State v. Sandquist

Decision Date16 July 1920
Docket Number21,747
Citation178 N.W. 883,146 Minn. 322
PartiesSTATE v. E. E. SANDQUIST
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Defendant was indicted by the grand jury of Blue Earth county charged with the crime of carnal knowledge of a female child under 18 years of age, tried in the district court for that county before Comstock, J., and a jury which returned a verdict of guilty as charged in the indictment. From the judgment entered pursuant to the verdict, defendant appealed. Reversed.

SYLLABUS

Rape -- cross-examination of prosecutrix.

1. A defendant, charged with the crime of carnal knowledge of a female under the age of consent, is entitled to much latitude in his cross-examination of the prosecutrix, but she ought not to be compelled to give the details of the act to any greater extent than is reasonably necessary, and it is largely within the discretion of the trial court to place limits upon her cross-examination on that subject.

Trial -- examination of witness by trial judge.

2. It is within the discretion of the trial judge to question a witness, and ordinarily error cannot be predicated upon his doing so. As a rule the examination of a witness should be conducted by counsel and only under exceptional conditions is the judge justified in conducting an extended examination.

Trial -- improper for presiding judge to testify as witness.

3. The presiding judge should not leave the bench and go upon the witness stand to give testimony during the trial of a case before him. Under the circumstances stated in the opinion the substantial rights of the defendant were prejudiced by the trial judge's testimony, and its effect was not removed by the statement made preliminary to the giving thereof or by the charge to the jury.

Regan & Grogan, for appellant.

Clifford L. Hilton, Attorney General, James E. Markham, Assistant Attorney General, and Charles E. Phillips, County Attorney, for respondent.

OPINION

LEES, C.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered upon the conviction of the defendant of the crime of carnal knowledge of a female under the age of 18 years.

Defendant asks for a reversal on several grounds. Only three need be considered: The first, that he was unduly restricted in his cross-examination of the girl; the second, that the court's examination of defendant's witness Lillygren was prejudicial to him; the third, that by calling the clerk of court as a witness and examining him and then leaving the bench and taking the witness stand and testifying as a witness himself, the trial judge committed error prejudicial to defendant's substantial rights.

1. A defendant charged with an offense of this nature is entitled to much latitude in his cross-examination of the prosecutrix, for the accusation is easily made and the effect of her testimony is hard to overcome, State v. Connelly, 57 Minn. 482, 59 N.W. 479; State v. Trocke, 127 Minn. 485, 149 N.W. 944, although as a general rule it is largely within the discretion of the trial court to place limits upon the cross-examination. But the prosecutrix ought not to be compelled to give the details of the act to any greater extent than is reasonably necessary. Questions asked to obtain information, embarrassing to her and not necessary to aid the jury in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant, should not be permitted. We are not prepared to say that the court abused its discretion in limiting the cross-examination as it did, but we do think that defendant was entitled to more latitude than was given him, and, since the judgment must be reversed on other grounds, more should be allowed him when the case is tried again.

2. Lillygren was a life insurance solicitor at Mankato and had previously been a traveling salesman. After the crime is alleged to have been committed he visited the girl and her mother and obtained from each of them an affidavit. In her affidavit, the girl exonerated the defendant and stated that her testimony at the preliminary hearing was not true. Lillygren was called as a witness to testify to what was said and done when he obtained these affidavits. The trial judge then questioned him at some length as to the nature of his business, and finally wound up by asking him this question (referring to his previous occupation):

"Q. That was a talking trade also, was it? A. Yes. Court: That is all. Mr. Regan: Give us an exception to the examination of this witness by the court upon the ground the same is prejudicial to the interest of the defendant."

It is argued that an inference which the jury might draw from the court's questioning of the witness was that Lillygren had employed the arts of a life insurance solicitor and traveling salesman in persuading the girl to sign the affidavit; that he had talked her into it, and that the statements contained in the affidavit should not be credited.

It is within the discretion of the trial judge to question a witness and it is not usual to have exceptions taken to his doing so, and ordinarily a court of review will not scrutinize his conduct in this respect very closely. Wheeler v. Wallace, 53 Mich. 355, 19 N.W. 33. The exercise of this power, if the questions are directed to the vital issues in the case, may be of serious consequence to the defendant in a criminal prosecution. In Dunn v. People, 172 Ill. 582, 50 N.E. 137, it was said, that it is difficult for a presiding judge so to conduct the examination of a witness that nothing in the tone of the voice, the play of the features, the manner of framing or propounding the questions, or the course of the investigation pursued in the examination, will indicate to the jury the trend of the judge's mind. It was also said, that the examination of the witnesses is the more appropriate function of counsel, and that the instances are rare and the conditions exceptional that will justify the judge in conducting an extended examination of a witness. Similar statements are found in Bolte v. Third Ave. R. Co. 38 A.D. 284, 56 N.Y.S. 1038, together with a dissertation upon the part of the trial of a case before him which may properly be taken by the presiding judge.

We discover nothing in the record which required the trial judge to take part in the cross-examination of Lillygren in order to lay before the jury the circumstances under which he procured...

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