State v. Sanchez-Sanchez

• Decision Date: 18 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. A14–0584.,A14–0584.
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Julian SANCHEZ–SANCHEZ, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

879 N.W.2d 324

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Julian SANCHEZ–SANCHEZ, Appellant.

No. A14–0584.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 18, 2016.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.

Mary F. Moriarty, Chief Hennepin County Public Defender, Peter W. Gorman, Assistant Hennepin County Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.

OPINION

HUDSON, Justice.

This case presents the issue of whether the Minnesota Rules of Evidence apply in a court trial, which was held in accordance with Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), to determine whether any aggravating sentencing factors exist. Following a straight guilty plea, appellant Julian Sanchez–Sanchez waived his right to have a jury determine whether aggravating factors existed to justify an upward durational departure in his sentence. Instead, Sanchez–Sanchez submitted the Blakely question to the district court. Without objection, the district court failed to apply the rules of evidence during the Blakely court trial. After hearing the testimony of the State's sole witness at trial, the district court found the existence of several aggravating factors and sentenced Sanchez–Sanchez to 240 months in prison, which reflected an upward durational departure from the presumptive sentencing range of 74 to 103 months. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding in part that the rules of evidence do not apply during a Blakely court trial. Based on the language of Minn. R. Evid. 1101 and State v. Rodriguez, 754 N.W.2d 672 (Minn.2008), we conclude that the rules of evidence apply in a Blakely court trial, but that such a conclusion was not previously clear or obvious. We therefore affirm as modified.

I.

In March 2013, the State of Minnesota charged appellant Sanchez–Sanchez with conspiracy to commit a first-degree sale of methamphetamine while a co-conspirator possessed a firearm. See Minn.Stat. §§ 152.021, subd. 1(1), 152.096, subd. 1, 609.101, subd. 3, 609.11 (2014). The charge stemmed from an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of a large interstate methamphetamine trafficking network. The complaint alleged that Sanchez–Sanchez had a leadership role in “La Familia Michoacana,” a Mexican drug cartel that was distributing methamphetamine. Specifically, the State maintained that Sanchez–Sanchez conspired with about 21 other people to sell approximately 17 pounds of methamphetamine.

The complaint detailed Sanchez–Sanchez's involvement in the conspiracy from May 2010 until March 7, 2012. Sanchez–Sanchez, whose primary residence was in California, rented a house in Brooklyn Park, Minnesota that was used as a “stash house” to store and distribute methamphetamine in Minnesota. Sanchez–Sanchez sometimes stayed at the house and co-directed the methamphetamine distribution. The complaint also documented a series of calls between Sanchez–Sanchez and a co-conspirator that showed that Sanchez–Sanchez arranged and directed the co-conspirator's pickup of 9.6 pounds of methamphetamine in California for transport to Minnesota.

The State notified Sanchez–Sanchez that it intended to seek an upward durational sentencing departure based on the presence of three aggravating factors: (1) the offense constituted a “major controlled substance offense,” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.b(5); (2) Sanchez–Sanchez committed the crime as part of a group of three or more people who all actively participated in the crime, Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.b(10); and (3) Sanchez–Sanchez's conduct placed a number of people at risk.

The State offered Sanchez–Sanchez a 172–month sentence in exchange for his guilty plea to the charged offense. Sanchez–Sanchez rejected the offer. Instead, in July 2013, Sanchez–Sanchez entered a straight plea to the charge of conspiracy to commit a first-degree controlled substance crime, meaning he pleaded guilty to the offense but did not enter into any agreement regarding sentencing. See State v. Thompson, 720 N.W.2d 820, 823 (Minn.2006).

At the plea hearing, Sanchez–Sanchez waived his right under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), to have a jury determine whether aggravating factors existed to justify an upward durational departure in his sentence. Sanchez–Sanchez understood that he was still entitled to a Blakely court trial before a judge to determine whether the alleged aggravating factors existed.

Without objection, the district court did not apply the Minnesota Rules of Evidence during Sanchez–Sanchez's Blakely court trial, which allowed the State to present its entire case through a single witness: FBI Special Agent Andrew Mento. Agent Mento was one of the case agents involved in the investigation that resulted in charges against Sanchez–Sanchez and 21 other defendants. During his testimony, Agent Mento recounted how the FBI investigation led to Sanchez–Sanchez. Using wiretaps, the FBI was able to intercept telephone calls between Sanchez–Sanchez and Daniel Samorano, a co-conspirator. The calls were placed while Samorano was in California to pick up drugs to bring back to Minnesota. Agent Mento testified about the calls in detail and explained how they showed that Sanchez–Sanchez orchestrated Samorano's acquisition of a car that was used to transport drugs and cash in a hidden trunk compartment.

According to Agent Mento, law enforcement stopped Samorano in Medford, Minnesota and found approximately 10 pounds of methamphetamine packed in coffee grounds in a hidden compartment in the car that he was driving. Agent Mento testified that, based on what an expert told him, the sophistication of the hidden compartment was consistent with “a large-scale Mexican drug trafficking organization”—“La Familia Michoacana.” Agent Mento estimated that the methamphetamine had a street value of $300,000.

Agent Mento additionally testified to statements made by lower-level, cooperating co-conspirators, which were received without objection. In those statements, co-conspirators identified Sanchez–Sanchez as having a role at the highest levels of the conspiracy. Agent Mento then explained how other evidence, including drug ledgers and bank notes found at the Brooklyn Park home that Sanchez–Sanchez leased, also linked Sanchez–Sanchez to the conspiracy. According to Agent Mento, the total amount of methamphetamine recovered in connection with the investigation was about 16 pounds, which was the equivalent of 36,000 “hits”¹ of methamphetamine.

At the end of the trial, the district court concluded that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt all three of the aggravating sentencing factors. Based on its findings, the district court imposed a 240–month sentence—a greater-than-double upward durational departure from the presumptive sentencing range of 74 to 103 months. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A (showing the sentencing-guidelines grid used to determine a defendant's presumptive sentencing range).

On appeal, Sanchez–Sanchez argued, among other claims, that the district court committed plain error when it failed to apply the rules of evidence during the Blakely court trial, allowing the admission of “hearsay provided by anonymous informants and other arrestees, and related by FBI [A]gent Mento.” According to Sanchez–Sanchez, Agent Mento's testimony regarding the out-of-court statements of the cooperating co-conspirators was inadmissible under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) (explaining the showing required to admit statements made by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy as non-hearsay). Sanchez–Sanchez therefore claimed that, “virtually all of Agent Mento's testimony should have been inadmissible at the sentencing hearing,” and the district court plainly erred by relying on it.

The court of appeals held that the district court did not err by admitting the hearsay testimony. State v. Sanchez–Sanchez, No. A14–0584, 2015 WL 1880196, at *2 (Minn.App. Apr. 27, 2015). In so holding, the court of appeals stated that “[t]he rules of evidence do not apply at a sentencing proceeding without a jury.” Id. Citing to our decision in State v. Rodriguez, 754 N.W.2d 672 (Minn.2008), the court concluded that the rules of evidence apply only to a Blakely jury trial. Sanchez–Sanchez, however, had waived his right to a jury determination, and therefore the court concluded that Rodriguez was inapplicable. Sanchez–Sanchez, 2015 WL 1880196, at *2 n. 1. Having concluded that there was no error, the court of appeals did not consider the remaining prongs of the plain-error test.² We granted review on the issue of whether the rules of evidence apply to a Blakely court trial.³

II.

Minnesota Rule of Evidence 1101 governs the application of the rules of evidence to actions and proceedings in Minnesota. The Rule reads, in relevant part:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (b), these rules apply to all actions and proceedings in the courts of this state.

(b) Rules inapplicable. The rules other than those with respect to privileges do not apply in the following situations:

....

(3) Miscellaneous proceedings. Proceedings for extradition or rendition; probable cause hearings; sentencing, or granting or revoking probation; issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal summonses, and search warrants; and proceedings with respect to release on bail or otherwise.

Minn. R. Evid. 1101 (emphasis added). The question, therefore, is whether a Blakely court trial qualifies as “sentencing” under Minn. R. Evid. 1101(b)(3). We review the interpretation and application of the rules of evidence de novo. See State v. Stone, 784 N.W.2d 367, 370 (Minn.2010) (reviewing de novo whether the district court properly interpreted Minn. R. Evid. 803(5) ); see also State v. Heaney, 689 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Minn.2004) (“The construction of statutes and rules is subject to de novo review.”).

In State v. Rodriguez, 754 N.W.2d 672 (Min...