State v. Salazar-Cabrera
| Decision Date | 17 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 49471 |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. POMPEYO SALAZAR-CABRERA, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District State of Idaho, Nez Perce County. Hon. Gregory FitzMaurice District Judge. Hon. Gregory Kalbfleisch, Magistrate.
Blewett Muschlitz Hally, LLP; Jonathan D. Hally, Lewiston for appellant. Jonathan D. Hally argued.
Hon. Raul R. Labrador, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. John C. McKinney argued.
Pompeyo Salazar-Cabrera appeals from the decision of the district court, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate court, affirming his judgment of conviction for misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter. We affirm.
The State charged Salazar-Cabrera with felony vehicular manslaughter after he drove his semi-truck and trailer down a hill and failed to stop at a stop sign, resulting in a collision that killed another driver. A jury acquitted Salazar-Cabrera of the felony charge but found him guilty of the included offense of misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter. Thereafter, the district court granted Salazar-Cabrera a new trial after concluding that an error in the jury instructions lowered the State's burden of proof for misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter. The case was remanded to the magistrate court for retrial of the misdemeanor. Salazar-Cabrera then filed an unsuccessful motion to dismiss asserting, in relevant part, that it was legally impossible for him to commit misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter as alleged in the amended charging document filed after his first trial. At the conclusion of the retrial, a jury again found Salazar-Cabrera guilty of misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter.
Salazar-Cabrera appealed to the district court, challenging various decisions by the magistrate court. The district court affirmed Salazar-Cabrera's judgment of conviction. Relevant to this appeal, the district court concluded that the magistrate court did not err by denying Salazar-Cabrera's motion to dismiss, by admitting evidence that he passed emergency ramps on the hill prior to the collision, or by rejecting jury instructions he proposed. The district court also concluded that admission of videos taken by a dashcam in Salazar-Cabrera's truck was harmless error. Salazar-Cabrera again appeals.
For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a case from the magistrate division, we review the magistrate court record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate court's findings of fact and whether the magistrate court's conclusions of law follow from those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415, 224 P.3d 480, 482 (2009). However, as a matter of appellate procedure, our disposition of the appeal will affirm or reverse the decision of the district court. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 968, 318 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2014). Thus, we review the magistrate court's findings and conclusions, whether the district court affirmed or reversed the magistrate court and the basis therefore, and either affirm or reverse the district court.
Salazar-Cabrera asserts the following arguments challenging his conviction for misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter: (1) the magistrate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (2) error in the denial of his motion to dismiss alleging his retrial would violate double jeopardy; (3) evidence showing he failed to use available "runaway truck ramps" to stop his truck violated I.R.E. 403; (4) the State failed to lay sufficient foundation for two videos leading up to the collision recorded by a dashcam in his truck; and (5) he was entitled to certain jury instructions. The State responds that Salazar-Cabrera waived or forfeited his double jeopardy arguments, evidence of the ramps was properly admitted, any error in admitting the dashcam videos was harmless, and the jury instructions as a whole were not misleading. We hold that Salazar-Cabrera has failed to show reversible error in regard to any of his arguments challenging his judgment of conviction for misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter.
We first address Salazar-Cabrera's argument that the magistrate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter charge. Salazar-Cabrera asserts for the first time in his reply brief that the amended charging document,[1] filed following his first trial, "failed to charge a viable offense." According to Salazar-Cabrera, the amended charging document did not confer jurisdiction on the magistrate court because it was legally impossible to commit misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter in the manner alleged in the document, necessitating vacation of his conviction and dismissal of the case. We disagree with Salazar-Cabrera's assertion that the magistrate court lacked jurisdiction.
Generally, this Court will not address issues raised for the first time in a reply brief. State v. Hawkins, 159 Idaho 507, 517, 363 P.3d 348, 358 (2015). However, a challenge asserting that a charging document is jurisdictionally deficient is never waived and may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal. State v. Stewart-Meyers, 145 Idaho 605, 606, 181 P.3d 531, 532 (Ct. App. 2008). Whether a charging document conforms to the requirements of law and is legally sufficient is also a question of law subject to free review. Id. If an alleged deficiency is raised by a defendant before trial or entry of a guilty plea, the charging document must, in order to survive the challenge, set forth all facts essential to establish the charged offense. Id. When the information's jurisdictional sufficiency is challenged after trial, it will be upheld unless it is so defective that it does not, by any fair or reasonable construction, charge the offense for which the defendant was convicted. Id. A reviewing court has considerable leeway to imply the necessary allegations from the language of the information. Id. In short, when considering a post-trial challenge to the jurisdictional sufficiency of an information, a reviewing court need only determine that, at a minimum, the information contains a statement of the territorial jurisdiction of the court below and a citation to the applicable section of the Idaho Code. Id.
The amended charging document alleging Salazar-Cabrera committed misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter, which was filed following his acquittal of the felony vehicular manslaughter charge in his first trial, alleged Salazar-Cabrera violated I.C. § 18-4006(3)(c) in "the County of Nez Perce, State of Idaho." The amended charging document was legally sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction because it alleged a specific offense committed in the State of Idaho. See Stewart-Meyers, 145 Idaho at 606-07, 181 P.3d at 532-33. Accordingly, Salazar-Cabrera's subject matter jurisdiction challenge fails.
Salazar-Cabrera contends that the magistrate court erred by denying his motion to dismiss because retrying him for misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter violated his constitutional rights against double jeopardy. According to Salazar-Cabrera, "misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter was the same criminal offense for which a jury acquitted [him] in the first trial," rendering his retrial for that offense a double jeopardy violation.
The State initially charged Salazar-Cabrera with felony vehicular manslaughter. Idaho Code Section 18-4006 defines vehicular manslaughter and provides, in pertinent part:
A violation of subsection (a) is a felony and a violation of subsection (c) is a misdemeanor. See I.C. § 18-4007(3). Both provisions require the commission of an underlying "unlawful act." The initial information charging Salazar-Cabrera with violating I.C. § 18-4006(3) alleged reckless driving[3] as the underlying unlawful act. More specifically, the initial information alleged that Salazar-Cabrera committed "reckless driving with gross negligence, by driving carelessly and heedlessly, at a speed or in a manner as to endanger or likely to endanger any person or property."
At the conclusion of Salazar-Cabrera's first trial, the district court instructed the jury on the elements of both felony vehicular manslaughter and, as an included offense, misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter with reckless driving purportedly serving as the underlying unlawful act. Instruction No. 14, which labeled the offense "Vehicular Manslaughter with Gross Negligence," instructed the jury as follows:
You are further instructed that the unlawful act of Reckless Driving is committed when all of the following are found to...
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