State v. Smith

• Decision Date: 11 February 2021
• Docket Number: SC 20187
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Jeffrey SMITH
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

338 Conn. 54

256 A.3d 615

STATE of Connecticut

v.Jeffrey SMITH

SC 20187

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 1, 2020

Officially released February 11, 2021^**

Adele V. Patterson, senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Melissa Patterson, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Michael L. Regan, former state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D'Auria, Kahn, Ecker and Vertefeuille, Js.^*

VERTEFEUILLE, J.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a motion to correct an illegal sentence when the defendant, Jeffrey Smith, claimed that the sentencing court improperly failed to follow State v. Polanco , 308 Conn. 242, 255, 61 A.3d 1084 (2013), in which this court exercised its supervisory power to hold that the proper remedy for cumulative convictions that violate the double jeopardy clause is to vacate one of the convictions. In 2005, the defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of felony murder and manslaughter in the first degree, among other crimes. The trial court, Schimelman , J. , merged the conviction for manslaughter with the felony murder conviction and sentenced the defendant to sixty years in prison on the felony murder charge. In 2015, the defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence in which he contended that the sentence was illegal under the Polanco supervisory rule because the court merged the convictions instead of vacating the conviction on the manslaughter charge. The trial court, Strackbein , J. , concluded that, because Polanco was decided pursuant to this court's supervisory authority, it did not apply retroactively. Accordingly, the trial court denied the defendant's motion. The defendant appealed, and the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See State v. Smith , 180 Conn. App. 371, 384, 184 A.3d 831 (2018). We then granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal to this court, limited to the following issue: "Does this court's holding in State v. Polanco , [supra, at 255, 61 A.3d 1084 ], readopting vacatur as a remedy for a cumulative conviction that violates double jeopardy protections, apply retroactively?" State v. Smith , 330 Conn. 908, 193 A.3d 559 (2018).¹ In its brief to this court, the state claims for the first time that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence because the motion sought only to modify the defendant's conviction, not his sentence. We agree with the state's jurisdictional claim, and, accordingly, we conclude that the form of the Appellate Court's judgment affirming the judgment of the trial court was improper. We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and remand the case to that court with direction to remand the case to the trial court with direction to dismiss the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence.

The record reveals the following facts, which were found by the trial court, and procedural history. In 2001, the defendant was charged with capital felony in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-54b (5), murder in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-54a, felony murder in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-54c, two counts of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a) (2) (A) and (B), and robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (1), in connection with the August, 1998 death of James Connor. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the felony murder charge, the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55, both kidnapping counts and the robbery count. The defendant was found not guilty of the charges of capital felony and murder.

Thereafter, the trial court, Schimelman , J ., merged the manslaughter conviction with the felony murder conviction and sentenced the defendant to sixty years in prison on the felony murder conviction. The court also sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years on each kidnapping count and twenty years on the robbery count, all concurrent with each other but consecutive to the felony murder sentence. The total effective sentence was eighty-five years imprisonment.

On August 6, 2015, the defendant, representing himself,² filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22. Thereafter, he filed an amended motion. The defendant claimed, among other things, that the sentencing court had incorrectly merged the convictions of manslaughter and felony murder because, under State v. Polanco , supra, 308 Conn. 242, 61 A.3d 1084, and State v. Miranda , 317 Conn. 741, 120 A.3d 490 (2015), the court should have vacated the manslaughter conviction. Although the precise nature of the defendant's claim was somewhat unclear, he also contended that this sentencing procedure violated his double jeopardy rights. The state contended that, because the holding of this court in State v. Polanco , supra, at 255, 61 A.3d 1084, that vacatur is the proper remedy for a cumulative conviction that violates double jeopardy protections was based on the court's supervisory authority, the holding was not retroactive. The trial court, Strackbein , J. , agreed with the state and, after rejecting the defendant's other claims, denied his motion to correct.³ The defendant, still representing himself, appealed, and the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. Smith , supra, 180 Conn. App. at 373, 384, 184 A.3d 831.

This certified appeal followed. The defendant, now represented by counsel, claims that, although the holding of State v. Polanco , supra, 308 Conn. at 255, 61 A.3d 1084, was decided pursuant to this court's exercise of its supervisory authority, public policy militates in favor of applying the Polanco supervisory rule retroactively to cases that were final before the case was decided. The state contends that, to the contrary, there is no reason to create an exception for this court's holding in Polanco to the general rule that a supervisory rule does not apply to cases in which the judgment was final before the rule was adopted. The state also contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant's motion to correct because the defendant sought only to modify his conviction, not his sentence. Although the state raises this claim for the first time in its brief to this court, it is well established that a jurisdictional claim may be raised at any time. See, e.g., Waterbury v. Washington , 260 Conn. 506, 527, 800 A.2d 1102 (2002). We agree with the state's unpreserved jurisdictional claim and, therefore, conclude that the trial court should have dismissed the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence.

We begin with a review of the legal principles governing motions to correct an illegal sentence. Practice Book § 43-22 provides in relevant part that "[t]he judicial authority may at any time correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition, or it may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner ...." "It is well established that under the common law a trial court has the discretionary power to modify or vacate a criminal judgment [only] before the sentence has been executed. ... This is so because the court loses jurisdiction over the case when the defendant is committed to the custody of the [C]ommissioner of [C]orrection and begins serving the sentence. ... Without a legislative or constitutional grant of continuing jurisdiction ... the trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify its judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Evans , 329 Conn. 770, 778, 189 A.3d 1184 (2018), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1304, 203 L. Ed. 2d 425 (2019).

"Because the judiciary cannot confer jurisdiction on itself through its own rule-making power, [Practice Book] § 43-22 is limited by the common-law rule that a trial court may not modify a sentence if the sentence was valid and its execution has begun. ... Therefore, for the trial court to have jurisdiction to consider the defendant's claim of an illegal sentence, the claim must fall into one of the categories of claims that, under the common law, the court has jurisdiction to review." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 778–79, 189 A.3d 1184.

"[A]n illegal sentence is essentially one [that] ... exceeds the relevant statutory maximum limits, violates a defendant's right against double jeopardy, is ambiguous, or is internally contradictory. ... In accordance with this summary, Connecticut courts have considered four categories of claims pursuant to [Practice Book] § 43-22. The first category has addressed whether the sentence was within the permissible range for the crimes charged. ... The second category has considered violations of the prohibition against double jeopardy. ... The third category has involved claims pertaining to the computation of the length of the sentence and the question of consecutive or concurrent prison time. ... The fourth category has involved questions as to which sentencing statute was applicable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 779, 189 A.3d 1184.

This court has recognized that "a claim is cognizable in a motion to correct an illegal sentence if it is a challenge specifically directed to the punishment imposed, even if relief for that illegal punishment requires the court to in some way modify the underlying convictions, such as for double jeopardy challenges." Id., at 781, 189 A.3d 1184. In support of this proposition, we cited State v. Cator , 256 Conn. 785, 804–805, 781 A.2d 285 (2001). In Cator , "[t]he trial court found the defendant guilty of murder and felony murder and initially sentenced him to a total effective sentence of fifty-five years, suspended after fifty years, with a five year period of probation at the...