State v. Samora

• Decision Date: 12 August 2013
• Docket Number: No. 32,597.,32,597.
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Michael Anthony SAMORA, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

307 P.3d 328

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Michael Anthony SAMORA, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 32,597.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Aug. 12, 2013.

Robert E. Tangora, L.L.C., Robert E. Tangora, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Yvonne Marie Chicoine, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

OPINION

DANIELS, Justice.

{1} Defendant Michael Samora was convicted of first-degree murder and other crimes for the bludgeoning death of his girlfriend and a subsequent robbery and stabbing at an Albuquerque convenience store. One of Defendant's primary issues in his direct appeal to this Court is whether his convictions should be reversed as a result of the district court's excusal of a Spanish-speaking prospective juror who had difficulty understanding the English language. While we agree with Defendant's argument, made for the first time on appeal, that the juror's dismissal violated Article VII, Section 3 of the New Mexico Constitution, we hold that the unpreserved error was not the kind of fundamental error that requires reversal of a conviction without a party's raising the issue in the trial court. We also hold that Defendant's remaining challenges are without merit. Accordingly, while we affirm Defendant's convictions, we stress to trial judges and lawyers that they have a shared responsibility to make every reasonable effort to protect the right of our non-English-speaking citizens to serve on New Mexico juries.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

{2} Defendant's appeal is based primarily on the dismissal of Mr. Rojelio Haros from Defendant's jury pool. During voir dire, the district court noted that Mr. Haros had written in his jury questionnaire that he did not “understand English [well] enough to write in English” and asked him if he understood English well enough to proceed with jury selection without the aid of an interpreter, stating that the interpreter that had been requested by the court mistakenly ended up in another courtroom. When Mr. Haros stated that he had been able to follow the discussions to that point, the court promised to provide an interpreter should Mr. Haros be selected as a juror.

{3} At the conclusion of voir dire, when the court asked Mr. Haros if he had been able to follow the voir dire exchanges, Mr. Haros admitted that there was a large part of it that he had not understood. When the court proposed to excuse Mr. Haros for cause, defense counsel objected, not because the inability to understand English could not provide a lawful basis for dismissal but on the theory that Mr. Haros understood English well enough to serve without an interpreter during voir dire. The State argued that Mr. Haros should be removed. The court ultimately dismissed Mr. Haros, concluding that Mr. Haros had been unable to participate in voir dire in a meaningful way.

{4} On appeal, Defendant argues that his conviction should be reversed because Mr. Haros's dismissal violated Article VII, Section 3 of the New Mexico Constitution, which resulted in a denial of Defendant's constitutional right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury. Defendant also argues that his conviction should be reversed based on violations caused by (1) the late disclosure of DNA evidence, (2) being denied an expert witness, (3) inappropriate testimony by a witness, (4) ineffective assistance of counsel, (5) trial delays, and (6) cumulative error. Because Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment, this Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear his direct appeal. See N.M. Const. art. VI, § 2 (“Appeals from a judgment of the district court imposing a sentence of death or life imprisonment shall be taken directly to the supreme court.”); accordRule 12–102(A)(1) NMRA.

II. DISCUSSIONA. Excusal of a Juror for Inability to Understand English Was Error but Not Fundamental Error Requiring Reversal in the Absence of Preservation

{5} Article VII, Section 3 of the New Mexico Constitution guarantees that “[t]he right of any citizen of the state to ... sit upon juries, shall never be restricted, abridged or impaired on account of ... [the] inability to speak, read or write the English or Spanish languages except as may be otherwise provided in this constitution.” While we agree that Mr. Haros's dismissal in the circumstances before us violated that constitutional provision, the unpreserved error does not warrant reversal of Defendant's conviction under the fundamental error standard.

1. Mr. Haros's Dismissal Violated Article VII, Section 3 of the New Mexico Constitution

{6} We begin our analysis by examining whether the dismissal of Mr. Haros violated the New Mexico Constitution. We review constitutional claims de novo. See State v. Pacheco, 2007–NMSC–009, ¶ 12, 141 N.M. 340, 155 P.3d 745 (reviewing de novo the two interrelated constitutional rights of a non-English-speaking citizen to serve on a jury and a defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury).

{7} This Court has recognized more than once that Article VII, Section 3 unambiguously protects the rights of non-English speakers to serve on our state juries. See State v. Rico, 2002–NMSC–022, ¶ 5, 132 N.M. 570, 52 P.3d 942;see also Pacheco, 2007–NMSC–009, ¶ 13, 141 N.M. 340, 155 P.3d 745 (interpreting Article VII, Section 3 as applying to jury deliberations as well as to trials). This unique right has been a part of our judicial history since our territorial days. See Territory v. Romine, 1881–NMSC–010, ¶¶ 11, 14, 2 N.M. 114 (addressing an 1859 statute that lacked any language requirement for jury service and noting that “[a]part from the impracticability of obtaining English-speaking juries, it would have been manifestly unjust to the great majority of the people of the territory, had such a requirement as to language been made”). Today, the right is enshrined in our state Constitution as one of the few provisions that can be amended only by a supermajority of both legislators and voters. See N.M. Const., art. XIX, § 1 (“No amendment shall restrict the rights created by Section[ ] ... Three of Article VII ... unless it be proposed by vote of three-fourths of the members elected to each house and be ratified by a vote of the people of this state in an election at which at least three-fourths of the electors voting on the amendment vote in favor of that amendment.”).

{8} In order to protect the rights guaranteed by Article VII, Section 3, we have emphasized that New Mexico courts are required to “make every reasonable effort to accommodate a potential juror for whom language difficulties present a barrier to participation in court proceedings.” Rico, 2002–NMSC–022, ¶ 11, 132 N.M. 570, 52 P.3d 942 (emphasis added). In explaining what we meant by “every reasonable effort,” we cautioned that “inconvenience alone will not suffice; a trial court shall not excuse a juror on the basis of an ‘inability to speak, read or write the English or Spanish languages' absent a showing that accommodating that juror will create a substantial burden.” Id. ¶ 12 (quoting N.M. Const. art. VII, § 3). And we went further to provide examples of the factors that may be relevant to the reasonable efforts standard:

What constitutes sufficiently reasonable efforts will depend on the circumstances in which the problem arises. Whether a reviewing court will find a trial court's efforts in this regard reasonable will depend on several factors, including, but not limited to, the steps actually taken to protect the juror's rights, the rarity of the juror's native language and the difficulty that rarity has created in finding an interpreter, the stage of the jury selection process at which it was discovered that an interpreter will be required, and the burden a continuance would have imposed on the court, the remainder of the jury panel, and the parties.

Id.

{9} In Rico, this Court vacated the judgments of two defendants because the district courts failed to provide Navajo interpreters for prospective jurors, even though the nearest interpreter was two and a half hours away. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. In determining that the efforts by the district courts were insufficient, we explained that when a trial court becomes aware of a language problem, the court

should first take steps to determine whether the difficulty will prevent the juror from following the proceedings. Then, the trial court must take steps to ensure the availability of a suitable interpreter, if an interpreter is needed. If an interpreter is needed and not available, the court is under a constitutional obligation to continue the trial for a reasonable time if the continuance will be effective in securing an interpreter.

Id. ¶ 16.

{10} Here, unlike in Rico, Defendant's trial took place in the Second Judicial District Court, the most populous district in our state, where a Spanish interpreter should have been readily available. At a minimum, voir dire should have been continued until the misdirected interpreter was brought to the correct court or a replacement interpreter secured. Seeid. ¶ 15 (noting that when “the language for which an interpreter is needed is one commonly spoken in the jurisdiction, particularly when it is one in which interpreters are specially trained, and no interpreter is available on the first scheduled day of the trial, the trial should be continued for a reasonable time in order to secure an interpreter”).

{11} The record before us does not document what, if any, efforts the court made to secure an interpreter. Merely stating that an interpreter was requested but unavailable provides an appellate court little insight into what the judge may or may not have done to remedy the situation. See id. (explaining that the duration of a continuance appropriate to satisfy the every reasonable effort standard depends on the totality of the circumstances).

{12} Because the record reflects that after determining that Mr. Haros did not understand all of the voir dire exchanges, the district court made no further...