant argues that while Victim identified him in open court, "the one and only time prior to the incident that [Victim] met [Defendant] was at the barbecue[,]" and the Facebook printout thus "bolstered" Victim's in court identification. Defendant does not elaborate on this claim of prejudice. What is more, Defendant fails to accurately account for the identification evidence at trial. First, contrary to Defendant's briefing, Victim not only identified Defendant in court but also picked Defendant out of a photo array close in time to the incident. Second, Victim's in-court identification was unequivocal. Victim testified that he spoke with Defendant at the barbecue, and that he recognized Defendant's jersey and saw Defendant's face when he hit Victim with his SUV. Victim elaborated that when Defendant hit Victim with his SUV, "[Defendant's] face, the driver's window, was right there" and that Victim "could see right in the car." Third, based on our review of the record, the Facebook printout amounted to attenuated identification evidence at best. In light of the above, Defendant fails to demonstrate why the Facebook printout was prejudicial. Nor has he cited any legal authority in support of his claim of prejudice.
{10} We therefore conclude Defendant has not met his initial burden of demonstrating prejudice, and even if the Facebook printout was admitted in error, it was harmless. See State v. Cox, No. A-1-CA-35997, mem. op. ¶¶ 17, 18 (non-precedential) (concluding the defendant had not met his burden when he made only conclusory assertions of prejudice, articulated no theory of prejudice, and cited no legal authority to support his claim of prejudice).
{11} We turn next to whether there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. To review the sufficiency of theevidence, we must evaluate whether substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial, supports a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction. State v. Montoya, 2015-NMSC-010, ¶ 52, 345 P.3d 1056. We view the "evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, indulging all reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict." State v. Torrez, 2013-NMSC-034, ¶ 40, 305 P.3d 944 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{12} "Jury instructions become the law of the case against which the...
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