State v. Sanders, No. 9-597/08-1981 (Iowa App. 10/7/2009)
| Decision Date | 07 October 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 9-597/08-1981,9-597/08-1981 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONNIE LEE SANDERS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Kurt L. Wilke, Judge.
Ronnie Sanders appeals from his conviction and sentence for second-degree sexual abuse.
AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and David Adams, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Elisabeth Reynoldson, Assistant Attorney General, Timothy N. Schott, County Attorney, and Ricki L. Osborn and Corey Kuhn-Coleman, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield, J. and Beeghly, S.J.*
Ronnie Sanders appeals from his conviction and sentence for second-degree sexual abuse in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1 and 709.3 (2007). He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and raises several ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Because we find sufficient evidence supports Sanders's conviction for second-degree sexual abuse and Sanders's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue that section 903B.1 is unconstitutional, we affirm.
Following a jury trial, Sanders was convicted of willful injury causing bodily injury in violation of Iowa Code section 708.4(2) and second-degree sexual abuse in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1 and 709.3. On December 1, 2008, the district court sentenced Sanders to five years in prison for the willful injury conviction and twenty-five years for the sexual abuse conviction, the sentences to run concurrently. His sentence included the special sentencing provisions of Iowa Code section 903B.1.
Sanders appeals and asserts (1) sufficient evidence did not support his conviction for second-degree sexual abuse because the State did not prove he used or threatened to use force creating a substantial risk of death or serious injury and (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the imposition of the section 903B.1 sentence, contending it is unconstitutional. He asserts that Iowa Code chapter 903B violates: (1) the equal protection clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions; (2) the separation of powers doctrine of the Iowa Constitution; (3) the due process clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions; and (4) the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment of the United States Constitution.
Sanders challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction of second-degree sexual abuse. We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4 (2008). "A jury verdict is binding upon this court, and we must uphold the verdict unless the record lacks substantial evidence to support the charge." State v. Arne, 579 N.W.2d 326, 327-28 (Iowa 1998). Substantial evidence is evidence that could convince a rational jury that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bash, 670 N.W.2d 135, 137 (Iowa 2003). The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, including legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record. State v. Taylor, 538 N.W.2d 314, 316 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). We consider all the evidence admitted at trial, not just the evidence that supports the verdict. Id.
In order to prove that Sanders committed second-degree sexual abuse of his accuser (R.S.), the State was required to prove that (1) Sanders performed a sex act with R.S.; (2) Sanders performed the sex act with force or against the will of R.S. or with R.S.'s consent or acquiescence gained by threats or violence; and (3) Sanders used or threatened to use force creating a substantial risk of death or serious injury to R.S. Iowa Code §§ 709.1, 709.3. Sanders does not challenge the first two elements; he argues that the State did not prove he used or threatened to use force creating a substantial risk of death or serious injury.
State v. Hilpipre, 395 N.W.2d 899, 904 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) (quoting State v. Phams, 342 N.W.2d 792, 796 (Iowa 1983)). A substantial risk of serious injury means there was a "real hazard or danger" of serious injury. Taylor, 538 N.W.2d at 316. A serious injury includes a bodily injury that (1) creates a substantial risk of death, (2) causes serious permanent disfigurement, or (3) causes protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. Iowa Code § 702.18 (defining serious injury).
In the present case, Sanders attacked R.S. and choked her until she lost consciousness. She testified that Sanders had his hands around her neck and she "couldn't even breathe even a little bit." She attempted to move so that she could breathe, but Sanders was on top of her pinning her down. She stated "I was afraid I was going to die right there." While unconscious, Sanders took R.S. to a bathroom and removed her clothing, after which she regained consciousness. R.S. pleaded with Sanders not to hurt her because she stated, "I realized what he was capable of doing with him choking me like that." As Sanders penetrated her vagina digitally, she told him to stop numerous times and was crying. Sanders then raped her by forcing her to have oral sex and sexual intercourse.
The emergency room physician who treated R.S. testified that as a result of being choked, R.S. had bruising on her neck and around her eyes, among other injuries. He stated the choking was severe enough to cause the blood vessels around her eyes to rupture and bleed underneath the skin. Further, in order to cause the injuries from choking, he opined a "severe amount of force" was used, which could be life threatening. He explained,
Choking can cause death to the brain cells. Depending on which brain cells die at the time, people can die from choking such as she had received . . . . Choking about the neck stops the blood flow. The flow of blood then backs up through the rest of the blood vessels into the brain and those blood vessels pop and burst causing the bruising that we saw about the eyes. But then it also causes anoxic injury, which is a lack of oxygen. With the lack of oxygen, then brain cells, muscle cells and connective tissue cells die.
An optometrist, who also treated R.S., testified that the injuries to her eyes were caused by asphyxiation, or lack of oxygen to the head caused by the strangulation. Additionally R.S. had hemorrhaging of the conjunctiva, which is the thin layer of clear tissue that covers the white part of the eye, and hemorrhages of the skin area around the eyes. He also testified that as a result of strangulation, there was a risk of retinal hemorrhaging that could result in the loss of vision.
The evidence demonstrated that when Sanders strangled R.S. so that she lost consciousness, he used force which created a substantial risk of serious injury and/or death. Taylor, 538 N.W.2d at 316 (quoting State v. Howard, 284 N.W.2d 201, 202-03 (Iowa 1979)); see, e.g., State v. Sewell, 658 A.2d 598, 600 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) (); State v. Fisher, 680 P.2d 35, 37 (Utah 1984) (). Upon review of the evidence, we find the State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Sanders used or threatened to use force creating a substantial risk of death or serious injury to R.S.
Sanders next raises several ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.1 We review these claims de novo. State v. Martin, 704 N.W.2d 665, 668 (Iowa 2005). To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Sanders must show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984); State v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d 371, 393 (Iowa 2007). While we often preserve ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims for postconviction proceedings, we consider such claims on direct appeal if the record is sufficient. State v. Tate, 710 N.W.2d 237, 240 (Iowa 2006). The record is sufficient to address Sanders's claims.
To prove that counsel breached an essential duty, a defendant must overcome a presumption that counsel was competent and show that counsel's performance was not within the range of normal competency. State v. Buck, 510 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Iowa 1994).
Although counsel is not required to predict changes in the law, counsel must exercise reasonable diligence in deciding whether an issue is worth raising. In accord with these principles, we have held that counsel has no duty to raise an issue that has no merit.
State v. Dudley, 766 N.W.2d 606, 620 (Iowa 2009). To prove that prejudice resulted, a defendant must show there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 143 (Iowa 2001).
Because counsel has no duty to raise a meritless issue, we will first determine whether Sanders's alleged constitutional violations have any validity. See Dudley, 766 N.W.2d at 620. "If his constitutional challenges are meritorious, we will then consider whether reasonably competent counsel would have raised these issues and, if so, whether [Sanders] was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to do so." Id.
Sanders asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for...
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