State v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 19 April 2021
• Docket Number: No. A-1-CA-38089,A-1-CA-38089
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sandi TAYLOR and Mary Taylor, Defendants-Appellants.

493 P.3d 463

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Sandi TAYLOR and Mary Taylor, Defendants-Appellants.

No. A-1-CA-38089

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Filing Date: April 19, 2021

Certiorari Granted, June 28, 2021, S-1-SC-38818

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM for Appellee

Harmon, Barnett & Morris, P.C., Tye C. Harmon Clovis, NM, Wray Law P.C. Katherine Wray Albuquerque, NM for Appellants

BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Judge

B. ZAMORA, Judge.

{1} Defendants Mary Taylor and Sandi Taylor appeal their convictions for one count of reckless child abuse resulting in great bodily harm, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-6-1(E) (2009), and one count of reckless child abuse resulting in death, contrary to Section 30-6-1(F). On appeal, Defendants contend (1) there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions; (2) the district court erred in denying Defendants' requested jury instructions; (3) the district court abused its discretion in its evidentiary rulings at trial; (4) the alleged evidentiary issues at trial resulted in cumulative error; and (5) their convictions violated their right to be free from double jeopardy. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} Defendants owned Taylor Tots, a daycare they operated from their home in Portales, New Mexico. On July 25, 2017, Defendants had twelve children under their supervision, the two youngest being one-year-olds M.J. and A.L. (collectively, Victims). Defendants drove the group of children in two separate sport utility vehicles (SUVs) to a local park. During the return trip from the park, prior to 1:00 p.m., one of the children defecated, prompting Defendant Sandi to rush into the home to change the child's diaper. Ten of the twelve children exited the SUVs. However, Defendants failed to remove Victims from the SUV, and both remained buckled in their car seats. For over two hours and forty minutes, Defendants left Victims in their car seats while the temperature outside reached 91° F.

{3} Defendant Sandi returned to the SUV shortly after 3:00 p.m. and discovered Victims still strapped into their car seats. Defendant Sandi observed that Victims were both blue in the face, and M.J. was unresponsive. Defendant Sandi called 911. Portales Police Department Officer Amador Lujan and paramedics arrived at the scene. M.J. died of a heat stroke, and A.L. suffered life-threatening injuries.

{4} Defendants were arrested, and a grand jury indicted each Defendant on one count of reckless child abuse resulting in great bodily harm for A.L., and one count of reckless child abuse resulting in death for M.J. At trial, the State's theory was that Defendants' conduct on July 25, 2017, demonstrated a reckless disregard for the safety and health of Victims, which resulted in death and severe injuries. To demonstrate the harm allegedly caused by Defendants' conduct, the State presented medical testimony that M.J.'s death and A.L.'s injuries resulted from being left inside the hot SUV. Furthermore, the State presented testimony from the Children, Youth & Families Department (CYFD) and compliance reports showing Defendants were in violation of numerous CYFD safety policies on the day in question. In contrast, Defendants argued that M.J.'s death and A.L.'s injuries resulted from an "accident" rather than from a "reckless disregard" for Victims' safety. The jury convicted Defendants on all counts. Defendants appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. Reckless Child Abuse

{5} This case requires us to determine whether a defendant who acts recklessly can still be convicted of child abuse even where the defendant is unaware that he or she committed an act or omission (i.e., forgetting and leaving a child unattended in a vehicle). Defendants argue that there is insufficient evidence to support their convictions for reckless child abuse because (1) they did not know they left Victims unattended in the SUV and therefore, they did not knowingly act or fail to act, and (2) the State failed to show Defendants acted with a reckless disregard for the safety of Victims. The State disagrees and contends that reckless child abuse does not require that a defendant be aware that he or she is acting or failing to act. Rather, the State argues that Defendants' convictions are supported by sufficient evidence because "Defendants knew [Victims] were originally in the [SUV,]" Defendants "created [the] risk by failing to take [Victims] out of the [SUV,]" and Defendants "then disregarded that risk by leaving them there." We agree with the State.

{6} We begin by addressing whether criminal liability under the reckless child abuse statute requires that a defendant have knowledge of his act or failure to act (the actus reus) in addition to a culpable mental state. "A crime generally consists of two elements, a physical, wrongful deed (the ‘actus reus’), and a guilty mind that produces the act (the ‘mens rea’)." State v. Gonzalez , 2005-NMCA-031, ¶ 10, 137 N.M. 107, 107 P.3d 547 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see State v. Padilla , 2008-NMSC-006, ¶ 12, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299 ("Typically, criminal liability is premised upon a defendant's culpable conduct, the actus reus, coupled with a defendant's culpable mental state, the mens rea."); see also State v. Granillo , 2016-NMCA-094, ¶ 9, 384 P.3d 1121 ("Observing that [a] conviction of child abuse cannot be sustained in the absence of sufficient evidence of both the actus reus and the mens rea ." (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)).

{7} According to Defendants, to be culpable, a defendant must be aware that he or she is committing the criminal act or omission. Thus, they contend, it is the "ability to choose whether to commit the act that gives rise to criminal liability." State v. Cole , 2007-NMCA-099, ¶ 10, 142 N.M. 325, 164 P.3d 1024 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).¹ Defendants rely on a series of cases involving intentional acts to support their argument. See State v. Arrendondo , 2012-NMSC-013, ¶ 27, 278 P.3d 517 (affirming a conviction for reckless child abuse when a defendant's act, shooting a firearm into a house with a baby inside, "would allow a reasonable jury to have found that [the defendant] knew or should have known that his conduct created a substantial risk"); State v. Gonzales , 2011-NMCA-081, ¶ 32, 150 N.M. 494, 263 P.3d 271 (reversing a conviction for reckless child abuse when a defendant's act, driving drunk, failed to "endanger[ ] a particular child that was foreseeable at the time of the accident").

{8} We agree that no New Mexico case has evaluated whether a conviction for reckless child abuse can result from an act or omission that occurred without a defendant's knowledge (i.e., the act of forgetting a child in a car). However, because "the plain language of a statute is the primary indicator of legislative intent[,]" we disagree that a defendant must knowingly commit an act or omission to be convicted of reckless child abuse. High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque , 1998-NMSC-050, ¶ 5, 126 N.M. 413, 970 P.2d 599 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see State v. Swick , 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 11, 279 P.3d 747 (holding that the meaning of a criminal statute is defined primarily by the language of the statute itself). As provided by statute, reckless child abuse "consists of a person ... [recklessly] and without justifiable cause, causing or permitting a child to be ... placed in a situation that may endanger the child's life or health ... or ... exposed [the child] to the inclemency of the weather." Section 30-6-1(D)(1), (3). Nowhere in Section 30-6-1(D) does the word "intentional" or "knowingly" appear in describing the acts or omissions necessary to sustain a conviction for reckless child abuse, and we decline to read language into a statute that is not present. See State v. Almeida , 2011-NMCA-050, ¶ 10, 149 N.M. 651, 253 P.3d 941 ("We will not read into a statute language which is not there, especially when it makes sense as it is written." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

{9} Instead, the critical inquiry is whether Defendants' acts and omissions, irrespective of whether they were knowingly committed, caused or permitted "a child to be ... placed in a situation that may endanger the child's life or health ... or ... exposed [the child] to the inclemency of the weather." Section 30-6-1(D)(1), (3). A defendant acts recklessly within the meaning of Section 30-6-1(D) when he or she disregards a "substantial and unjustifiable risk of serious harm to the safety or health of [a child]." UJI 14-622 NMRA (listing elements for reckless child abuse resulting in death); UJI 14-615 NMRA (listing elements for reckless child abuse resulting in great bodily harm). A substantial and unjustifiable risk is one that "any law-abiding person would recognize under similar circumstances and that would cause any law-abiding person to behave differently ... out of concern for the safety or health" of a child. UJI 14-622 ; see State v. Consaul , 2014-NMSC-030, ¶ 37, 332 P.3d 850 (stating that recklessness requires a defendant to "consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk of such a nature and degree that its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe"). "No specific intent to disregard [one's] obligations is involved" in the concept of conscious disregard; "[t]he only ‘intent’ involved is ... purposely engaging in conduct which implies a conscious disregard of [one's] obligations." In re Adoption of Doe , 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 10, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).²

{10} Having rejected the argument that criminal liability under the reckless child abuse statute requires proof that a defendant has knowledge of his or her act, we next address Defendants' contention that the State failed to prove by sufficient evidence that their...