State v. Santiago, 34519.

• Citation: 145 Conn.App. 374,74 A.3d 571
• Decision Date: 03 September 2013
• Docket Number: No. 34519.,34519.
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Jaime SANTIAGO.
• Court: Appellate Court of Connecticut

145 Conn.App. 374
74 A.3d 571

STATE of Connecticut
v.
Jaime SANTIAGO.

No. 34519.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 3, 2013.
Decided Sept. 3, 2013.

[74 A.3d 572]

Jaime C. Santiago, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).

Marjorie Allen Dauster, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt, state's attorney, and Maureen Keegan, former senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

DiPENTIMA, C.J., and SHELDON and BISHOP, Js.

DiPENTIMA, C.J.

[145 Conn.App. 375]The defendant, Jaime Santiago, appeals following the trial court's initial denial and later dismissal of his motion to correct illegal sentence. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred in denying his motion to correct because his convictions for assault in the first degree in violation of

[74 A.3d 573]

General Statutes § 53a–59 (a)(3) and risk of injury to a child in [145 Conn.App. 376]violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53–21(1) violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. We are not persuaded.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of the defendant's claim. In affirming the defendant's conviction on his direct appeal, this court concluded that the jury reasonably could have found the following relevant facts. “During the day, while his wife was at work, the defendant stayed at home and cared for his three month old infant son and four year old daughter. On November 30, 1998, the defendant was the sole attendant and caregiver for his two children. At about 1 p.m., the infant fell from the defendant's lap to the floor. When the defendant picked him up, the infant was crying loudly, his arms and body were shaking and his eyes were rolling. When the baby stopped crying, he became unresponsive and the defendant thought that the infant was dead. The defendant then poured water on him and shook him, after which the baby began kicking and coughing.

“Later that afternoon, the defendant's fifteen year old daughter returned home from school and, when she saw the baby, told the defendant that the baby looked sick and that there was something wrong with his eyes. Although the defendant knew how to reach the infant's physician, he did not seek advice or assistance for the infant until about 6 p.m., when he drove with the infant and his younger daughter to Cheshire to pick up his wife. When his wife saw the baby, she told the defendant to drive immediately to the hospital.

“The defendant and his family arrived at Waterbury Hospital at about 7 p.m., where the baby was found to be struggling to breathe, unresponsive, in distress and in need of intensive care. An examination showed evidence of brain swelling, anoxic brain injury and retinal hemorrhaging....

[145 Conn.App. 377]* * *

“The injuries sustained by the baby were consistent with ‘shaken baby syndrome,’ and, in fact, that was [the director of the pediatric intensive care unit's] diagnosis of the cause of the injuries.... After a trial, the jury convicted the defendant of assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a–59 (a)(3) and risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53–21(1).” State v. Santiago, 74 Conn.App. 736, 737–38, 740, 813 A.2d 1068 (2003). The defendant was sentenced to ten years incarceration and ten years special parole on the charge of assault in the first degree. Additionally, the defendant was sentenced to ten years incarceration on the charge of risk of injury to a child. The court ordered that the two sentences be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty years incarceration and ten years special parole.

On February 10, 2012, the defendant filed a motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Practice Book § 43–22, primarily claiming that his consecutive sentences on the two charges of which he was convicted violated his right against double jeopardy under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. The court, Damiani, J., held a hearing on the motion to correct, at the conclusion of which he denied the motion. In denying the defendant's motion to correct, the court reasoned that double jeopardy was not violated because assault in the first degree and risk of injury are separate crimes with different elements and that the state had proved the elements of both crimes at trial. In further support of its denial, the court stated that the sentence conformed to its original sentencing

[74 A.3d 574]

intent, was not ambiguous and did not exceed relevant statutory limits. On March 7, 2012, the court, sua sponte and without explanation, revoked its prior denial of the motion to correct and dismissed the motion on the ground that it did not have subject matter [145 Conn.App. 378]jurisdiction to hear the motion to correct.¹ This appeal followed.

Subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue and, therefore, before addressing the merits of the defendant's claim, we first determine whether the court properly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the defendant's motion to correct. PHH Mortgage Corp. v. Cameron, 130 Conn.App. 238, 241, 22 A.3d 1282 (2011) (“court must dispose of issues concerning subject matter jurisdiction as threshold matter”). “Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law over which our review is plenary.... The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal.... We consider the question of subject matter jurisdiction because, once raised, the question of subject matter jurisdiction must be answered before we can address the other issues raised....

“Jurisdiction involves the power in a court to hear and determine the cause of action presented to it and its source is the constitutional and statutory provisions by which it is created.... It is well established that the jurisdiction of a sentencing court terminates once a defendant has begun serving his sentence.... [T]herefore, that court may no longer take any action [145 Conn.App. 379]affecting a defendant's sentence unless it expressly has been authorized to act.... Practice Book § 43–22, which provides the trial court with such authority, provides that [t]he judicial authority may at any time correct an illegal sentence.... An illegal sentence is essentially one which either exceeds the relevant statutory maximum limits, violates a defendant's right against double jeopardy, is ambiguous, or is internally contradictory.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Delgado, 116 Conn.App. 434, 437–38, 975 A.2d 736 (2009). “[A] challenge to the legality of a sentence focuses not on what transpired during the trial or on the underlying conviction. In order for the court to have jurisdiction over a motion to correct an illegal sentence after the sentence has been executed,...