State v. Samantha C. (In re Interest Samantha C.)
| Citation | 843 N.W.2d 665,287 Neb. 644 |
| Decision Date | 07 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. S–13–533,S–13–533 |
| Parties | In re Interest of Samantha C., a child under 18 years of age. State of Nebraska, appellee, v. Samantha C., appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Nebraska |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from the County Court for Dodge County: Kenneth Vampola, Judge. Affirmed.
Shane J. Placek, of Sidner Law, for appellant.
Sara VanBrandwijk, Deputy Dodge County Attorney, for appellee.
1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juvenile court's findings.
2. Statutes. The meaning of a statute is a question of law.
3. Juvenile Courts: Parental Rights. The foremost purpose and objective of the Nebraska Juvenile Code is the protection of a juvenile's best interests, with preservation of the juvenile's familial relationship with his or her parents where the continuation of such parental relationship is proper under the law. The goal of juvenile proceedings is not to punish parents, but to protect children and promote their best interests.
4. Juvenile Courts: Minors. The Nebraska Juvenile Code must be construed to assure the rights of all juveniles to care and protection.
5. Legislature: Intent. The intent of the Legislature is expressed by omission as well as by inclusion.
Samantha C. appeals from a juvenile court order adjudicating her as being “habitually truant from ... school.” 1 She primarily argues that the State was required to first prove her school's compliance with the remedial measures set forth in a compulsory education statute.2 Because (1) the Nebraska Juvenile Code and the compulsory education statutes are separate statutory enactments with distinct purposes and goals and (2) the State met its burden of proving that Samantha was habitually truant from school, we affirm the court's order.
By filing a petition with the county court for Dodge County, Nebraska, sitting as a juvenile court, the State invoked the court's “exclusive original jurisdiction” 3 of Samantha. The State's petition alleged that Samantha was a juvenile as defined by § 43–247(3)(b) for being habitually truant from school. The petition, filed on March 11, 2013, specifically alleged that as of February 28 of the 2012–13 school year, Samantha had missed 48.14 days of school.
At the juvenile court's hearing on the State's petition, the guidance director for Samantha's school explained the circumstances of a referral she made to the county attorney regarding Samantha's school attendance. She testified that she made the referral on February 28, 2013. As of that date, Samantha had accumulated 48.14 days of absences from school. According to the guidance director, absences were classified as excused if the school received a doctor's note. If no doctor's note was provided, the absence was unexcused. She testified that 27 days of Samantha's absences were unexcused for that reason.
The guidance director revealed that she first became concerned regarding Samantha's attendance in September 2012. She testified that the school sent Samantha's parents several letters informing them of her current number of absences and warning them that the school was required to address excessive absences and make a report to the proper authorities. The letters advised Samantha and her parents that state law provides that “students cannot miss more than 5 days per quarter or 20 days in a school year for any reason.” They further explained that absences caused by serious illness qualified as “excused” absences and requested that Samantha's parents provide the school with doctors' notes for her absences.
The record shows that five of these letters were sent to Samantha's parents. The first was sent on September 19, 2012, when Samantha had missed 9 days of school. Others followed on November 13, when she had missed 16.429 days; on January7, 2013, when she had missed 27.571 days; on January 11, when she had missed 31.5 days; and on February 12, when she had missed 43.142 days.
The record also shows that the county attorney's office sent a letter to Samantha's parents on January 18, 2013, warning them that it would consider filing a petition in juvenile court and charges against them if there was not a significant improvement in Samantha's attendance.
The guidance director explained that the school had requested Samantha's medical records in order to determine that her absences were not excused by serious illness. The school received records covering Samantha's medical visits from March 22, 2012, to January 23, 2013. The medical records detail instances of sickness characterized by cough, sore throat, vomiting, or fever, and chronic abdominal pain. However, according to the guidance director, two statements in the medical records showed that Samantha's absences were not excused by serious illness. The February 12, 2013, medical summary contained the statement, “Get her back to school as soon as possible.” The February 25 summary stated, “School tomorrow.”
Samantha's attorney questioned the guidance director regarding the school's definition of truancy. The director testified that the school defined truancy as “skipping school or not being in school for a reason.” She also explained that if a parent or guardian grants a child permission to miss school, the school does not consider the child to be truant. She further admitted that it appeared Samantha's parents had consented to her absences from school.
The guidance director also acknowledged that to her knowledge, no meeting between the school attendance officer, school social worker, or the school principal and Samantha's parents had ever taken place to discuss an attendance plan. She further stated that she was unaware if any of the other measures the school had in place for chronically ill children, such as providing a home tutor or arranging for parents to pick up homework, had been offered to Samantha. She also admitted that she did not know if an educational evaluation had been performed for Samantha during 2012 and that she was unaware if Samantha had ever seen the school psychologist.
Based upon the guidance director's testimony, Samantha argued that the juvenile court could not adjudicate her under § 43–247(3)(b), because the school had failed to provide her with the services outlined in § 79–209 to address excessive absenteeism. Section 79–209(2) requires school districts to develop a written policy on excessive absenteeism stating “the number of absences or the hourly equivalent upon the occurrence of which the school shall render all services in its power to compel such child to attend some public, private, denominational, or parochial school.” Section 79–209(2) further provides that such services shall include one or more meetings between school officials and the child's parent or guardian to report and solve excessive absenteeism, educational counseling to address possible curriculum changes, educational evaluation to diagnose and treat any conditions contributing to excessive absenteeism, and investigation by the school social worker. Thus, because the State did not present any evidence that the school had provided her with these services before making the attendance referral, Samantha argued that the State did not meet its burden of proof and could not adjudicate her under § 43–247(3)(b).
The juvenile court entered an order finding that Samantha was a juvenile as defined by § 43–247(3)(b) for being habituallytruant from school. The court found that as of February 28, 2013, Samantha had been truant with 27 unexcused absences from school. The court also rejected Samantha's argument that in order to adjudicate her under § 43–247(3)(b), the State was first required to prove her school's compliance with the compulsory education statutes. The court opined that the compulsory education statutes and the juvenile code are neither mutually inclusive nor mutually exclusive. Relying upon § 79–209(4), which states that “[n]othing in this section shall preclude a county attorney from being involved at any stage in the process to address excessive absenteeism,” the court found that the school's failure to comply with the compulsory education statutes did not preclude the county attorney from proceeding in juvenile court.
Samantha timely appealed the juvenile court's order. We moved the case to our docket pursuant to statutory authority.4
Samantha assigns that the juvenile court erred in (1) determining that the State proved the allegations of the petition “by a preponderance of the evidence” and (2) concluding that Samantha's school and the State were not required to “attempt remedial measures specifically outlined under [§] 79–209 prior to pursuing court intervention.”
An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juvenile court's findings. 5
The meaning of a statute is a question of law.6
At oral argument, Samantha's counsel conceded that the correct burden of proof was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The State's counsel agreed, and so do we. This is clear both in statute 7 and in case law.8 And the juvenile court made the requisite finding using the correct standard. With that understanding, we turn to Samantha's specific arguments.
Samantha argues that she was not truant under her school's definition of truancy. We do not have the school's written policy in our record. Samantha relies on the guidance director's testimony that if a parent or guardian granted a child permission to miss school, the school did not consider the child to be truant. Samantha also asserts that the school's policy regarding unexcused absences was unclear. While we agree that Samantha's parents apparently consented to her absences, we reject her...
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