State v. Samuel Dickson

Decision Date06 February 1995
Docket Number1994 CA 00152,95-LW-3914
PartiesSTATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee v. SAMUEL DICKSON, Defendant-Appellant Case
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

Criminal Appeal from the Canton Municipal Court, Case No. 93 CRB 03289.

For Plaintiff-Appellee: VIVIANNE WHALEN, Assistant Prosecutor 218 Cleveland Ave., S.W., Canton, OH 44702.

For Defendant-Appellant: BARRY T. WAKSER, Stark County Public Defender Office, 306 Market Avenue, North, Canton, OH 44702.

Hon. W Scott Gwin, P.J., Hon. William B. Hoffman, J., Hon. W. Don Reader, J.

OPINION

HOFFMAN J.

Defendant-appellant, Samuel Dickson, appeals his conviction and sentence on one count of criminal trespass following a jury verdict of guilty. The State of Ohio is plaintiff-appellee.

FACTS

Dale Borntrager is the property manager of Skyline Terrace Apartments, a privately owned apartment complex. Visitor access to Skyline Terrace is monitored by means of a pass policy and is enforced by uniformed private security. The appellant had previously been a tenant at Skyline Terrace. He was evicted in 1992, and advised several times not to return to the Skyline Terrace property.

On October 29, 1993, Mr. Borntrager saw the appellant on the Skyline Terrace property and radioed for security. Michael Womack, head of security, who had seen the appellant on numerous previous occasions, also saw the appellant on the property on October 29, 1993, at which time the appellant ran from the Skyline Terrace property. Security Officer Leverne Darby also saw the appellant on the Skyline Terrace property on October 29, 1993.

The appellant filed a notice of alibi and testified that he was not at Skyline Terrace on October 29, 1993, but rather was at Mary Corbett's house, with whom he was residing and for whom he was caring, the entire day.

Appellant assigns as error the following:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS FOR CRIMINAL TRESPASSING (TR AT 28-30, 38, 41 AS, 75-76).
II. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY DENYING HIM A CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL WHEN A DEFENSE WITNESS FAILED TO APPEAR (TR AT 30-31, 35-36.).

Prior to trial the appellant filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude any and all evidence concerning his prior convictions for criminal trespass. His motion was overruled.

During trial, the trial court admitted into evidence, over the appellant's objection, State's Exhibits One through Four which were certified copies of the appellant's previous convictions for criminal trespass. The complainant in each of those four cases was Mr. Borntrager on behalf of Skyline Terrace Apartments.

Evid.R. 404(B) provides:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. (Emphasis added.)

Appellant argues that evidence of his prior convictions for criminal trespass, though arguably admissible under Evid.R. 404(B), if offered to prove that he had knowledge that he was not privileged to enter onto the Skyline Terrace property, was, nevertheless, improperly admitted in the case sub judice because (1) the appellant was not raising his lack of knowledge as a defense but rather was denying any entry onto the Skyline Terrace property occurred at all and (2) other, less prejudicial evidence of several previous actual communications made to him demonstrating lack of privilege to enter had been established by the testimony of Mr. Borntrager.

Regardless of appellant's defense of alibi and complete denial of any entry onto the Skyline Terrace property, the appellee was required to prove knowledge in its case-in-chief. The fact that evidence other than the previous criminal trespass convictions was available to establish knowledge does not preclude their admissibility under Evid.R. 404(B). As stated by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Smith (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 137:

It is a fundamental principle of criminal law that when an accused pleads not guilty to a charge which contains 'specific intent' as an element of a crime, he places intent squarely at issue and the
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