State v. Samalia
| Decision Date | 08 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | 31611-4-III |
| Parties | STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. ADRIAN SUTLEJ SAMALIA, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Adrian Samalia appeals his conviction for first degree robbery arguing that the evidence was insufficient and that several errors deprived him of a fair trial. Concluding the evidence was sufficient, and the trial court properly dealt with the other issues, we affirm.
This case has its genesis in the theft of packages from a United Parcel Service (UPS) truck parked in an alley in Yakima on December 9, 2011. A delivery driver left the door to the storage area of his truck open while he went inside a business to pick up some packages. When the driver returned he saw two males inside the truck; each ran off with a package when they heard him speak out.
The men fled down the alley with the driver and the business owner in pursuit. The second man dropped his package and pulled out a gun. He pointed it at the business owner and both pursuers stopped. The two men got into a vehicle and left. The business owner reported the license plate of the vehicle.
Officer Tarin Miller located and stopped the vehicle. A passenger in the backseat fled; the officer pursued until the suspect discarded a gun. The officer then secured the weapon and called in the fleeing suspect's direction to other responding officers. A dog tracked the suspect to a carport where the police arrested Mr. Samalia. While Officer Miller pursued Samalia, the car fled. Police located it later that night. A search of the vehicle revealed Mr. Samalia's identification card in the back seat.
Mr Samalia was charged with first degree robbery as both a principal and as an accomplice.[1] Also charged with first degree robbery were Travis Cliett and Stacey Melton. Mr. Cliett was identified as the first robber who got away with the package while Ms. Melton, the owner of the vehicle used in the escape, was accused of being the get-away driver. Mr. Cliett's case was tried separately.[2] In exchange for her agreement to testify, Ms. Melton was allowed to plead guilty to a gross misdemeanor offense of rendering criminal assistance. The prosecutor would recommend that she be sentenced to the 22 days she had already served in custody.
The matter proceeded to jury trial in the Yakima County Courthouse, a building that generally closes at 4:00 p.m. Mr. Samalia's trial ran later than 4:00 p.m. on at least three occasions. On those days, the court had security keep the doors to the courthouse unlocked. However, the sign by the front door and the court's website both still indicated the court closed at 4:00 p.m.
Issues in this appeal arise from the trial testimony of two of the witnesses. Officer Chris Taylor testified that he searched the Melton vehicle at the police garage and found Mr. Samalia's identification card in a wallet in the back seat. Defense counsel cross-examined Officer Taylor at length on the fact that he had not observed the vehicle prior to the search. Counsel then got the officer to admit that he "assumed" Mr. Samalia had left the identification in the car. A series of questions ensued which confirmed that the officer did not know when the wallet had been placed in the car. Counsel then asked the officer if he only assumed that Mr. Samalia left the wallet in the car because it advanced the State's case. The court sustained the prosecutor's objection to the question. Counsel then asked why the officer would assume it. The officer answered:
Because another officer stopped that car. Saw Mr. Samalia run from it. He was detained shortly thereafter in a very immediate proximity to where the car was. Based on my training experience I know these officers aren't lying.
3 Tr. of Proceedings (TP) at 333.
Defense counsel objected to the answer and the court struck the final sentence. TP at 334. However, unchastened by the experience, counsel then confirmed that the officer was familiar with the rules about testifying before stating "you're willing to break those rules if you think it will help get a conviction." TP at 334. The court sustained an objection and counsel ended his cross-examination.
Ms. Melton later testified to her involvement in the day's activities. She stated that Cliett and Samalia had run to her car. Cliett carried a package and Samalia sat in the back seat. Samilia fled when the officer stopped the vehicle. Defense counsel began his cross-examination by getting Ms. Melton to admit that she initially had lied to the police concerning her car and being with Mr. Samalia that day. Counsel had her confirm that she originally had been charged with first degree robbery and asked her what the penalties were for that crime. TP at 393. An objection was raised and the jury was excused.
During the ensuing argument, defense counsel insisted that he was permitted to question the witness concerning the fact that the robbery charge carried a maximum sentence of life in prison. The court believed it would be prejudicial for the jury to know that fact. The court indicated that counsel could examine the witness about how she faced substantially less punishment for the rendering offense. Counsel then got Ms. Melton to agree that her expected punishment was much less significant than the robbery punishment would have been, "almost infinitesimal by comparison." TP at 433. She also agreed that she received an "incredible benefit" for her testimony. TP at 434. She told jurors that the new charge was a gross misdemeanor offense and that she would only receive the "twenty-something" days she had already served. TP at 437.
The court instructed the jury on accomplice liability. The court rejected two defense instructional requests that would have amended the "intent" and "use of force" instructions. The defense argued the case to the jury that the State had not shown that a robbery occurred or that his client was involved. Nonetheless, the jury found Mr. Samalia guilty of first degree robbery.
Immediately after the verdict was read, the defense sought a new trial on the basis of Officer Taylor's testimony and the prosecutor's use in closing argument of one PowerPoint slide stating that the defendant was "GUILTY." The court denied the motion, reasoning that its actions in striking the challenged testimony was sufficient and that the slide did not amount to misconduct.
The court ultimately imposed a standard range sentence. Mr. Samalia timely appealed to this court.
Mr Samalia raises six challenges. We first consider his evidentiary sufficiency challenge. We then address whether the jury was instructed properly, whether cross-examination of Ms. Melton was unduly restricted, whether the court erred in denying the motion for a new trial, and whether the courtroom was erroneously closed to the public. In light of our conclusion that there were not multiple errors, we do not address the cumulative error claim.
Mr Samalia argues that there was insufficient evidence of robbery for two reasons-he had already dropped his package before pulling out the gun and there was no evidence that he knew Cliett had retained his package. Properly viewed, the evidence did support the jury's determination.
Well settled standards govern our review of this issue. Evidence is sufficient to support a verdict if the trier of fact has a factual basis for finding each element of the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221-222, 616 P.2d 628 (1980). The reviewing court will consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. Green, 94 Wn.2d at 221.
"A person commits robbery when he or she unlawfully takes personal property from the person of another or in his or her presence against his or her will by the use or threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear of injury to that person or his or her property or the person or property of anyone." RCW 9A.56.190. This statute reflects a transactional view of the crime rather than the former common law standard that force used during a robbery needed to be contemporaneous with the taking. State v. Handburgh, 119 Wn.2d 284, 830 P.2d 641 (1992). Under the transactional view, a taking can occur outside the presence of the victim, and the necessary force to constitute robbery can be found in the forceful retention of stolen property that was peaceably taken. Id. Washington's robbery statute simply requires that the force be used either to obtain or retain property, or to overcome resistance to the taking. State v. Johnson, 155 Wn.2d 609, 611, 121 P.3d 91 (2005).
To convict Mr. Samalia on a theory of accomplice liability, the State had to prove that (1) "With knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime" he (2) "Aids . . . such other person in planning or committing it." RCW 9A.08.020. The knowledge requirement is general knowledge of the crime: '"Specific knowledge of the elements of the coparticipant's crime need not be proved to convict one as an accomplice.'" State v. Roberts, 142 Wn.2d 471, 512, 14 P.3d 713 (2000) (quoting State v. Rice, 102 Wn.2d 120, 125, 683 P.2d 199 (1984)). Because of this, the person must be generally aware of the type of crime charged, but not necessarily the degree of it. In re Pers. Restraint of Sarausad, 109 Wn.App. 824, 836, 39 P.3d 308 (2001). Where the elements of a crime are split between accomplices, all of the participants are guilty of the crime. See State v. Haack, 88 Wn.App. 423, 427-428, 958 P.2d 1001 (1997).
Mr Samalia first argues that because he abandoned his purloined property before pulling a weapon, he was not guilty of robbery...
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