State v. Sampson

Decision Date19 March 1993
Docket NumberNo. 92-1177,92-1177
Citation616 So.2d 93
Parties18 Fla. L. Week. D764 STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Lucy SAMPSON, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Nancy Ryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

James Dickson Crock, Daytona Beach, for appellee.

GOSHORN, Chief Judge.

In this appeal, the State argues that the suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to the arrest of Lucy Sampson was error because, under the totality of the circumstances, the police had probable cause to arrest Sampson. We agree and reverse.

The State charged Sampson with one count of being a principal to a sale of cocaine. 1 Sampson filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to her arrest on the ground that the police had no probable cause to arrest her. At the suppression hearing, Detective Mark Barker of the Holly Hill Police Department related the events surrounding Sampson's arrest. Detective Barker testified that he first learned of Sampson through a confidential informant (CI), who had provided reliable information in previous cases. Detective Barker testified that the CI told him that Larry Kodak, an old friend of the CI, said that Sampson had cocaine to sell.

As a result of this information, Detective Barker went to a position down the street from the CI's house and saw Sampson and Kodak walk to the front door and go inside. Detective Barker then talked to the CI on the telephone and learned that Sampson and Kodak had brought cocaine to sell. Detective Barker told the CI to arrange with Sampson to meet the CI and Detective Barker at a car wash parking lot later that evening to sell cocaine.

As previously arranged, Detective Barker went to the car wash and waited for the CI. Shortly after the CI arrived and parked next to Detective Barker, Sampson drove up with Kodak as the passenger. Kodak got out of the car alone and approached Detective Barker and the CI. Kodak and Detective Barker then began negotiating for the sale of cocaine. When Detective Barker asked about the quality of the cocaine, Kodak went back to the driver's side of the car to talk to Sampson. Detective Barker testified that he could not hear anything they said and that he did not see any cocaine exchanged. However, upon returning, Kodak showed the cocaine to Detective Barker, who then paid Kodak. Detective Barker testified that during the transaction, Kodak indicated that the cocaine belonged to Sampson. Detective Barker also testified that he did not see any money exchanged between Kodak and Sampson.

After the transaction, Detective Barker radioed to other officers to stop the car and to arrest both Kodak and Sampson. About three blocks from the car wash, the police stopped and arrested both occupants. Upon searching Sampson's person, the police found the $160 that Detective Barker had paid Kodak for the cocaine. After the arrest, Sampson made several incriminating statements and then took the police to her home, where she gave them six grams of cocaine that she had in a housecoat pocket.

Kodak also testified at the hearing on Sampson's motion to suppress. Kodak testified that he was painting a room in Sampson's house, when Sampson approached him and asked if he knew anyone who wanted to buy some cocaine that she had for sale. Kodak contacted an old friend about Sampson's cocaine, without knowing that his friend was a CI for the police. Kodak testified that he and Sampson went to the CI's house to sell cocaine and agreed to meet the CI later at the car wash to sell cocaine to a friend of the CI. Kodak further testified that Sampson drove him to the car wash and asked him to conduct the sale. Kodak testified that he approached Detective Barker and they began negotiating. When Detective Barker wanted to see the cocaine, Kodak testified that he went back to the car to get the cocaine from Sampson and that Sampson gave him the cocaine. Kodak also stated that after the transaction was over, Kodak returned to the car and gave the money from the sale to Sampson.

After hearing the testimony, the trial court granted Sampson's motion to suppress finding that Detective Barker did not have independent knowledge of the CI's information and that the trial court could not rely on the officer's testimony concerning the CI's information because the CI did not testify at the hearing. Although the trial court did not discredit the officer's testimony concerning Kodak's statement that the cocaine belonged to Sampson, the trial court ultimately found that Kodak was an unreliable informant, and therefore, Detective Barker could not rely on Kodak's statement alone to justify arresting Sampson. Without the information from the CI and from Kodak, the trial court found that Detective Barker witnessed nothing other than purely innocent activity by Sampson, and thus, the officer did not have probable cause to arrest Sampson. Based on its findings, the trial court suppressed the money, statements, and cocaine obtained pursuant to Sampson's arrest.

We begin our analysis by noting that for purposes of making an arrest without a warrant, an officer needs probable cause to believe that the suspect is committing or has committed a crime. See Sec. 901.15, Fla.Stat. (1989). Probable cause for an arrest does not require the officer to see the suspect actually violating the law or to determine beyond question that the suspect is committing or has committed a crime. See State v. Riehl, 504 So.2d 798 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 513 So.2d 1063 (Fla.1987). Statements by another suspect can provide sufficient probable cause for an arrest in certain circumstances. See State v. Dean, 532 So.2d 712 (Fla. 5th DCA1988), review denied, 542 So.2d 1333 (Fla.1989) (finding that the police had probable cause to arrest an individual whom the police had just seen talking to a...

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4 cases
  • Butler v. State, 92-3090
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • March 15, 1994
    ...drugs on defendant's person and surveilling officer observed defendant "hand passing" something to numerous persons); State v. Sampson, 616 So.2d 93 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (probable cause to arrest where known, reliable CI told police defendant had cocaine for sale, police independently observ......
  • Rock v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • October 26, 2005
    ...when the drugs were produced. The cases relied on by the State, Lima v. State, 458 So.2d 422 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), and State v. Sampson, 616 So.2d 93 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), are distinguishable. In Lima, the defendant was identified as the drug supplier and this occurred after he was detained, n......
  • Espinosa v. State, 95-842
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • March 8, 1996
    ...knowledge, he reasonably believed the suspect had committed the crime. Benefield v. State, 160 So.2d 706 (Fla.1964); State v. Sampson, 616 So.2d 93 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). In the instant case, the officer never provided any testimony concerning exactly what facts and circumstances supported hi......
  • Dodd v. City of North Bay Village, 93-612
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • November 23, 1993
    ...Buchsbaum and John Morrow, Hollywood, for appellee. Before JORGENSON, LEVY and GERSTEN, JJ. PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See State v. Sampson, 616 So.2d 93 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); State v. Joseph, 593 So.2d 594 (Fla. 3d DCA ...

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