State v. Sallis
| Decision Date | 28 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-1147 |
| Citation | 981 N.W.2d 336 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Maurice Edward SALLIS, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson (argued), Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau (argued), Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
This drug case requires us to decide whether an officer's recollection that a motorist had a driving status of "barred" as of several months before amounted to reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop. We are also called upon to address the extent to which trial courts may regulate limited appearances of retained counsel in cases with appointed counsel.
An officer pulled over the defendant's vehicle. The officer had checked the defendant's driver's license status two to six months earlier and determined it was barred, but he did not recheck that status before making the stop. Cocaine was found, and the driver was determined to be under the influence; he was charged with several offenses. Because of his indigency, the defendant received appointed counsel. Later, during the lengthy pretrial proceedings, a retained attorney sought to enter two limited appearances for certain pretrial matters, without getting involved in the trial itself. The district court refused to allow these limited appearances. The court also overruled the defendant's motion to suppress.
Following a trial in which he was represented by appointed counsel, the defendant was convicted of all charges. On appeal, the defendant asserts error in the denial of his motion to suppress and the denial of his retained attorney's requests to enter limited appearances.
On our review, we disagree. The officer's information about the defendant's driver's license status, although several months old, gave the officer reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was presently engaged in criminal activity by operating a vehicle.
On the limited-appearance issue, we decline to decide definitively whether a criminal defendant with appointed counsel has some constitutional right to have a retained attorney enter a limited appearance. Instead, we conclude that if such a right exists, it is subject to reasonable regulation by the district court. Under the circumstances of the case, given the extent to which pretrial proceedings had been prolonged and the potential for further delay and disruption, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the requested limited appearances.
Having affirmed these rulings, and because we also affirm the district court's ruling denying a mistrial, we uphold the defendant's convictions and sentence.
A. The April 23, 2016 Stop and Resulting Charges. On April 23, 2016, at around 7:30 p.m., Waterloo officers responded to a noise complaint from an individual who resided on Mosely Street. The caller reported what he described as an "ongoing problem" involving a man wearing a backward-facing baseball hat who was loudly playing music from his black Kia Soul.
Two officers, Thomas Frein and Jarid Hundley, responded separately to the call. While they were en route, the dispatcher informed them that the car in question had left the scene. Nonetheless, Officer Frein decided to continue toward the location of the complaint. On his way, he spotted a vehicle and driver matching the description that had been provided by dispatch. From previous encounters, Officer Frein could identify the driver as defendant Maurice Sallis.
Officer Frein had first learned that Sallis was barred from driving in 2012 as part of a criminal investigation. Officer Frein had updated that information by conducting a license check on Sallis two to six months before the date of this encounter. To the best of Officer Frein's recollection, that check confirmed that Sallis's driving privileges were barred.1
Officer Frein turned on his flashers to initiate a traffic stop. As Sallis was turning, and before he came to a stop, Officer Frein saw a bag containing a white, powdery substance—later identified as 24.23 grams of cocaine salt—being thrown from the passenger-side window. According to Officer Frein, "It's very common when that happens to be either in the middle of a turn or while completing a turn."
While Officer Frein pulled over Sallis, Officer Hundley retrieved the jettisoned bag containing cocaine. He then joined Officer Frein at the traffic stop.
Officer Frein had Sallis get out of the Kia, handcuffed him, and read him his Miranda rights. Officer Frein asked Sallis if he had a license, and he said he didn't have one. Officer Frein located $1,020 in cash on Sallis's person in the form of ten one-hundred-dollar bills and one twenty-dollar bill. Officer Frein also spotted a half-empty bottle of Remy Martin—an alcoholic beverage—in the passenger seat. He further detected an odor of an alcoholic beverage on Sallis's breath and noted that "Mr. Sallis had bloodshot, watery eyes."
Sallis was arrested. On June 6, a five-count trial information was filed in the Black Hawk County District Court charging Sallis with enhanced possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, a class "C" felony; failure to affix a drug stamp, a class "D" felony; unlawful possession of a prescription, a serious misdemeanor; driving while barred, an aggravated misdemeanor; and operating while intoxicated, a serious misdemeanor. Sallis applied for court-appointed counsel. Attorney Ted Fisher from the public defender's office was appointed. Sallis pleaded not guilty and subsequently waived speedy trial.
B. Pretrial Proceedings. Approximately six months later, on December 19, 2016, Robert Montgomery of the Parrish Law Firm filed a limited appearance on behalf of Sallis. Montgomery limited his representation to "[p]retrial proceedings including discovery/discovery depositions, and any and all motions or applications relating thereto and/or arising therefrom, and motions to continue trial and continue pretrial." The scope was not to include "pretrial conference, trial-related motions in limine, or trial, particularly since [Montgomery] is unavailable at times currently scheduled for pretrial and trial."
Montgomery also filed motions for depositions; for the appointment of an investigator at state expense; and to extend the timelines for discovery, pretrial, and trial. The district court denied these motions because the public defender's office had an existing allowance for funding depositions, the office already had an in-house investigator which eliminated the need for an additional investigator, and Montgomery's limited appearance provided that he would not participate in either pretrial conferences or trial. Montgomery also filed a motion to suppress on Sallis's behalf.
On February 8, 2017, Fisher filed his first motion to withdraw, citing Montgomery's involvement in the case. A hearing was held on the motion, at which the State expressed concern about Fisher's potential withdrawal. The prosecutor pointed out that if Fisher were relieved from the case and Montgomery's appearance remained limited in scope, then defendant Sallis could be without counsel by the date of trial. In that event, "someone will have to be reappointed and get back up to speed on this case," which could potentially cause delays and difficulties in the proceedings.
Following the hearing, the district court ordered Montgomery to withdraw his limited appearance and to enter a general appearance by March 3 if he wished to continue in the case; otherwise, Fisher would remain Sallis's counsel.
Montgomery did not enter a general appearance. Instead, Fisher remained Sallis's counsel. On June 26, Fisher handled the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. At the hearing, Officer Frein testified, and his dashcam video and Officer Hundley's bodycam video were received into evidence.
On June 30, Fisher asked again to withdraw from the case, citing an "irreparable breakdown" in the attorney–client relationship.2 During the hearing on this second motion to withdraw, Fisher told the district court that Sallis had sent him "an e-mail requesting some very specific legal things, [from] which it was pretty clear ... that was driven by Mr. Montgomery." In addition, Fisher stated that he and Montgomery were "not on the same page" as to strategy and did not "see eye-to-eye" on the legal issues. In one instance, according to Fisher, Montgomery had requested specific actions from Fisher, threatening that if Fisher did not comply with the request, then Montgomery would engage in steps consistent with the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. Fisher added, "In [fifteen] years, I haven't experienced this type of situation, Judge, and I don't believe I can effectively continue to represent Mr. Sallis because of this breakdown for which ... Montgomery is in the mix ...."
After hearing from the interested parties, the district court granted Fisher's second motion to withdraw and appointed contract attorney Donna Smith to represent Sallis. On November 11, Smith filed a written "closing argument brief" on the still-pending motion to suppress. One month later, on December 11, the district court entered an order denying the motion to suppress. The court reasoned that the traffic stop could be sustained on two independent grounds:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Rapenske
...Because he challenges the denial of his suppression motion on constitutional grounds, our review is de novo. See State v. Sallis, 981 N.W.2d 336, 344 (Iowa 2022). If a law enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion that a criminal act has occurred or is occurring, the officer is permitted......
-
State v. Davila
...knowledge about a driver's license being barred was too stale to provide reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. State v. Sallis, 981 N.W.2d 336, 338 (Iowa 2022). There, the officer last checked the defendant's status two to six months before the stop and found his license barred. Id. at 3......